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U.S. abortion restrictions diminish access and perpetuate a culture of hostility toward 
abortion seekers. Support for restrictions is high—potentially, because restriction knowledge is 
low and attitudes are complex. The current study focused on knowledge and support of 
restrictions and empathy for abortions seekers among Arkansans. The purpose was to evaluate 
the effectiveness of a video intervention intended to increase awareness of Arkansas abortion 
restrictions and induce empathy for abortion seekers.  
Using a randomized controlled trial with pre-, post-, and follow-up design, a sample of 
Arkansans (N = 369) were randomly assigned to one of five video conditions--either a control or 
an intervention, varying by actor’s race and pregnancy narrative. Data were analyzed across the 
study with repeated-measures analyses of variance, chi-squared analyses, and hierarchical 
regressions. 
Manuscript 1: For knowledge of restrictions, there was a statistically significant 
interaction between the effects of time and video condition. Specifically, post-test scores were 
significantly higher than pre-test and follow-up scores. In terms of support for restrictions, the 
time main effect was significant, but the group main effect was nonsignificant. Manuscript 2: 
chi-squares indicated participants who watched a testimonial where the woman was raped had 
higher empathetic feeling scores. Post-test empathy sum scores were a function of sex, 
experience with abortion and sexual assault, baseline Empathic Concern, and video condition; 
follow-up scores were a function of personal experiences with abortion and sexual assault, sex, 
and Empathic Concern. The testimonial depicting a Black woman who was raped induced the 
most empathy at post-test.  
 
The intervention was effective in increasing awareness and decreasing support for myriad 
Arkansas abortion restrictions. Knowledge scores were significantly higher among those who 
watched a testimonial; this may be because information was repeated or because emotional 
connections made the information more memorable. Support decreased across the study, 
however, the intervention did not have the hypothesized effect on this outcome. Prior personal 
experiences and internalization of abortion stigma can affect empathy induction. People were 
more empathetic for the woman who was raped compared with the consensual narrative. The 
hierarchy of abortion narratives may influence perceptions of abortion seekers.  
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“And yet, women keep trying. They put off the rent or the utilities to scrape together the 
$500 for a first-trimester abortion. They drive across whole states to get to a clinic and 
sleep in their cars because they can’t afford a motel. They do not do this because they are 
careless sluts or because they hate babies or because they fail to see clearly what their 
alternatives are. They see the alternatives all too clearly. We live, as Ellen Willis wrote, 
in a society that is “actively hostile to women’s ambitions for a better life. Under these 
conditions the unwillingly pregnant woman faces a terrifying loss of control over her 
fate.” Abortion, wrote Willis, is an act of self-defense.”  
― Katha Pollitt, Pro: Reclaiming Abortion Rights, p. 8 
 
This study is dedicated to 1) the people who have considered, sought, or had abortions in 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Background  
There are an estimated 6.2 million pregnancies per year in the United States, nearly half 
(45%) of which are unintended (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). Approximately 19% of all 
pregnancies (i.e., intended and unintended) will end in abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a), 
with greater frequency among those who experience unintended pregnancy (i.e., 40%; Finer & 
Zolna, 2016). The rate of abortion in the U.S. is 14.6 per 1000 women of reproductive age 
(Dreweke, 2017) and less than 0.5% of women experience complications from abortion in the 
first trimester (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). Given these data, it is apparent that abortion is a 
common and safe pregnancy outcome. Although abortion has been legal in the U.S. for over 45 
years (with Roe v. Wade in 1973) and is safe and common, it remains a salient and contentious 
public health issue and has spurred myriad legislative restrictions. The following sections will 
discuss general restrictions in the U.S. and then will narrow scope to discuss restrictions in 
Arkansas, a particularly “hostile” state toward abortion. Then I will briefly describe the impact of 
these restrictions in both the U.S. and Arkansas, and offer a theoretical explanation of this 
impact. Finally, I will discuss strategies for intervention aimed at reducing this impact and 
describe the proposed study based on the aforementioned theoretical framework.  
Abortion restrictions. In the last five years, there has been a significant increase in state-
level restrictions. For example, state legislatures passed approximately the same number of 
legislative abortion restrictions from 2011 to 2016 as they had passed in the previous fifteen 
years (Guttmacher Institute, 2016a). In 2016, a total of 50 new legislative restrictions were 
passed at the state-level, resulting in 338 laws restricting abortion in 6 years and comprising 30% 




Guttmacher Institute classifies abortion restrictions enacted across the U.S. into 10 specific 
categories. Examples of these common state restrictions include mandatory waiting periods 
between pre-abortion counseling and abortion provision, restricting insurance coverage, and 
requiring providers to give information (much of which is false or misleading) during pre-
abortion counseling. If a state has four or more of these restrictions, they are considered “hostile” 
to abortion and if they have more than six, they are considered “extremely hostile.” In 2017, 
twenty-two states were considered “extremely hostile” and nearly all were in the Southern region 
of the U.S. (Nash et al., 2017). The number of restrictions in just ten of these states account for 
60% of all new restrictions in the U.S. (Guttmacher, 2016b). Arkansas is among these ten 
extremely hostile Southern states. 
Abortion restrictions in Arkansas. Arkansas is among the top three states with the most 
abortion restrictions (22) passed between 2011 and 2015 (Guttmacher Institute, 2016b). In 
response to the expanding list of proposed restrictions, legal teams from nonprofit organizations 
such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for Reproductive Rights 
filed suit against these hostile states. For example, in 2017, the state of Arkansas passed a 
restriction prohibiting the dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure, a restriction enacted in only 
seven states as of mid-February 2017 (Donovan, 2016). Soon thereafter, the ACLU initiated a 
lawsuit that resulted in a judge blocking the restriction (DeMillo, 2017). Therefore, these new 
restrictions change quickly and often. Despite the consistent challenging of new laws, restrictions 
in eight of the ten major categories are enacted in Arkansas. Consequently, Arkansas’ myriad 
restrictions have resulted in only three facilities in the entire state (Cartwright, Karunaratne, 
Barr-Walker, Johns, & Upadhyay, 2018) able to provide abortion services for approximately 




restrictions are an important part of the reason that 97% of Arkansas counties do not have a 
facility that can offer abortions, leaving 77% of women in Arkansas without an accessible 
facility in their county (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). Consequently, although abortions are 
theoretically legal in all 50 states, recent increases in legislative abortion restrictions at the state 
level (e.g., Arkansas) have limited practical abortion accessibility, especially for low-income 
women and women of color. 
Impact of restrictions. Deprivation of accessible facilities is a significant concern 
because abortion is a common outcome of pregnancy. When women are denied abortion access, 
they report increased negative mental health outcomes such as depression and anxiety compared 
to women who obtained a sought-after abortion (Foster et al., 2015). Additionally, women who 
may be forced into motherhood prematurely (by being denied a sought-after abortion) are less 
likely to achieve future plans such as finish high school or secure higher paying employment, 
and are more likely to live in poverty (Foster, Biggs, Ralph, Gerdts, Roberts, & Glymour, 2018; 
Gipson, Koenig, & Hindin, 2008; Upadhyay et al., 2015). Further, research shows that being 
denied an abortion has long-lasting effects related to economic hardship. Foster and colleagues 
(2018) found that, six months following their pregnancy outcome, women who were denied 
abortions and gave birth were less likely to be employed full-time, more likely to be on public 
assistance (e.g., food stamps, WIC), and had lower personal income than those who were able to 
obtain wanted abortions. The cohort of women who gave birth after being denied an abortion 
continued to live in poverty four years later, by both subjective (i.e., reported they did not have 
sufficient funds to cover basic living expenses) and objective (i.e., income was below the federal 
poverty level) definitions (Foster et al., 2018). Thus, the significant influx of state-enacted 




Impact of restrictions in Arkansas. Although overall abortion rates have decreased 
nation-wide (Dreweke, 2017), rates in Arkansas have increased in recent years from 7.6 to 8.0 
abortions per 1,000 women of reproductive age (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). At a national level, 
most patients seeking and obtaining abortions are in their 20’s, low-income, and vary by 
race/ethnicity (Jerman, Jones, & Onda, 2016). In Arkansas, a state that is 79.4% White, 15.7% 
Black, and 7.3% Latino/a (United States Census Bureau, 2016), a disproportionate number of 
low-income residents are people of color (i.e., 28.9% Black and 26.7% Latino, whereas only 
14.1% White are low-income; Center for American Progress, 2017). Therefore, at a state level, 
restrictions placed on abortion have the ability to affect Arkansan women of color 
disproportionately, a segment of the population already at increased risk for experiencing 
unintended pregnancy (Arkansas Department of Health, 2010).   
Theoretical explanation for restriction impact. An intersectional paradigm (Crenshaw, 
1989) offers an explanation as to why restrictions in Arkansas disproportionately affect low-
income women of color by addressing how multiple social identities relate to power (e.g., 
privilege) and oppression at a micro-level and a macro-level. That is, the combined micro-level 
social identities (i.e., gender, class, race) of low-income women of color are the most 
disadvantaged at a macro-level in society. According to this framework, oppression at a macro-
level compounds as more micro-level social identities intersect, a phenomenon that has been 
applied to obstacles infringing on women’s abortion access (Price, 2011). For example, women 
in general endure the most of the burden of an unintended pregnancy; women of color face 
racism and social marginalization, and low-income women face a lack of resources including 
limitation of Medicaid coverage (Boonstra, 2016; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011). Thus, a low-




identities. These obstacles could infringe on her ability to afford or to use birth control correctly 
and consistently, which could increase her risk of unintended pregnancy, therefore increasing the 
possibility of abortion. 
These oppressions affect all aspects of a woman’s unintended pregnancy, including how 
others perceive her. For example, a woman’s social identities may change how others perceive 
her responsibility for the situation in which a pregnancy occurred (e.g., consensual sex, rape). A 
woman who is pregnant because of consensual sex will likely be judged more harshly for 
seeking an abortion than a woman who was raped on the assumption that people will think the 
woman who became pregnant because of consensual sex had some control over her risk of 
pregnancy (Hans & Kimberly, 2014). Adding biases toward low-income women and women of 
color (e.g., misconceptions such as laziness or lack of education) exacerbates those perceptions, 
widening the gap between privileged and oppressed women with social minority statuses (e.g., 
low-income, not White) and women with social majority statuses (e.g., high-income, White). 
Strategy to combat restrictions. In order to combat the influx of abortion restrictions 
and their particular impact on low-income women of color, it is important to understand how 
these restrictions are passed. First, legislators introduce a bill and it is assigned to a committee. 
The committee reads the bill and either passes it (with or without amendments) and sends it to 
the floor (for debate and vote) or another committee, or “kills” it by voting it down. If passed to 
the floor for a vote, two-thirds of the house and senate must approve after which the governor 
must sign it. If those steps are successfully completed, the bill becomes law (AAP, 2009). 
Therefore, if the majority of state legislators (and the governor) are anti-choice, it is relatively 




Advocating for women’s reproductive choice by voting for “pro-choice” candidates is a 
structural strategy that could significantly reduce the influx of abortion restrictions. In theory, 
legislators are elected to represent the views of their constituents. The majority (80%) of 
Americans support abortion access under at least under some circumstances (Smith & Son, 
2013). When looking at the state-level in hostile regions, there also seems to be support for 
abortion legality, regardless of the number of restrictions in place. According to a study assessing 
a convenience sample of young adults from Arkansas and Oklahoma, approximately 67.7% 
indicated support for abortion access (Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018). Similarly, according 
to the Arkansas Poll (2017), a state-wide telephone survey of residents on political issues, about 
60% of Arkansans thought abortion should be legal under at least some circumstances (Parry, 
2017), which may suggest that Arkansans are not as “red” on abortion as state abortion 
restrictions might suggest. Yet anti-choice legislators are still consistently elected to office and 
propose legislation aimed at restricting abortion access (Wilson, 2017). Given that it appears 
people believe women should have access to abortion when asked on surveys, yet state-level 
legislation continues to restrict access, there seems to be a schism between constituents’ abortion 
opinions and state legislatures. 
A potential explanation for this schism could be because the 80% who support abortion 
access under at least some circumstances fail to vote with abortion in mind or fail to vote at all 
because they do not see it as an important or critical issue. It could be the case that people may 
care about abortion but when weighing their values, consult different foundations of morality; 
therefore, social justice issues (e.g., reproductive rights) may only occupy a portion of their 
moral world and other values may take precedence (such as patriotism or divinity; Haidt & 




although Arkansas is portrayed as a “red” state, and in the 2016 election, about 60% of 
Arkansans voted Republican for president, senators, and house representatives (which tend to be 
in favor of anti-choice legislation; New York Times, 2017), only 53.1% of Arkansans actually 
voted (McDonald, 2016).  Moreover, as a nation, only 20% of the population report abortion 
views are “very important” regarding which candidate to support, and this 20% is predominantly 
anti-choice (Bowman & Sims, 2017). Although people believe women should have access to 
abortion, general knowledge of abortion legislation is low (Cockrill & Weitz, 2011; Lara et al., 
2015) and Arkansans’ feelings seem to be mixed with regard to women who seek abortions (i.e., 
22.5% feel extremely negative, 14.6% feel extremely positive and 62.9% fall somewhere in the 
middle; Parry, 2017). 
Another explanation for a disjunction between public opinion (e.g., general support for 
abortion access under at least some circumstances) and the myriad abortion restrictions passed 
by legislators could be related to this low knowledge and mixed feelings. Research indicates that 
people may support abortion access and, simultaneously, favor laws that would restrict access 
(Bowman & Sims, 2017). That is, they may report being in favor of legislation that restricts 
abortion under the pretense that certain mandated steps (e.g., pre-abortion counseling, 
ultrasound) improves safety for women, but lack the information about what anti-abortion 
legislation really means for women who seek abortions (Weitz et al., 2008). Further, they may 
vote for candidates who put forth such anti-abortion legislation by framing it as an effort to 
protect women’s health without understanding the real-world implications of these restrictions. 
 As such, there is a need to increase awareness regarding what these restrictions actually 
mean in terms of limiting women’s access to abortion and empathy for women who face these 




access under at least some circumstances but may support abortion restrictions because of a lack 
of knowledge about which laws are in place and what the laws actually do. In order to decrease 
support for abortion restrictions, we plan to intervene at a micro-level by 1) increasing awareness 
of legislative abortion restrictions in place in Arkansas and 2) increasing empathy for Arkansan 
women who must face these restrictive laws to get the care they seek.  
 Raising awareness and increasing empathy. General efforts to shift attitudes often 
incorporate the use of persuasive messages, however the effectiveness of these messages depend 
on message type (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). That is, persuasion efforts aimed at shifting affect-
based attitudes (e.g., emotions and feelings) and cognition-based attitudes (e.g., beliefs and 
judgments) are most effective when there is a match between the message with the type of 
attitude (i.e., emotional messages with affective attitudes and informational messages with 
cognitive attitudes; Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Attitudes toward abortion are unique in that they are 
often both emotional (e.g., considering how the woman must feel) and cognitive (e.g., scientific 
statements against existence of fetal pain, plausibility of being able to financially provide for a 
child), which can lead to complex feelings about abortion and feelings of ambivalence (Alvarez 
& Brehm, 1995; Craig et al., 2002; Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & Crawford, in preparation; 
Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018). Therefore, in order to decrease support for abortion 
restrictions, one must address both aspects of these attitudes. To address the cognitive side, we 
aim to increase extent to which people are aware of restrictions enacted in Arkansas and to 
address the affective side, we aim to increase positive attitudes and empathy for women who 
seek abortions by offering a testimonial from someone who has had to face these restrictions.  
Previous work with knowledge. To address the cognition-based side of abortion attitudes, 




and of legislative restrictions in Arkansas. Few studies have examined knowledge of abortion or 
legislation with a general population, none specifically in a hostile state such as Arkansas. Many 
studies examining knowledge of abortion or abortion legislation focus on health professionals in 
the U.S. (e.g., Coles et al., 2011; Pace et al., 2008), general populations of outside of the U.S. 
(e.g., Appiah-Agyekum et al., 2015; Assifi et al., 2016; Phillips, Eltherington, de Costa, & 
Woods, 2012; Sydsjö et al., 2012; Thapa, Sharma, & Khatiwada, 2014), or health professionals 
outside of the U.S. (e.g., Chong et al., 2009; Hammarberg et al., 2016). Of the few studies that 
examine knowledge of abortion and abortion legislation in the U.S. with general populations 
(e.g., Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh, Bessett & Littman, 2013; Lara et al., 2015; White et al., 
2016), all revealed that knowledge among their samples was low and called for interventions to 
increase such knowledge. 
Previous work with empathy. To address the affect-based side of abortion attitudes, our 
goal is to increase positive attitudes toward women who seek abortions and empathy for women 
who seek abortions/face restrictions in Arkansas. One mechanism effective in shifting attitudes 
regarding contentious social issues is empathy-based interventions. For example, empathy-based 
interventions have been used to destigmatize highly stigmatized groups (persons with AIDS, the 
homeless population, individuals who are incarcerated; Batson et al., 1997) and reduce 
disparities in perception of patients’ pain based on race (Drwecki et al., 2011). Empathy-based 
interventions have incorporated a variety of activities to increase people’s ability to relate to 
others such as simulating disabilities (Lor et al., 2015) and conducting assessments to test 
people’s ability to identify others’ emotional states (Drwecki et al., 2011; Sherman et al., 2015). 
In particular, audio and video-based testimonials appear to result in longer lasting attitude 




1996; Roberto et al., 2000). Presently, there are media campaigns that target abortion stigma by 
trying to normalize abortion with anecdotal experiences similar to testimonials 
(shoutyourabortion.com). However, research shows that people do not tend to seek out political 
media content that opposes their views (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 2009). As such, it is 
unlikely that the majority of voting-aged adults, especially those with at least some opposition to 
abortion, would seek out such media or be exposed to such media naturally (i.e., without 
prompting). Therefore, a more targeted intervention is needed. 
To date, no media-based interventions have attempted to address abortion knowledge and 
empathy, specifically targeting perceived pregnancy responsibility, and the potential influence of 
race. As such, the current study aims to test the effectiveness of an empathy-based, video 
intervention via a randomized-controlled experiment with Arkansas residents to increase 
awareness about abortion legislation in Arkansas and shift attitudes towards abortion access. 
The Current Study  
 The current study consisted of several video interventions that addressed either the 
cognitive side of abortion attitudes (i.e., knowledge of legislation) or the combination of 
cognition and affect (i.e., empathy for women who seek abortions). The control video did not 
include the affective component and consisted only of the knowledge portion (a “news anchor” 
giving a news report about abortion legislation in Arkansas). The intervention videos, aimed to 
increase empathy, followed the knowledge portion and depicted an actor delivering one of four 
different testimonials from the perspective of a woman who faced abortion restrictions in 
Arkansas. We manipulated two variables in the testimonial videos (i.e., race of the woman, 





We compared control vs. intervention video conditions by examining pre-test, post-test, 
and follow-up differences of knowledge of current abortion restrictions in Arkansas, support for 
those abortion restrictions, and empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas. We 
explored the following research questions: 
 RQ1. Research question 1 aimed to test the effectiveness of the intervention videos 
compared to the control video. That is, did watching a video with an empathy-inducing personal 
story in addition to an informational component (cognitive/knowledge + affective/empathy) 
induce significantly different outcomes than watching a video that only contained an 
informational component (only cognitive/knowledge). To explore the effectiveness of the 
affective/empathy component, we compared outcomes of those who received the control 
condition to those who received the intervention conditions on two sub questions: 1)  knowledge 
gain/retention about abortion restrictions and 2) differences in support for abortion restrictions in 
Arkansas.  
 H1. In general, we posited that those who received an intervention condition 
(cognitive/knowledge + affective/empathy) would experience a decrease in support for abortion 
restrictions compared to the control video and an increase in knowledge of abortion and abortion 
restrictions similar to that of the control video. RQ1 and H1 are described in more detail in 
Chapter 3. 
RQ2. Research question 2 aimed to test if the variables manipulated in the intervention 
testimonials (race and pregnancy responsibility) would produce different empathy outcomes. 
Comparisons on empathic characteristic scores were made between the five different video 




4) Black woman, consensual sex, and 5) control (no testimonial). To explore the impact of these 
variables, we made comparisons between the five condition groups on differences in empathy 
characteristics after the video as separate scores and as a sum score. 
H2. In general, we posited there would be differences in empathy scores by intervention 
condition. In particular, between intervention conditions, we expected that empathy would be 
highest among participants who watched a rape testimonial compared with those who watched a 
consensual testimonial. We expected participants who watched a White testimonial would have 
higher empathy than those who watched a Black testimonial. Additionally, we examined if other 
personal experiences/traits contributed to empathy sum scores. we hypothesized that 1) females, 
2) people with personal experiences with abortion, 3) people with personal experiences with 
sexual assault, 4) higher level of baseline Empathic Concern, and 5) people who viewed the 
video with a White woman who was raped would have the highest empathy sum scores. RQ2 
and H2 are described in more detail in Chapter 3. 
Research Design and Methods 
Intervention. The intervention consisted of five video conditions; participants were 
randomly assigned to one. A pre-test and two post-tests were administered to all participants (see 
Figure 1 in Chapter 3 for flow diagram). As described above, the content of the videos were 
guided by the idea of intersecting social identities and the effect of their combinations 
(Crenshaw, 1989). That is, some social identities of the person in the video were controlled for 
and some were manipulated. We controlled for social identities such as gender, socioeconomic 
status, and age—all people in the video presented as women, indicated that they are low-income, 
and appeared to be in their 20’s to parallel salient characteristics of the majority of abortion 




variables: video content (control vs. empathy testimonial), race of the woman in the video (White 
woman vs. Black woman), and degree of perceived pregnancy responsibility in the testimonial 
(raped vs. consensual sex). All participants (control and intervention conditions) watched a video 
clip about current restrictions in Arkansas to increase participants’ knowledge about abortion 
restrictions in Arkansas. The control condition then immediately received a post-test. The 
intervention conditions watched one of four testimonial video clips after the knowledge clip. 
This clip depicted a woman speaking about her experience of how restrictions made obtaining an 
abortion in Arkansas more difficult:  
• Control: Knowledge; no Testimonial  
• Intervention 1: Knowledge + Testimonial (White woman, Raped) 
• Intervention 2: Knowledge + Testimonial (White woman, Consensual Sex) 
• Intervention 3: Knowledge + Testimonial (Black woman, Raped) 
• Intervention 4: Knowledge + Testimonial (Black woman, Consensual Sex) 
After the testimonial clip, the intervention condition received the post-test. Then, participants in 
all conditions received a follow-up post-test 2 weeks later (Johansson-Love & Geer, 2003). 
Procedures. Before the survey was distributed, the instrument was pilot tested with a 
convenience sample of researchers (n=10) to assess clarity/readability. Once the instrument was 
finalized, we conducted an online video-based randomized-controlled trial with Arkansas 
residents (18+) (N=369) through Qualtrics survey software. A convenience sample of 
participants were recruited through social media targeted toward Arkansans across the state (e.g., 




First, participants who received the survey link were directed to an introductory page 
providing them with information about the study. After clicking to the next page, they were 
directed to an informed consent form, which notified them that by completing the survey, they 
were indicating their consent to participate. Interested participants clicked to the next page which 
began the online survey, starting with a pre-test that included: 1) demographic information 
(including a unique identifier to link participants from pre-test/post-test to follow-up), 2) political 
behaviors (e.g., voting and media consumption), 3) general knowledge about abortion, 4) 
knowledge of Arkansas abortion restrictions, 5) support for abortion restrictions in Arkansas, 6) 
attitudes toward women who seek abortions (i.e., revised from Batson et al., 1997), 7) personal 
beliefs about social dominance (Ho et al., 2015), 8) identification of Empathic Concern and 
perspective taking (Davis, 1983), and 9) the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale-Short 
Form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 1982).  
After completing the pre-test, participants were randomly assigned to a video-
intervention or control group (see Figure 1 in Chapter 3). After viewing the assigned video 
(control or one of four intervention videos), a post-test with similar questions to the pre-test was 
administered to assess effects, in addition to measuring empathy toward women who seek 
abortions in Arkansas (i.e., 6 empathy characteristics from Batson et al., 1997)), modified IOS 
scale (Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992), and specific empathy toward the woman in the video for 
intervention conditions.  
Based on previous literature (Johansson-Love & Geer, 2003), a follow up post-test was 
administered two weeks after the intervention to measure re-bound effects. The follow-up post-
test included similar questions to post-test 1 in addition to 1) measuring participants’ evaluation 




Scale (Ohanian, 1990) and 2) assessing what relevant media, if any, they consumed in the 2-
week period after post-test 1. Participants received one $10 e-gift card after Post-test 1 and 
another one after the follow-up post-test to incentivize participation. 
Analyses. Data were analyzed by several statistical tests (see Table 1 and 2) with 
independent variables as assigned video condition and dependent variables as (RQ1) knowledge 
of restrictions, and support for restrictions, and (RQ2) empathy for women who seek abortions. 
Additionally, demographic characteristics (e.g., gender, age) and scores on the IRI subscales of 
Empathic Concern (Davis, 1980) served as control variables. Group sample sizes were generated 
from a power analysis using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) with power (1 - β) set at 0.80 and α = 
.05, two-tailed. 
Potential limitations. As with all self-reported data, there is the possibility of self-
selection, response, and social desirability biases, especially due to the sensitive nature of the 
topic. However, to increase respondent honesty, all data were anonymous and participants 
completed the survey in a private location of their choosing. Additionally, we checked for social 
desirability using the Marlowe-Crowne Desirability Scale-Short Form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 
1982), a scale that assesses the degree to which participants’ self-report data may be susceptible 
to social desirability bias. Lastly, the adult population of Arkansas cannot be generalized to the 
entire U.S. population, though it may be an adequate representation of other hostile states (e.g., 
Kansas, Oklahoma). Thus, we are aware this intervention may not be applicable to all potential 
voters. Alternatively, findings from this study may be most useful in states where access to 
abortion is more restricted and where there may be more hostile attitudes towards abortion. 
Although these findings will be preliminary, the current study has potential to inform 





The purpose of the study was to examine a mechanism that could decrease support for 
abortion restrictions by increasing knowledge and empathy in Arkansas residents. An applied 
outcome of raising awareness and decreasing support for abortion restrictions could translate to 
voting behaviors (e.g., voting for “pro-choice” candidates). It is important to note that even 
though the majority of people support abortion access under at least some circumstances 
(Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018; Smith & Son, 2013), they oppose access under others and 
those oppositions may take precedence in terms of rationalizing voting for a candidate who is 
anti-choice. Unfortunately, people with these attitudes may not realize that methods to restrict 
access for some women often end up restricting access for all women, particularly those who are 
most in need of an abortion. First, people may be unaware of restrictive laws in Arkansas and 
second, people may be unaware of what these restrictions actually mean for women. Thus, 
exposing participants to testimonials of individuals impacted by these regulations may assist in 
decreasing support for these restrictions and subsequently motivating them to increase support 
“pro-choice” candidates. Previous literature has shown testimonials to be more impactful than 
other mechanisms (e.g., Roberto et al., 2000). The employed intervention could alleviate the 
surrounding stigma of women who receive abortions by “applying a story to the statistics.” 
Women may feel ashamed and thus do not share their abortion experiences freely (Norris et al., 
2011), further complicating the normalization of their experience and perpetuating stigma. 
Therefore, negative attitudes toward abortion discourage women from feeling comfortable with 
sharing their experiences with abortion, place women at a disadvantage, and allow restrictive 




Finally, this study aimed to incorporate differences in empathy by race and pregnancy 
responsibility into the dialogue about social inequalities regarding abortion. Using an 
intersectional approach in the analyses and discussion, this study may reveal underlying biases 
that are addressed less often in discussions about abortion access. Scholars have made a 
concerted effort to draw attention to the racial inequalities within reproductive access (e.g., 
Kumar, 2013; Price, 2011) and rape is a commonly accepted exception to abortion restrictions 
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017d; Mikolajczak & Bilewicz, 2015; Nash et al., 2017; Smith & Son, 
2013), however the intersection of race and perceived pregnancy responsibility has yet to be 
explored. Although women of all races obtain abortions in the U.S. (Jerman et al., 2016), Black 
women have a higher ratio of abortions (Jones & Jerman, 2017a), and are more likely to 
underreport their abortions on survey data (Jagannathan, 2001). As such, there are social 
inequalities that create invisible subsets of the population who are even more impacted. The 
proposed study aimed to further illuminate these issues and assess a potential intervention 





CHAPTER 2: SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE 
Abortion is a salient and contentious public health issue in the U.S. Although researchers 
have referred to abortion as a “common reproductive health event” (p. 224; Moreau, Trussell, 
Desfreres, & Bajos, 2011) or a “common life circumstance” (p. 238; Steinberg & Russo, 2008), 
unlike other common medical practices, abortion is deeply politicized. Therefore, abortion 
discourse is steeped in controversy, misconception, and debate. I will discuss aspects of abortion 
and its politicization in several subsequent sections. In section 1, I will discuss practices of 
abortion (i.e., safety and prevalence in the U.S.). In section 2, I will discuss the politics of 
abortion including legality and cognitive framing. In section 3, I will discuss the affect-based 
component of abortion attitudes. In section 4, I will discuss current abortion legislation and how 
knowledge and attitudes affect voting. In section 5, I will narrow the scope to a particular 
population (i.e., abortion in Arkansas) and need for intervention. In section 6, I will discuss 
different intervention strategies used in the past to change conditions of and attitudes toward 
abortion. In section 7, I will describe the current study and in section 8, I will describe the 
theoretical framework that will guide the methodology and hypotheses. 
1. Practices of Abortion 
To understand the succeeding sections about politics, attitudes, legislation and voting, 
specific populations, intervention, and theory, one must first understand the basic concepts of 
abortion: safety (i.e., what obtaining an abortion actually entails) and prevalence (i.e., who 
obtains abortions). 
Safety of abortion. An estimated 1.2 million abortions are provided in the U.S. per year; 
the majority (88.8%) occur during the first 12 weeks of gestation or less), an estimated 10% of 




(Finer & Henshaw, 2003; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Jatlaoui et al., 2016; Jerman, Jones & 
Onda, 2016). The risk of serious complications, such as infection or hemorrhage, from abortion 
is very low at all gestational ages (experienced by less than 0.5% of women in the first trimester; 
Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). In fact, a woman who continues a pregnancy to term compared to a 
woman who terminates a pregnancy, is 5-25 times more likely to have serious complications and 
14 times more likely to die from pregnancy or childbirth (Raymond & Grimes, 2012). Overall, 
induced abortion has a mortality rate of 0.7 deaths per 100,000, which is the same rate for 
spontaneous miscarriage (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010). Risk of death increases with length of 
pregnancy; at 8 weeks’ gestation or earlier, the mortality rate is 0.03 deaths for every 100,000 
abortions whereas at 18 weeks or later, it is 6.7 deaths per 100,000 abortions (Guttmacher 
Institute, 2017a).  
There are two main types of abortion methods; both are safe and effective (Kulier et al., 
2011). Method use depends on gestational age, physician expertise, and personal and physician 
preference (Lee, Ng, & Ho, 2010). Though the two types are commonly referred to as “surgical” 
and “medical” abortion, Weitz and colleagues (2004) argue these terms are confusing and 
perpetuate inaccurate implications (i.e., “surgical” implies cutting and suturing, “medical” 
implies physician-based procedures); instead they recommend using “aspiration” and 
“medication” abortion to imply more accurate depictions of their protocols. Not all procedural 
abortions include the use of aspiration, however, so “procedural” is a more inclusive term to 
describe all abortions that are not medication. An additional terminological recommendation 
discourages the use of describing termination of pregnancy in relation to “trimesters” and 




Sciences, 2018). Therefore, I will use these terms as a commitment to accuracy of language in 
abortion discourse. 
Procedural abortion. The majority of abortions provided in the U.S. are procedural (also 
referred to as surgical or in-clinic), accounting for approximately 68% of all abortions (National 
Academy of Sciences, 2018), 72.4% of which are provided before or at 12 weeks and 8.3% of 
which provided at 13 weeks or later (CDC, 2013). This type of abortion involves a minor 
procedure to end a pregnancy using a combination of instruments to empty the uterus--the most 
common instruments used are the curette (i.e., a small metal scraping instrument), dilators (i.e., 
methods to open the cervix), and vacuum aspiration (i.e., gentle suction). During the Dilation and 
Curettage (D&C) procedure, a physician may use a combination of these two instruments to 
empty the uterus. Modern D&Cs, which can be provided as early as 4-6 weeks (O’Connell et al., 
2009; National Academy of Sciences, 2018), often use vacuum aspiration instead of or in 
addition to use of the curette (O’Connell, Jones, Simon, Saporta, Paul, & Lichtenberg, 2009), 
hence the recommendation of name change to “aspiration” abortion by Weitz and colleagues 
(2004). The use of vacuum aspiration is considered the safest method with the lowest rate of 
complications (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010) and comprises two types: manual vacuum 
aspiration (MVA; generally used during the first 12 weeks; Hamoda & Templeton, 2010) or 
conventional vacuum aspiration (VA; generally used after 12 weeks; Hemlin & Moller, 2011).  
Between the gestational weeks of 13 and 28, the most common method of abortion is a 
Dilation and Evacuation (D&E) procedure, which often employs the use of VA in combination 
with other instruments such as forceps (National Academy of Sciences, 2018; Strauss, Gamble, 
Parker, Cook, Zane, & Hamdan, 2007) and accounts for less than 9% of all abortions (National 




between 16 and 20 weeks and 85.1% at 21 weeks or later (Gamble et al., 2005). There are two 
types of D&E procedures: nonintact and intact. These terms refer to the condition of the fetus 
upon removal (Jones & Weitz, 2009). Intact D&E is sometimes referred to as Dilation and 
Extraction (D&X) and though not often provided (i.e., about one in every 10,000 abortions; Levit 
& Verchick, 2016) and typically only in cases of fetal abnormality, they are considered safe and 
effective (Chasen et al., 2004). Although risk of complications increases as gestational age 
increases, D&Es are considered very safe procedures and do not impact future fertility, or risk 
for other pregnancy-related disorders (Jacot et al., 1993; National Academy of Sciences, 2018). 
To understand common abortion protocols for aspiration procedures before and after 12 weeks, 
O’Connell and colleagues (2008, 2009) surveyed hundreds of administrators and clinicians in the 
National Abortion Federation (NAF) and found similarities across facilities; I have described 
these procedures below:  
Aspiration procedures. Prior to the procedure, patients will participate in pre-abortion 
counseling, a pelvic exam, and methods to confirm pregnancy (e.g., most clinics offer or are 
required to provide ultrasound; O’Connell et al., 2008; 2009). Prior to abortion, to reduce the risk 
of complications (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010), clinics administer a cervical ripening agent 
(e.g., misoprostol) to be taken at home or in-clinic (O’Connell et al., 2009). Choice of instrument 
for the procedure depends on the physician’s preference and, often, when they received their 
medical training (e.g., older physicians who received their training over 10-20 years ago, were 
more likely report using a metal curette and less likely to report using MVA during a procedure 
in the first 12 weeks; O’Connell et al., 2009). The method of anesthesia depends on the provider, 




during a D&C, and the majority using a combination of local and intravenous sedation or deep 
sedation during a D&E (O’Connell et al., 2008; 2009).  
Medication abortion. Scientists developed the abortifacient agent mifepristone (also 
known as RU-486 or the brand name Mifeprex), a non-procedural abortion method, in the 1980’s 
in France (Crandell, 2012; Hamoda & Templeton, 2010). Today, it is considered to be an 
important advancement in fertility control (Hamoda & Templeton, 2010), though it was 
approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 12 years after its approval in France. 
In 2000, mifepristone was approved for abortions up to 7 weeks’ gestation (Hamoda & 
Templeton, 2010; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Schaff et al., 2000) and in 2016, the FDA 
approved a new label to include an additional 3 weeks of administration (i.e., up until week 10 of 
pregnancy; Guttmacher Institute, 2017b). Medication abortions account for 45% of abortions 
prior to 9 weeks (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a), though this rate is steadily increasing (National 
Academy of Sciences, 2018). Medication abortion involves the combination of mifepristone and 
a prostaglandin analogue (e.g., misoprostol; Hamoda & Templeton, 2010). Mifepristone inhibits 
progesterone receptors, which causes the lining of the uterus and its contents to shed, and is 
usually administered orally in-clinic or at home. Some states mandate that clinicians must be in 
the physical presence of the patient when they take the medication (National Academy of 
Sciences, 2018). Then a prostaglandin (misoprostol in the U.S.; Lee et al., 2010) is administered 
1-3 days later, almost always at home, inducing uterine contractions and expelling the contents 
of the uterus. Post-abortion, patients return to their physician for an exam to make sure the 
abortion was complete. The risk of incomplete abortion is low (i.e., 2-4%; Kahn et al., 2000), 
however, if the abortion is not complete at that time, another dose of misoprostol is administered 




Cost of procedures. Cost of these procedures are often influenced by gestational age, 
insurance coverage, and legislative restrictions in the state. Without insurance coverage, the 
median out-of-pocket cost of an abortion is $575 compared to median cost with insurance 
coverage at a range of $0-18 (Roberts et al., 2014). Furthermore, the price for abortions increases 
with gestational age--without insurance, an abortion up to 12 weeks costs an average of $497, 
abortion between 14-20 weeks’ costs an average of $860, and after 20 weeks, an abortion costs 
an average of $1874 (Roberts et al., 2014). Procedures at 13 weeks and beyond are more 
expensive in general and, on top of the cost of the procedure, they often require additional costs. 
These costs often result from legislative restrictions that delay abortion (requiring extra travel 
and lodging) and increase charges (e.g., ultrasound; Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Drey et al., 2006; 
Jones & Weitz, 2009). Price related to gestational age applies to abortion services in all states. 
However, additional costs to the procedure (e.g., ultrasound, services offered in a facility that 
must adhere to Ambulatory Surgical Center standards, waiting periods that necessitate two trips 
to the doctor) vary from state to state and depend on the type and amount of restrictions enacted 
(see Section 4).  
Prevalence of abortion. Approximately 1 in 4 women (of all demographic 
characteristics) will have an abortion by the age of 45 (i.e., 14.6 abortions per 1000 women aged 
15-44; Dreweke, 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017f; Jones & Jerman, 2017b). The largest groups 
of abortion patients are in their 20’s (34% aged 20-24 and 27% aged 25-29), have never married 
(46%), were using a contraceptive method (51%), have had at least one birth (59%), are poor or 
low-income (75%), and over half (54%) of abortion patients report some religious affiliation 
(17% as mainline Protestant, 13% as evangelical Protestant, 24% as Catholic, 38% no affiliation, 




(i.e., solely in terms of numbers), it appears they are fairly equally distributed with slightly more 
White women reporting abortions (39% compared to 28% Black, 25% Hispanic, and 9% other; 
Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). However, when abortion rates are examined proportional to the 
subpopulation, White women’s abortion rates are the lowest (i.e., 10.0 per 1000) and Black 
women’s rates are the highest (i.e., 27.1 per 1000; Jones & Jerman, 2017b), specifically those 
who are low-income (Jones and Kavanaugh, 2011). Additionally, many studies indicate women 
underreport their abortions in population-based surveys (Bajos et al., 2010; Trussell, 2008). 
Accordingly, abortion rates are linked to socioeconomic status in the U.S., particularly poverty. 
Yet, poverty is not the sole explanation for these rates--there are unequal rates among low-
income women of color (i.e., low-income Black women have higher rates of abortion than low-
income Hispanic women do; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011).  
Impact of finances. Paradoxically, low-income women of color, who have the highest 
rates of abortion, also face the most barriers to access. Finances are simultaneously an indicator 
of prevalence (i.e., reason for seeking an abortion) and a barrier to access for women. Three-
fourths of women cite seeking an abortion for reasons related to the financial impact an 
unplanned child would have on their life and the life of their family (Boonstra, 2016; Guttmacher 
Institute, 2017a; Jerman, Jones, & Onda, 2016). As low-income women compose the majority of 
abortion patients, for more than half of women who seek abortions, provision and travel costs 
comprise more than a third of their monthly income (Roberts et al., 2014). Although, two-thirds 
of women report receiving some financial assistance, even with aid, most women pay out of 
pocket for their abortions and report an average of $54 for travel with a range of $0-2200 
(Roberts et al., 2014). Consequently, over half of women report that financial issues delayed 




the costs of provision and travel (Roberts et al., 2014; Upadhyay et al., 2014). Though cost may 
delay care, women prove to endure many obstacles, and will often defer payments for rent, 
groceries, and other bills, in order obtain an abortion (Dreweke, 2017).  
2. Politicization of Abortion 
Despite the safety and prevalence of abortion, the issue of women’s reproductive rights 
(referred to by some as a “war” on women; e.g., di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Harrison, 2016) has 
been shrouded in politics (e.g., rhetoric, legislative restrictions) for decades in the U.S. 
Fluctuations of sexually conservative and progressive movements throughout history have 
influenced this “war” and resulted in a bipolar cognitive approach to the issue.  
Legality of abortion. Abortion was not officially illegal in the U.S. until the Comstock 
Act of 1873, which criminalized possession of items or information pertaining to contraception 
and abortion (Levit & Verchick, 2016). This Act was passed in response to a combination of 
sexist and racist attitudes such as the American Medical Association’s position that abortion was 
in conflict with a woman’s martial duties and fears of the general public that upper-middle-class 
White women were having lower birth rates than women of color (Levit & Verchick, 2016).  
Roe v. Wade. A century later, the court cases Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton legalized 
abortion in 1973 (Ellison, 2003). Scholars considered this advancement in reproductive rights to 
be a major public health gain because it led to increased access to abortion and thus safer 
provision (Cates, 1982). Roe v. Wade (sometimes referred to by researchers and activists as just 
“Roe”) laid out a structure of legality by trimester so that 1) a woman and her practitioner had the 
right to terminate the pregnancy through abortion in the first trimester without legal restrictions, 




abortions were illegal unless the woman’s life or health was in danger (Roe v Wade, 410 US 
113, 1973). Legalizing abortion allowed for the systematic collection of epidemiological data, 
which led to better recommendations, better training of physicians, and lower mortality and 
morbidity rates (Cates, 1982, 2012). Before legalization, abortion provision was unregulated, 
unsafe, and occurred in secrecy. For example, prior to Roe, in 1965, 17% of all deaths due to 
pregnancy and childbirth were the result of illegal abortion (Gold, 1990). Despite these benefits 
to legalization, anti-abortion activists worked to decrease access and discourage women from 
seeking abortion.  
Immediately following Roe, there was a period of optimism and liberation (Schoen, 
2015). During this time, people created a network of freestanding clinics and abortion was 
cheaper and more accessible than ever with the establishment of abortion fund organizations. In 
addition, feminists were empowered and women were encouraged to learn about their 
reproductive choices and options. However, this optimism was halted in the 1980’s with the 
beginning of the current sexually conservative movement (i.e., the Religious Right), a “moral 
panic” (p. 68) reaction to the women’s liberation and gay rights movements (di Mauro and Joffe, 
2007).  
A swell of Religious Right-affiliated groups (e.g., Focus on the Family, the Family 
Research Council) activated in the 80’s during Ronald Regan’s administration (di Mauro & 
Joffe, 2007). These anti-abortion activists used rhetoric to create a movement that perpetuated 
fear, stigma, and misconception. In combination with politicians and legislatures, the anti-
abortion movement worked strategically to pass restrictions at a state and federal level to infringe 
on the legal parameters set in 1973. Leaders of this movement created Crisis Pregnancy Centers 




abortion was detrimental to women’s health, causing infertility, increased risk of miscarriage, 
uterine rupture, and hemorrhaging (Haugeberg, 2017). They worked to discredit medical 
professionals who cited scientific evidence that opposed these declarations (i.e., that abortion 
was safe with very few physical or psychological complications; di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; 
Haugeberg, 2017). They spread anti-abortion messages with the use of graphic, bloody images of 
fetuses and histrionic language, coining “junk science” terms (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007, p. 77) 
such as Post Abortion Syndrome and “partial-birth” abortion (Esacove, 2004; Haugeberg, 2017). 
This political climate facilitated construction of the dominant cognitive frames of abortion 
stance. 
Cognitive framing of abortion. The dichotomization of abortion framing (i.e., “pro-life” 
vs. “pro-choice”) stemmed from the Religious Right’s use of tactics such as stigmatization 
campaigning and language to create an “adversarial” relationship between fetal rights and 
maternal rights (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010). This cognition is 
based on knowledge, reasoning, and judgments relating to the relationship of the fetus and/or the 
woman and how it relates to one’s construction of their moral values system. 
Before further describing this dichotomization, a note on terminology used in this 
section: there is discussion and criticisms on both sides that these labels may not accurately 
reflect the values of their group. For example, out-group critics often equate the term “pro-
choice” to “pro-abortion” and therefore perpetuate that “pro-choice” individuals have a negative 
stance against all pregnancies (Shamess, 1988). However, “pro-choice” individuals adopt the 
term because it implies that women should have access to the full spectrum of pregnancy 
outcome opportunities (choices), be that they decide to maintain their pregnancy or terminate it. 




insufficient because it ignores the inequality of access to “choice” (e.g., for women of color; di 
Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Smith, 2005). In attempts to move away from this rhetoric, some activists 
on this side offer a more precise term such as “supporters of abortion rights” (Feree, 2003). On 
the other hand, out-group criticism of the “pro-life” label argue its inaccuracy; focusing on the 
wellbeing (i.e., “life”) of the fetus often ignores the wellbeing/life of the woman carrying the 
pregnancy (Malik, 2018). “Pro-choice” individuals suggest that labels for those who oppose 
abortion such as “anti-choice,” or “anti-abortion” are more precise.  
While both labels may not be all-encompassing, for unification of language, I will refer to 
the fetal-centric side as “pro-life” and the woman-centric side as “pro-choice,” as I will discuss 
their ideologies with language from their rationalizations. While certain subgroups of each side 
have acknowledged the need for shifting the rhetoric, these messages/labels have prevailed for 
decades, which has been influential in social movements and affects who is heard, how they are 
heard, and what ideas dominate the discourse (Feree, 2003). 
The “pro-life”/fetal-centric frame. In the late 1980’s, these religious fundamentalist 
groups began promoting the idea that life begins at conception, designating personhood to the 
fetus and privileging its protection (Ellison, 2003). Under this stance, abortion is conceptualized 
as an unjustifiable killing of the fetus and should be criminalized under the 14th amendment (i.e., 
shall not deprive U.S. citizens of life, liberty, or property; Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010; 
Smith, 2005). In their analysis of anti-abortion rhetoric, Halva-Neubauer and Zeigler (2010) 
conclude that the “pro-life” movement is “vibrant [and] strategically sophisticated” (p. 117). 
“Pro-life” groups furthered their cause by using the increased visibility of the fetus through 
advancements in technology, generating language (e.g., unborn child), hypothesizing 




Technology. As pregnancy technology advanced over time (e.g., 4-D ultrasound, fetal 
photography, post-birth care for premature fetuses, fetal analgesics), fetuses have been 
conceptualized as an infant/person with emotional and cognitive response (Derbyshire, 2008; 
Norris et al., 2011). In fact, because premature fetal care is so advanced, Kluge (2012) suggests 
that, to avoid ethical violation, women who do not wish to carry their pregnancy should transfer 
their fetuses to incubate in artificial wombs. To increase fetal personhood rhetoric, “pro-life” 
activists have disseminated materials using high-tech images of in-utero fetuses, which some 
scholars argue decontextualizes the fetus and exaggerates its independence by erasing the 
pregnant woman from the picture (Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010; Taylor, 2008).  
Language. Another strategy to perpetuate fetal personhood is the use of language in 
government documents (e.g., bills) and media (e.g., “unborn child,” “preborn Americans,” 
“unborn baby”; Harrison, 2016; Mikolajczak & Bilewicz, 2015). A study examined the impact of 
language on attributing humanness to either a “zygote,” “embryo,” or “fetus” and found no 
differences between the three terms (MacInnis et al., 2014). However, Mikolajczak and Bilewicz 
(2015) conducted three studies in which they manipulated whether the participants would see the 
word “fetus” or “child” in a short text; those who saw the word “child” were more likely 
attribute human nature to it in follow-up questions. With the use of personified terms, anti-
abortion activists employed initiatives to perpetuate the concepts of fetal homicide (criminalizing 
third-party killing of fetuses) and fetal pain (Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010). 
Fetal pain. Whether or not a fetus can feel pain has been well debated. Kluge (2012) 
argues that there is a difference between pain reception and nociception (neural coding in the 
sensory nervous system that processes potentially harmful stimuli such as extreme temperature 




experience nociception, he presents evidence to support the position that fetuses have 
nociceptive capacity as well (i.e., indicating that they process noxious stimuli). However, 
Derbyshire (2008) presents a counter argument--even if fetuses experience nociception, they do 
not have the brain development to code or label that noxious stimuli as pain. Fetal pain can be 
divided into two components: neurobiology (i.e., pain processing via response to noxious 
stimuli) and developmental psychology (i.e., self-location or “you know that it is you that hurts”; 
Derbyshire, 2008, p. 118). Although neurobiological features that could respond to noxious 
stimuli develop at 7, 18, and 26 weeks’ gestation, the fetus does not have a state of consciousness 
at those development points to register stimuli as pain; this may not happen until at least 23 
weeks (Derbyshire, 2008).  
Crisis pregnancy centers. To disseminate these messages (e.g., fetal personhood, fetal 
pain) and intercept pregnant women who are seeking abortions, the “pro-life” side created a 
group of non-profits known as Crisis Pregnancy Centers (CPCs). CPCs are funded by a 
combination of private donors (e.g., proceeds from the “Choose Life” license plates) and state 
(Ludden, 2015) and federal funds (under the Title V funding for abstinence-only education 
programs during the Bush Administration in 2010; di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; NARAL, 2010), and 
currently under Title X funding during the Trump Administration. They pose as medical 
facilities and attempt to confuse vulnerable women by using vague advertising (e.g., offering 
“free and confidential services”; NARAL, 2010, p. 6) and situating their buildings within close 
proximity to actual abortion clinics (Haugeberg, 2017; NARAL, 2010). The volunteers that run 
CPCs may show gruesome images to pregnant women, warn them of the risks of abortion, 
conduct pregnancy tests (usually bought over the counter) and ultrasounds, and lie about 




Haugeberg, 2017). Often, they will collect sexual histories and emergency contact information 
and inform partners and parents about women’s intention to seek an abortion because they are 
not bound by patient confidentiality (Haugeberg, 2017).  
The “pro-choice”/woman-centric frame. In contrast, the “pro-choice” position typically 
maintains that the fetus is not a person/life capable of feeling pain and, therefore, is not entitled 
to legal protection under the 14th amendment (Halva-Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010; Smith, 2005). 
“Pro-choice” activists assert that legislation to alleviate (e.g., with anesthesia) or avoid fetal pain 
are just strategies to make abortion more expensive and create another barrier to access (Halva-
Neubauer & Zeigler, 2010). Though some “pro-choice” individuals may knowledge the potential 
personhood of the fetus, they advocate that women’s personhood should be prioritized, as 
women’s autonomy and their “moral competence to make abortion decisions” are core tenets of 
reproductive choice (Feree, 2003, p. 314). Under this stance, women’s bodies have been “sites of 
extensive and extended biopolitical contestation” (Ellison, 2003, p. 338) and activists prioritize 
the need to protect a woman’s right to the choice to control her own body (Smith, 2005); 
abortion is a means to control reproductive outcomes. 
 Public messaging and policy efforts of the “pro-choice” side pale in comparison to the 
strategy, organization, and visibility of “pro-life” activists. For example, there are hundreds of 
websites and sources of media dedicated to women who regret their abortion whereas only a few 
to “pro-choice” narratives (Ludlow, 2008). This lack of transparency could be because the 
reproductive rights movement has been forced into a defensive approach, simply to maintain 
legality instead of focusing on larger, more emphatic goals (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007). The 
ultimate “pro-choice” goal is affordable, unrestricted access to abortion at any gestational age, 




demand,” implying heartlessness and sterility; Ludlow, 2008). In order to eventually achieve this 
goal, “pro-choice” activists have, at times, had to pick their battles and rely on politically 
acceptable reasons for abortion (e.g., rape, incest, health) to relate to those who are undecided or 
oppose abortion. Instead of putting effort into keeping abortion legal for everyone at every 
gestational age (e.g., even the less acceptable reasons for abortion such as a woman simply not 
wanting children), they must water down their arguments so as not to turn people off or stir up 
controversy (Ludlow, 2008).  
Being strategic with “pro-choice” discourse relates to Feree’s (2003) work designating 
the two sides of the feminist abortion narrative: resonance and radicalism. She argues that “pro-
choice” feminists are selective in different “discursive opportunities” (p. 306), choosing to be 
resonant “for the purposes of influencing policy, gaining public support, and forestalling 
countermovement attacks” (p. 306) and radical in situations “whose success implies more 
fundamental change” (p. 306). She goes on to compare these approaches of abortion-rights 
activists in the United States and Germany and emphasizes the influence of societal context on 
success of abortion discourse. That is, the individualism of American societal values creates a 
more successful context for the “pro-choice” argument of women’s right to privacy, whereas the 
collectivism of German society better receives the argument of social protection of individual 
rights (Feree, 2003). 
Moreover, some of the strategies of the “pro-choice” side intended to help facilitate 
access to abortion ended up having an opposite effect. For example, “pro-choice” activists 
originally created freestanding abortion clinics to give women a separate and gender-congruent 
facility (Creinin, 2000; Jones & Kooistra, 2011). In theory, these clinics should have had the 




abortion facilities into freestanding clinics has hurt the reproductive rights cause by 
marginalizing those who obtain and provide services (Norris et al., 2011). Additionally, there has 
been criticism from within the “pro-choice” movement about its framing and approach, namely 
that “choice” excludes those that do not have free control over their reproductive options (e.g., 
poor women, women of color; di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Smith, 2005). For example, women of 
color, working class women, and lesbian women indicated a lack of identification with the 
message of the “pro-choice” movement because the impact of homophobia, racism, and classism 
is often left out of the conversation (e.g., research, statistics, and activism) regarding obstacles to 
women’s reproductive health care (Price, 2011). These within-group criticisms create a divided 
front and leave room for “pro-life” activists to criticize the “pro-choice” side as well 
(Vanderford, 1989). However, those on the “pro-choice” side have expressed optimism for 
younger generations of Americans’ heightened “social justice mindedness” in the hope that a 
“pro-choice” position will become so commonplace, those on the “pro-life” side will have to 
defend their outdated view (Rovner, 2016). 
 Conceptualization of the “pro-life”/“pro-choice” rhetoric. The dichotomy of abortion 
framing has resulted in two polarized sides that hinge on whose protection should take 
precedence in a pregnancy: “pro-life” individuals believe that protection of the fetus/child should 
take precedence whereas “pro-choice” individuals believe that protection of a woman’s bodily 
autonomy should be prioritized. Some say the polarization between to the two sides will never 
result in compromise, whereas others point to their similarities of conceptualization of their 
attitudes (Smith, 2005; Vanderford, 1989).  
Similarities in conceptualization. In Vanderford’s (1989) examination of large, organized 




and Abortion Rights Council of Minnesota), she found that both sides conceptualized the other 
as simultaneously “powerful and vulnerable” (p. 175). That is, they surmised that the other side 
was the minority in their beliefs but had un-checked power from powerful resources (i.e., “pro-
choice” elites in media, government, and businesses and “pro-life” elites in the church). 
Moreover, both sides used the same four strategies to vilify the other: 1) they articulated the 
other as a specific adversarial force, which clarifies the target, 2) they cast the other in an 
exclusively negative light, 3) they attributed “diabolical motives” to the other, and consequently, 
4) they magnified the other’s power (Vanderford, 1989).  
Another conceptual similarity in the “pro-life”/“pro-choice” rhetoric is that both sides 
cite marginalization of women of color, poor women, and women with disabilities perpetuated 
by the opposing side (Smith, 2005; Vanderford, 1989). For instance, the “pro-life” side argues 
that “pro-choice” individuals (especially White, liberals) are paternalistic in their views, see poor 
Black women as lacking the intelligence or morals to be chaste, and therefore, encourage 
abortion as a form of population control for people of color (Smith, 2005; Vanderford, 1989). 
Further, critics argue that the “pro-choice” side’s emphasis on “free choice” and “reproductive 
rights” obscures the fact that not all women have the same ability to make reproductive decisions 
(Smith, 2005). For example, some women who seek abortions are more stigmatized than others 
because of internal biases (Norris et al., 2011) such as women who test positive for fetal 
abnormalities might experience relief from stigma because of the social norm that children with 
certain disabilities will have “worthless” lives and can be acceptably aborted (Smith, 2005).  
In contrast, the “pro-choice” side argues that the “pro-life” stance restricts abortion 
access, which disproportionately affects low-income women of color and perpetuates a cycle of 




the criminalization of abortion would perpetuate white supremacy and capitalism via the prison 
system. That is, if Roe is overturned, as the “pro-life” side favors, women who have abortions 
will be prosecuted and be incarcerated. This criminalization will heavily impact poor women of 
color because 1) the prison system disproportionately incarcerates people of color and 2) 
proportionately, women of color have the most abortions. In fact, there has been a growing 
movement that focuses on women of color organizing for reproductive justice, as they are 
disproportionately affected by the outcomes of this debate (Ross, Gutierrez, Gerber, & Siliman, 
2016). Smith (2005) contends that women of color activists should develop alternate paradigms 
to replace the “pro-life”/“pro-choice” rhetoric and address these systems of oppression.  
Differences in conceptualization. Both sides see abortion as a socially and morally 
important issue to be legislated (“either by restrictive or protective measures,” Vanderford, 1989, 
p. 166). However, both sides may have different foundations for defining and conceptualizing 
morality and therefore, may never see eye-to-eye (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Haidt and Graham’s 
(2007) Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) describes five foundations of morality (i.e., 1) 
harm/care, 2) fairness/reciprocity, 3) ingroup/loyalty, 4) authority/respect, and 5) purity/sanctity) 
and posits that different groups of people value these foundations to varying degrees, potentially 
resulting in disjunctive views on social issues. Their analysis of these foundations by political 
ideology compares moral motivation of liberals and conservatives; they conclude that the first 
two foundations (i.e., harm/care, fairness/reciprocity), which make up the tenants of autonomy, 
motivate liberals. In contrast, conservatives are motivated by all five foundations and value 
autonomy to a point, but also factor in tenants of community (i.e., ingroup/loyalty, 




These differences in moral foundations can apply to the “pro-life”/“pro-choice” rhetoric 
as well. There has not been specific research to examine these polarized sides on the difference 
in their moral foundations. However, “pro-choice” individuals often align with a liberal school of 
thought whereas “pro-life” individuals often align with conservatives (Begun et al., 2016; Hess 
& Rueb, 2005; Smith, 2016; Strickler & Danigelis, 2002). Accordingly, “pro-choice” people are 
motivated by (women’s) autonomy, which concern the first two foundations of morality and 
“pro-life” people are motivated by all five foundations. For example, regarding foundation 1) 
harm/care, “pro-choice” and “pro-life” individuals have sensitivity to cruelty and harm but, as 
stated earlier, they differ on whose harm they prioritize. To “pro-choice” people, forcing a 
pregnancy on a woman who does not wish to be pregnant is mentally and physically harmful 
whereas “pro-life” people view abortion as cruelty to a helpless fetus. Regarding foundation 2) 
fairness/reciprocity, “pro-choice” individuals, who often identify as feminists (Levit & Verchick, 
2016), are people who prioritize social justice and reproductive rights. Therefore, they deeply 
value the second foundation of justice and fairness for women. “Pro-life” people may value 
justice as well but, as Haidt and Graham (2007) point out, “these virtues [related to fairness and 
justice] can, of course, be overridden by moral concerns from the other four systems” (p. 104). 
Arguably, “pro-life” individuals endorse foundations related to community and divinity with 
more weight, which apply to the next three foundations. Regarding these last three foundations 
3) ingroup/loyalty, 4) authority/respect, and 5) purity/sanctity, similar to Haidt and colleagues’ 
(2009) MFT application of conservatives’ moral aversion to homosexuals, “pro-life” people have 
a moral aversion to women who seek abortions. They are more likely to see women who seek 
abortions as violating the norms and roles of traditional femininity (e.g., ingroup femininity as 




aspiration for motherhood, and nurturing of vulnerable persons; Kumar et al., 2009). These 
violations may override a “pro-life” person’s valuing of autonomy (i.e., the first two 
foundations).  
Knowledge of abortion. Beliefs and knowledge about what abortion entails (and how 
that affects their conceptualization of the fetus) affects part of these cognitive attitudes toward 
the fetus. As education level links to attitudes (e.g., Kelly & Gauchat, 2016; Smith & Son, 2013; 
Wang, 2004), some studies have specifically examined knowledge of abortion and/or abortion 
laws in relation to view or behaviors, although few studies have examined a general U.S. 
population. Of the few studies that examine knowledge of abortion and laws with general 
populations in the U.S. (Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh, Bessett, & Littman, 2013; Lara et al., 
2015), all revealed that knowledge of abortion (e.g., safety, legality, prevalence) among their 
samples was low and called for interventions to increase such knowledge. 
Moreover, these American studies found evidence of misinformation among participants, 
including beliefs that abortion is illegal, causes negative health consequences, and confusing the 
abortion pill and emergency contraception (Bessett et al., 2015; Hickey, 2009; Kavanaugh et al., 
2013; Stone & Waszak, 1992). These misconceptions could certainly influence the cognitive side 
of abortion attitudes. Additionally, scholars have investigated participant characteristics that 
predict abortion knowledge. Studies indicate that greater knowledge of abortion is predicted by 
abortion experience (either those who knew someone who had an abortion or those who had had 
an abortion themselves; Bessett et al., 2015; Lara et al., 2015), more liberal attitudes toward 
abortion (Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh et al., 2013), less conservative political ideology 
(Bessett et al., 2015), and higher knowledge of non-abortion sexual health topics (e.g., 




general abortion knowledge is low considering that basic level of sexual health knowledge is low 
among adults in the U.S. (Frost et al., 2012; Kavanaugh et al., 2013; Volck et al., 2013). As level 
of sexual health knowledge is often related to states’ sex education policies, Bessett and 
colleagues (2015) examined whether knowledge of sexual health and abortion was predicted by 
where participants lived (e.g., red state, blue state). However, they found that it was not a 
significant predictor, indicating that lack of abortion knowledge is not necessarily linked to 
living in a conservative or liberal state.  
In addition to lack of knowledge affecting how attitudes are developed, it can also affect 
seeking abortion services; many women experience delays in abortion care because they didn’t 
recognize the pregnancy (e.g., lack of reproductive health knowledge) or they didn’t know where 
to find abortion care (either a provider in general or one with proper training; Doran & 
Nancarrow, 2015; Upadhyay et al., 2014). The combination of abortion identity (i.e. cognitive 
framing), moral foundation, and lack of knowledge can create cognitive dissonance and take an 
emotional toll on women who seek abortions (e.g., the affect-based side of abortion attitudes). 
3. Attitudes toward Abortion 
When examining demographic correlates and identification with these cognitive frames, 
as one incorporates more social identities (e.g., gender, education level), people do not fall as 
neatly into one side. Thus, asserting that people can only be “pro-choice” or “pro-life” may 
oversimplify attitudes. Although equal percentages of the U.S. population report identifying as 
“pro-life” and “pro-choice” (46% and 49% respectively; Gallup, 2017), research indicates that 
the public is deeply ambivalent (e.g., simultaneously think abortion is murder and a personal 
choice) and can identify with both or neither of the “pro-life” and “pro-choice” aspects (Bowman 




component in addition to a cognitive component (e.g., Breckler, 1984; Breckler & Wiggins, 
1989; Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Affect-based attitudes include emotions and feelings whereas 
cognition-based attitudes include beliefs and judgments (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Generally, 
attitudes are based in one component or the other (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016) but attitudes toward 
abortion are unique in that they include both components. In fact, simplifying a person’s attitude 
toward abortion based on their identification with a cognitive frame (e.g., “pro-life,” “pro-
choice”) would ignore the affective/emotional side of people’s abortion attitudes, or the conflict 
between the “head and the heart” (Kimport et al., 2012; Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Balancing those 
components leads to ambivalence and the more influential component often depends on the 
circumstance.  
For example, a cognition-based attitude about abortion may relate to one’s belief about 
whether the fetus is a person. If an individual does not believe that the fetus is a person, then 
different circumstances of pregnancy (e.g., poverty, health) may be irrelevant because their 
cognitive belief will take precedence and will result in support for a woman’s right to choose her 
pregnancy outcome. In contrast, if an individual believes that the fetus is a person, the 
circumstances of pregnancy may be irrelevant because their cognitive belief will result in 
opposition to abortion. However, there are circumstances that may be highly emotional and may 
create caveats to these cognitive beliefs. Circumstances such as rape or if the woman’s life is at 
stake generally elicit high support for abortion in the general population (Mikoajczak & 
Bilewicz, 2015; Smith & Son, 2013) and, therefore, could override cognitive belief about the 
fetus. Rape and life endangerment elicit both an affective (e.g., emotions for the woman’s safety) 
and cognitive response (e.g., believing that, to a degree, she was not responsible for her 




public support is low, such as second- and third- trimester abortions and “elective” reasons (e.g., 
circumstances not conceptualized as “traumatic”; Cook, Jelen, & Wilcox, 1992; Jones & Weitz, 
2009). These circumstances could override cognitive beliefs about the fetus as well. For 
example, “pro-choice” individuals often have reservations about abortion support after a certain 
gestational age (Ludlow, 2008). 
Indeed, people have always conceptualized “good” abortions (e.g., women who have a 
“good” reason for abortion; rape, fetal malformation, first time abortion) and “bad” abortions 
(e.g., women who have a “bad” reason for abortion; selfish women, later gestational age; Norris 
et al., 2011). These reasons are based on cognitive beliefs (or misbeliefs about fetal development 
at a certain point) but elicit very emotional responses in some people. Kumar and colleagues 
(2009) indicate that “suitability for motherhood and acceptability of pregnancy termination is 
determined by a host of individual characteristics including socio-economic status, occupation, 
race or ethnicity and age” (p. 628) and Osborne and Davies (2012) denote that supporting these 
“good” abortions but not “bad” abortions is based on internalized sexism. In fact, even women 
who have had abortions will distinguish themselves from other abortion patients as having a 
“good” reason compared to others (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010). The truth is that abortions that stem 
from “good” reasons are rare; 1% of abortions in the U.S. are from rape or incest, less than 1% 
are from fetal anomalies, and less than 20% of patients are under the age of 19 (Ludlow, 2008). 
More often, abortion is because of financial reasons, or lack of readiness, which may not fall 
under perception of “good” reasoning (Ludlow, 2008). 
Affect-based attitudes toward abortion. In addition to how certain pregnancy 
circumstances make an individual feel, the affective side of abortion attitudes (e.g., emotions and 




feelings toward women who seek abortions (e.g., effect of stigma). Additionally, it addresses the 
perception of the emotional toll abortion and abortion restrictions may or may not take on 
women. 
Feelings towards individuals involved with abortion. A well-studied component of the 
affect-based side of abortion attitudes involves how people view individuals involved with 
abortion, specifically regarding stigma. In order to stigmatize a group, others must identify (e.g., 
label/distinguish) that group’s differences (separating “us” from “them”), link those differences 
to perception of negative characteristics, and then members of the group with those perceived 
characteristics experiences a loss of status or discrimination (Goffman, 1963; Kumar et al., 2009; 
Link & Phelan, 2001). Therefore, stigma can result in negative mental health outcomes such as 
depression, anxiety, or feelings of isolation (Kumar et al., 2009; Macdonald, 2003) and can 
perpetuate secrecy and shame. These feelings can lead to delays in seeking an abortion, 
underreporting of abortions, reduction of the number of physicians who opt into training, and 
increase of unsafe abortions (Kumar et al., 2009; Norris et al., 2011).  
Norris and colleagues (2011) point out that abortion stigma is slightly different from 
other stigmas because it is “concealable” (p. S50). A safe and complete abortion allows for some 
invisibility because there are no obvious lasting outcomes, which permits women to keep it to 
themselves (Kumar et al., 2009). Although abortion stigma is concealable to some end, its effects 
are wide reaching and can apply to many people, whether primary or secondary to the 
experience. Norris and colleagues (2011) lay out categories of abortion stigma as it affects three 
populations: individuals who work in abortion provision, women who have abortions, and 




Individuals who work in abortion provision. Providers and individuals who work in 
abortion provision experience affiliate stigma, some that is less concealable because it is external 
(Lipp, 2011; Norris et al., 2011). This external stigma is perpetuated by anti-abortion activists’ 
use of picketing, intimidation, harassment, threats, and acts of violence (e.g., clinic bombings, 
arson) in attempts to decrease the number of providers (Medoff, 2015). In fact, 84% of clinics 
have reported at least one instance of harassment, 53% have reported incessant picketing, and 
3% have reported bomb threats (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). Many studies show that those who 
work in abortion provision worry about the effect of this external stigma on their safety and 
consequently, it has affected the number of health professionals that are willing to work in 
abortion provision (Doran & Nancarrow; 2015; Medoff, 2015; Norris et al., 2011). Additionally, 
for those that work in abortion care, there are internal stigmas among providers, depending on 
what kind of abortion they are willing to provide (Norris et al., 2011).  
A study by Lipp (2011) that examined nurses’ and midwives’ perceptions of coping with 
stigma within the context of abortion care, found an importance in providing the impression of 
normality and discretion within their facility so as to keep from spreading this external stigma to 
women. Norris and colleagues (2011) point out that even supportive environments, such as 
abortion clinics, may unintentionally perpetuate these stigmas to women because they are 
stigmatized environments. Women may feel less comfortable to ask about procedures (e.g., what 
to expect) and may internalize these stigmas so deeply that they feel even those who work in 
abortion care are judging them. Kimport, Weitz, and Freedman (2016) discuss how patients may 
perceive varying support from their physicians based on their own performance of the right 




Physicians experience an unconscious conceptualization of the “legitimacy” of abortions, which 
can affect the care they provide (Kimport et al., 2016). 
Women who have abortions. Women who have abortions face unique stigma. Lipp (2011) 
parses the sources of a woman’s stigma into two parts: stigma she feels about herself (guilt, 
shame) and internalization of societal prejudice. In an attempt to avoid societal prejudice, some 
women become stigmatizers of other abortion patients to distance themselves from women who 
have abortions for “bad” reasons (Norris et al., 2011). In fact, Ellison (2003) argues that 
stigmatizing women who have abortions and keeping them silent is a form of “structural 
violence” (p. 323) and therefore perpetuates the idea that there are “good” and “worthy” women 
(e.g., married women who become pregnant and have babies) and socially deviant women (e.g., 
those who are not married, those who end their pregnancies). Likewise, Kumar and colleagues 
(2009) posit that women who get abortions are marked “as inferior” (p. 628) by violating the 
three ideals of womanhood/femininity: women must have sex only for procreation, women must 
aspire to become mothers, and women must act on their instinct to nurture the vulnerable.  
Two-thirds of women report anticipating they would feel stigma if others knew that they 
had an abortion (Norris et al., 2011), therefore they go to great lengths to conceal their abortions, 
such as paying out of pocket instead of reporting it to their insurance (Jones, Finer, & Singh, 
2010) or self-sourcing abortion-inducing drugs (Grossman et al., 2010). When women conceal 
their experiences, they must cope without a support system; despite the fact that support systems 
alleviate the effects of abortion stigma so keeping it from others often does more harm than good 




Supporters of women who have abortions. As many women conceal their abortions from 
their support systems, the stigma felt by partners, friends, and family is understudied (Norris et 
al., 2011). However, Norris and colleagues (2011) posit these parties may also feel affiliate 
stigma --male partners of women who have abortions feel many of the same emotions that 
women feel (e.g., guilt, anxiety, ambivalence). There has been some research exploring the effect 
of partner pressure to have or not have an abortion and social abandonment on women’s reported 
abortion experiences (Kimport et al., 2011). However, literature on why partners left often 
focuses on feelings about parenting or finances instead of stigma they felt about being associated 
with abortion (Kimport et al., 2011). Additionally, Norris and colleagues (2011) speak about the 
effect stigma has on abortion scholars and activists when attempting to secure funding—they 
often face difficulty or rejection because of negative associations with abortion and the 
perception of people who study/support it. 
Mechanisms of stigma. Experience of social deviation applies to all three groups; Kumar 
and colleagues (2009) discuss behaviors/language at every level of an ecological model that 
perpetuate these stigmas and keep providers, support systems, and women scared and silent. 
Ecological models are composed of several concentric circles that represent factors/determinants 
of an issue. The outermost circle includes societal mechanisms that frame discourse, cultural 
norms, and mass media. At this level, Kumar et al. (2009) discuss the global language of 
pregnancy termination (e.g., lost, dropped), conflation of fetus and baby, and terms for abortion 
providers (e.g., abortionists, murderers). The next circle consists of governmental/structural 
factors such as policies and laws (e.g., global “gag” rules) that perpetuate the deviancy of 
abortion. Third, the organizational/institutional circle includes the separation of abortion care 




insurance coverage. The second to last circle includes community factors which comprise the 
loss of community networks for women who have abortions and being labeled negatively (e.g., 
as promiscuous or worse). Finally, the innermost circle includes individual factors of shame, 
guilt, feeling selfish or immoral, and the struggle to make sense of an abortion (because of norms 
of femininity). 
Affect-based outcomes after an abortion. Research indicates that women who have had 
an abortion are at no higher risk of negative mental health outcomes (e.g., anxiety, depression) 
than levels endemic to the general population; they even report an increase in psychological 
well-being (e.g., quality of life, life satisfaction, self-esteem) after an abortion (Biggs, Upadhyay, 
McCulloch, & Foster, 2016; Bradshaw & Slade, 2003; Crandell, 2012; Westhoff, Picardo, & 
Morrow, 2003). Despite evidence from myriad studies that abortion does not routinely cause 
negative mental health outcomes, anti-abortion activists assert the opposite in their discourse vis-
à-vis Post Abortion Syndrome (PAS); this phenomenon alleges women who have had abortions 
suffer negative mental health outcomes such as depression, loss of self-esteem, and thoughts of 
suicide (Haugeberg, 2017). While, the majority of women report neutral or positive post-abortion 
experiences, there are women who report feeling distress about their decision. Qualitative 
research with a small sample of women who experienced regret or distress indicated several 
social factors contributed to these negative feelings; these factors included feeling a lack of 
decisional autonomy (e.g., influenced or pressured by another person to get the abortion), a lack 
of social support, and loss of relationships (Kimport, 2012; Kimport, Foster, & Weitz, 2011). 
These women’s narratives align with previous research that indicates perceived abortion stigma 




symptoms (Rocca et al., 2015; Steinberg et al., 2016). However, these accounts are rare and 
contradict much of the literature on pre- and post- abortion mental health outcomes. 
Although post-abortion psychological outcomes are generally positive, the factors leading 
up to making a decision (e.g., unplanned/unwanted pregnancy, partner communication, social 
deviance) and gaining access to abortion are stress-inducing (Weitz et al., 2008). To examine the 
extent of these factors on mental health outcomes, Steinberg and colleagues (2016) point out that 
research is approached from a framework of either 1) abortion is trauma (e.g., examining 
common risk factors for psychological health such as history of intimate partner violence or 
mental health conditions) or 2) abortion is a stressful situation (e.g., examining how one copes, 
sociocultural context, protective factors such as support system or self-esteem, perception of 
stigma). There are studies that indicate if women do experience negative psychological outcomes 
(e.g., anxiety, depression), levels are highest right before an abortion and then dissipate or return 
to endemic levels after the abortion (Bradshaw & Slade, 2003; Rocca et al., 2015; Steinberg et 
al., 2016). Anti-abortion activists have capitalized on the pre-abortion influx of complicated 
feelings and stress and use it to perpetuate the looming threat of Post Abortion Syndrome (PAS) 
with the intention that women will change their minds about having an abortion (Haugeberg 
2017).  
Some research indicating women experience post-abortion negative mental health 
outcomes (and confirming the existence of PAS) has been systematically reviewed and found to 
be methodologically flawed. Typical flaws include failing to incorporate a comparison or control 
group, incorporating an inappropriate comparison group, or failing to control for confounding 
variables (Charles, Polis, Sridhara, & Blum, 2008). Methodologically sound studies that examine 




have had abortions to women who have carried their pregnancy to term or experienced other 
pregnancy events such as miscarriage or stillbirth. In these sound studies, overwhelmingly, there 
were no differences or a very slight decrease in examined psychological outcomes (e.g., anxiety, 
depression, affect, distress) between the comparison groups (Bradshaw & Slade, 2003; Crandell, 
2012; Posavac & Miller, 1990; Steinberg & Russo, 2008; Steinberg et al., 2016). Moreover, for 
decades, literature has found that women unequivocally report being sure they made the right 
decision (Rocca et al., 2015) and the most common post-abortion feeling was relief (Bradshaw & 
Slade, 2003). 
Post-abortion attitudes by gender. Though many studies focus on a woman’s pre- and 
post- abortion feelings, some literature examines the feelings of both women and their male 
partners. In these studies, feelings of distress often differ by gender. In a study examining 
sources of pre-abortion anxiety in men and women, the main source for women was anticipation 
of pain (these feelings dissipated after the abortion); however, for men, the main source of 
anxiety was moral dilemma (Lauzon, Roger-Achim, Achim, & Boyer, 2000). Moreover, male 
partners of women who have abortions tend to experience negative post-abortion feelings. Coyle 
and Rue (2015) found that male partners of women who had an abortion reported feeling like a 
victim or helpless in the decision; many men spoke about loss or grief for their “baby” and 
looked to religion for forgiveness or healing. It is important to note that this sample was recruited 
online from Crisis Pregnancy Center websites, likely resulting in a biased sample. That is, men 
who were feeling distraught by their partner’s decision may have sought out opportunities to 
express their negative feelings, whereas men who felt neutral or experienced feelings of eustress 




Affect-based outcomes after a denied abortion. Although research indicates that women 
who have abortions are not at a higher risk to experience negative mental health outcomes, 
women who are denied a wanted abortion are at an increased risk of depression and anxiety 
(Foster et al., 2015). Women who are forced to raise children from unintended pregnancies after 
being denied a sought-after abortion are more likely to be economically and educationally 
disadvantaged and their children are more likely to experience negative health consequences 
(Foster et al., 2018; Gipson, Koenig, & Hindin, 2008; Joyce, Kaestner, & Korenmen, 2000; 
Korenman, Kaestner, & Joyce, 2002; Monea & Thomas, 2011). In contrast, women who seek 
and obtain wanted abortions compared to those who seek them but are turned away/forced to 
continue the pregnancy, are more likely to achieve short-term aspirational plans (e.g., 
educational, employment, change in residence; Upadhyay et al., 2015), more likely to have full-
time employment, and less likely to be on public assistance months to years after the pregnancy 
(Foster et al., 2018). Upadhyay and colleagues (2014) estimate that more than 4000 women in 
2008 carried unwanted pregnancies to term because they were denied a wanted abortion. 
However, it is probable that number has grown in current years given the influx of state-level 
abortion restrictions.  
4. Legislation and Voting 
These different attitudinal components toward abortion are core to legislation and voting 
in response to this perception. Cognition-based attitudes about legislation involve 
beliefs/knowledge of the law’s status, what it entails, and how it practically affects women who 
seek abortions. The affective side of abortion legislation concerns the emotional aspect for 
women who seek abortions in states with these restrictions. First, this section will describe a 




Next, I will describe the most common types of abortion restrictions enacted across the nation by 
detailing the what it entails and in how many states, and the impact it has had on women’s access 
of each restriction category. Then, I will discuss literature that explores general knowledge of 
these abortion laws. Last, I will discuss practices of and attitudes toward voting on abortion.  
Post-Roe abortion legislation. In the last five years, there has been a significant increase 
in state-level restrictions on abortion; in 2016, 50 new restrictions were passed, resulting in 338 
laws restricting abortion in 6 years (Nash et al., 2017). These restrictions were gradually made 
possible by a series of court cases in the years since Roe, which weakened the trimester 
parameters originally set for abortions in 1973. Only a few years later, in 1977, congress passed 
the Hyde Amendment, which Boonstra (2016) refers to as the “grandfather of all abortion 
restrictions” (p. 46). Essentially, this amendment banned federal funding for abortion for women, 
yet it maintained funds for sterilization and birth expenses (Boonstra, 2016; Ellison, 2003). This 
action resulted in making reproductive choice a privilege that could not (and still cannot) be 
easily afforded by women who are low-come, have disabilities, are of Native American descent, 
prison inmates, or military personnel (Boonstra, 2016; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). 
 As time went on, in the late 80’s/early 90’s, two major court cases changed the nature of 
abortion access in the U.S. In 1989, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services replaced Roe’s 
trimester framework with a focus on viability of the fetus (i.e., interest in potential life; Levit & 
Verchick, 2016); in 1992, Planned Parenthood v. Casey set a new standard that allowed for any 
restriction of abortion as long as it did not place an “undue burden” (e.g., obstacle) on women 
(Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 1992). Together, court 
decisions asserted that the states’ interests were in protecting fetal life and opened the door for 




Health v. Hellerstedt clarified Casey’s standards so that courts must strike down proposed 
restrictions “that do not have tangible benefits” (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a), legislators have 
still managed to pass restrictions at the state level in multitudes. In fact, during the 2017 
legislative session, politicians introduced over 400 bills restricting access to reproductive 
options, passing 57 of them (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). 
Types of restrictions. There are several types of restrictions; Medoff (2015) describes 
them as either affecting the supply-side (e.g., facilities, providers) or the demand-side (e.g., 
women who seek services) of abortion. Most restrictions aim to delay abortion so that it is either 
too inconvenient, expensive, or logistically/legally impossible for women to obtain an abortion 
(Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Jones & Weitz, 2009). For example, some restrictions drag out the 
time between pre-abortion counseling and abortion provision, involve parents, require expensive 
testing (e.g., ultrasound), or supply misleading information to discourage women from their 
decision (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Jones & Weitz, 2009; Vandewalker, 2012). In a national 
examination of the effect of restrictions intended to delay abortion, Bitler and Zavodny (2001) 
found that the number of post-12 week abortions increased. This is concerning because abortions 
13 weeks and later have a higher risk of complications and death and are more expensive than 
those before 12 weeks (Roberts et al., 2014).  
Conversely, other restrictions actually try to make abortion impossible for women by 
restricting insurance coverage or requiring burdensome changes to the physical brick and mortar 
facility (Jones & Weitz, 2009). The Guttmacher Institute classifies 10 major types of abortion 
restrictions that are enacted across the U.S. (Nash et al., 2017). If a state has four or more of 
these restrictions, they are considered “hostile” to abortion and if they have more than six, they 




hostile” and nearly all were in the Southern region (Nash et al., 2017). These ten restrictions will 
be discussed as they stood in 2017; they typically restrict abortion via requiring parental 
involvement, pre-abortion counseling, waiting periods, or ultrasounds, prohibiting federal 
funding, inhibiting private funding, regulating medication abortion and abortion facilities, or 
restricting abortions based on viability, and preparing for the overturn of Roe. 
 Parental involvement. These restrictions require a minor to obtain permission (i.e., 
consent) or notification from a parent before an abortion (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Guttmacher 
Institute, 2017c). Twenty-one states require parental consent, 12 states require parental 
notification, and 5 states require both (Guttmacher Institute, 2017c). Although, minors often do 
involve parents in their medical decisions, Blasdell (2002) points out that if a minor decides not 
to involve their parents, they probably have a good reason (e.g., threat of domestic violence, 
getting kicked out). 
There are instances where a minor can petition the court for a judicial bypass (i.e., 
permission to have the abortion without involving parents) but it is not an intuitive or easy 
process (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Blasdell, 2002). Judicial bypasses are time-consuming and 
minors face unique burdens with respect to time and transportation (e.g., they would have to skip 
school, they may not have a car; Blasdell, 2002). Additionally, in order to be granted a judicial 
bypass, the minor has to demonstrate, via a test, that she is sufficiently mature to have an 
abortion. Blasdell (2002) points out that if she fails this maturity test, her punishment is denying 
her an abortion and potentially saddling her with motherhood (an experience that certainly 
requires maturity). Regardless, in many cases, it is impossible for minors to obtain a judicial 
bypass (Blasdell, 2002). As for the affect-based side of parental involvement laws, in the end, 




following the implementation of these laws, the overall number of teen abortions decreased 
dramatically (Blank et al., 1996), rates of abortions 13 weeks and after increased in these states, 
as did rates of teens traveling to another state to obtain an abortion (Blasdell, 2002). Therefore, 
these laws often result in increased financial and logistical burden on minors to obtain an 
abortion while avoiding involving their parents or forced pregnancy. 
 Pre-abortion counseling. Thirty-five states require pre-abortion counseling and 29 
require specific information be disseminated (Guttmacher Institute, 2017g). These restrictions, 
sometimes referred to as “biased counseling laws” (Vandewalker, 2012), mandate that during 
pre-abortion counseling, physicians must inform patients about the risks of abortion, often with 
medically inaccurate or misleading information (Nash et al., 2017; Vandewalker, 2012). 
Depending on the state, physicians are required to inform patients about risk associated with 
abortion: infertility, psychological or emotional consequences such as PTSD or thoughts of 
suicide, or possible link of breast cancer; medical and/or empirical evidence supporting these 
risks is largely lacking (Vandewalker, 2012). In some states, instead of alleged side effects for 
women, physicians may be required to describe the developing fetus or embryo using 
characteristics that apply to development much later in the pregnancy, describe fetal pain, or 
simply use biased language such as referring to the fetus as the “unborn child” (Vandewalker, 
2012). Many outcomes of mandatory counseling laws are discussed in conjunction with the 
impact of waiting periods (discussed next) as a means to require women to make a separate trip 
for the abortion after the counseling trip (Joyce et al., 2009). Regarding the outcome of 
mandating clinics to give certain information to women, some clinics are required to disseminate 
this information via pamphlet or mail, which clinics report as financially burdensome (Joyce et 




that a medication abortion can be reversed after the first dose of pills, a statement that is not 
evidenced by medical research (Guttmacher Institute, 2019; National Academy of Sciences, 
2018).  
 Waiting period. Mississippi enforced the first waiting period law after Casey in 1992, 
which required women to receive (potentially biased; see above) information about abortion and 
alternatives and then wait a period to “reflect” or “fully weigh their options” before the abortion 
could be provided (Bitler & Zavodny, 200; Karasek, Roberts, & Weitz, 2016; Vandewalker, 
2012). Twenty-seven states have waiting period requirements; most dictate a period of 24 hours 
but some states require as many as 72 hours to pass between pre-abortion counseling and 
abortion provision (Guttmacher Institute, 2017g; Vandewalker, 2012). As for the real-world 
impact of these laws on women, when this waiting period is combined with a restriction that 
requires pre-abortion counseling to be conducted in person (i.e., ban on “telemedicine” or 
consultation via video conference), abortion becomes a two-visit process (Vandewalker, 2012), 
which increases financial and logistical obstacles (Karasek, Roberts, & Weitz, 2016). Joyce and 
Kaestner (2000) analyzed the years of data preceding and following Mississippi’s 24-hour 
waiting period and found effects of a delay in abortion services. The proportion of abortions 12 
weeks and before decreased whereas abortions 13-24 weeks increased by 45%. Moreover, 
women who lived closest to an in-state provider compared to those who lived closest to a 
provider outside of Mississippi, had an average increased gestational age by 4 days at abortion 
and the number of women who traveled to an out-of-state provider (where there was no waiting 
period) increased. 
 Ultrasound. Although an ultrasound can be used to confirm pregnancy in the exam prior 




ultrasound before an abortion (Nash et al., 2017) to significantly add to the costs of provision 
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017h). In the 26 states that regulate the provision of ultrasound, some 
require physicians to show or describe the image (and/or the developing fetus) and some must 
provide the opportunity to view their image (Guttmacher Institute, 2017h; Kimport, Weitz, & 
Foster, 2014). “Pro-life” activists hoped these images would inspire maternal-fetal bonding 
(Kimport, Weitz, & Foster, 2014). Further, some states require the use of transvaginal ultrasound 
because it provides a clearer picture of the uterine contents (Vandewalker, 2012).  
As for the emotional impact of these laws, research examining women’s reported 
emotions, perceptions, and experiences viewing their ultrasound before an abortion found 
conflicting results; some research indicated that women found it to be a positive experience 
because they were relieved that it didn’t “look like a baby” and confirmed their decision (Wiebe 
& Adams, 2009). In contrast, some research found that women had mixed feelings: some were 
positive, some neutral, and some negative. A study by Kimport and colleagues (2014) noted that 
women who went to clinics where they were required to offer an ultrasound viewing were more 
likely to report negative feelings; women may have seen the offer as a recommendation instead 
of an option and felt that practitioners were imposing their beliefs onto them. Despite restrictions 
that intend to use ultrasound to discourage women from having an abortion, research shows that 
this tactic is generally ineffective in changing women’s minds (Wiebe & Adams, 2009) but 
substantially increases financial barriers for women (Guttmacher Institute, 2017h). 
 Federal funding. Restriction on coverage of abortion by federal funding has been in 
effect since the implementation of the Hyde Amendment in 1977. Although at a federal level, 
public funding, such as Medicaid, for abortions (with the exceptions of life endangerment, rape, 




seventeen states have these opt in policies that allow for Medicaid funding for abortion (Bitler & 
Zavodny, 2001; Guttmacher Institute, 2017d; Nash et al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2014). However, 
research examining the practicality of these exceptions to restrictions on Medicaid coverage 
(e.g., implementation of state subsidized funds, coverage in the event of rape, incest, or life 
endangerment) reveal substantial barriers.  
For example, Bessett and colleagues (2011) conducted interviews with women who tried 
to use these state subsidized funds to cover their abortions and found that the majority of women 
were not able to access the funds in a timely manner, causing delays on provision and limiting 
women’s ability to obtain a medication abortion. Similarly, Dennis, Blanchard, and Cordova 
(2011) found in their interviews with individuals who were eligible for the exception (e.g., 
experienced rape, incest, or life endangerment) and attempted to get their abortion covered by 
Medicaid, that women had to navigate a complicated process of paperwork and filing claims. 
They estimated that of the 1165 women who reported that they should have qualified, only 429 
women were reimbursed. Of these women who received reimbursement, they described 
employing strategies that they perceived to influence their success, such as developing 
relationships with Medicaid staff and facility staff that were experienced in billing processes, and 
participating in legal action to force Medicaid to pay. However, these strategies are more time-
consuming and are not an option for all low-income individuals, thereby limiting their options to 
use Medicaid to cover abortions, regardless if they experienced rape, incest, or risk of life 
endangerment (Dennis et al., 2011). 
Dissimilar to other research examining effects of abortion restrictions, there are fewer 
recent research studies that clearly examine pregnancy outcomes as a result of Medicaid 




abortions among teenagers, but long term effects are difficult to elucidate (Henshaw, Joyce, 
Dennis, Finer & Blanchard, 2009). Older data suggests an estimated 20-25% of abortions will 
simply not take place among women who receive public assistance who cannot afford provision 
and its associated costs (Blank et al., 1996). Instead, woman will be forced into carrying the 
pregnancy to term; this is more likely to be the case among young, low-income, women of color 
(Blank et al., 1996; Cook et al., 1999). However, as Henshaw and colleagues (2009) point out in 
a literature review of studies addressing outcomes of Medicaid restrictions, many studies on this 
subject were conducted 30-40 years ago and had weak methodology because there are myriad 
confounding variables. 
 Private funding. In addition to restrictions on federal funding, 25 states prohibit private 
insurance from covering abortion or require companies to charge for an extra plan or higher 
premium to cover abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017d; Nash et al., 2017; Roberts et al., 2014). 
In 2010, under the Affordable Care Act, the Obama administration designated state-level 
assistance for individuals and small businesses to buy private health insurance for themselves 
and their employees (which covered an array of medical procedures that theoretically included 
abortion). However, some states responded to this action by passing laws that restricted private 
insurance coverage to make sure no federal funds went to abortion. In states with these 
restrictions, private insurance is either not allowed to cover abortion at all (some states exclude 
the exception of rape, incest, life endangerment), or members must pay a separate premium, 
referred to by some anti-choice legislators as an “abortion surcharge” (Guttmacher Institute, 
2017d; Hasstedt, 2015).  
 Medication abortion. Some restrictions impose medically inappropriate regulations on 




women, especially those who live in rural areas (Nash et al., 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017b). 
Thirty-four states require a licensed physician (i.e., not an advanced practice clinician such as a 
nurse practitioner) to prescribe abortifacient medication (e.g., mifepristone and misoprostol) and 
19 states require the pre-abortion counseling be conducted in person (Guttmacher Institute, 
2017b). That is, some states prohibit the use of “telemedicine” with medication abortion, which 
requires women who do not live close to a facility (women in 87-90% of U.S. counties; 
Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Jones & Kooistra, 2011) to make two trips to the clinic or stay extra 
days in the clinic’s vicinity (Guttmacher Institute, 2017b; Vandewalker, 2012). Grossman and 
colleagues (2011) investigated success of medication abortions comparing those who met with 
their doctor via telemedicine versus face-to-face and found no differences in efficacy. 
Additionally, during pre-abortion counseling, four states require physicians to tell patients 
inaccurate information about the medication abortion (i.e., that it can be reversed after the first 
dose of pills; Guttmacher Institute, 2017g). Claims of reversal using a progesterone treatment 
were initially based on results from a small number of patients (n = 7) that received varied sizes 
of doses; research investigating the efficacy of these claims found a lack of consistency in these 
treatments (Grossman et al., 2015; National Academy of Sciences, 2018). Most recently, 
Delgado et al. (2018) published a larger study claiming successful reversal of the effects of 
mifepristone. Grossman and White (2018) rebutted this article maintaining that this treatment is 
inconsistent and laws promoting it “essentially encourage women to participate in an 
unmonitored research experiment” (p. 1491). 
 Abortion facilities. In an effort to diminish the “supply-side” of abortion (Medoff, 2015) 
and drive out abortion providers (Medoff & Dennis, 2011), some states have enacted very 




as TRAP laws (Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers; Guttmacher Institute, 2017i; Nash et 
al., 2017). For example, some states require providers to have admitting privileges or be within a 
certain distance to a hospital. These procedures seem to exist only to create barriers because less 
than 0.03% of patients experience major complications that would require a hospital 
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017i). In order to have admitting privileges, many hospitals require 
clinics to admit a certain number of patients per year. This minimum is difficult to impossible for 
clinics to reach because of the low risk of abortion provision (Gold & Nash, 2013).  
 In addition to admitting privileges, many TRAP laws require facilities to adhere to 
Ambulatory Surgical Center (ASC) standards (Jones & Weitz, 2009). An ASC is appropriate for 
“sophisticated” surgical procedures and overnight hospital stays--neither of which often apply to 
common abortion provision (especially medication abortions, the majority of which occur at 
home, yet ASC standards apply to facilities that offer this option in 17 states; National Academy 
of Sciences, 2018). These standards include specific augmentation of: hallway and doorway 
width, rate of airflow, number of parking spaces, staffing (e.g., there must be 1 registered nurse 
(RN) to oversee all nursing staff and another RN for every 6 patients in the facility), and other 
costly regulations such as specific outdoor landscaping (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; Jones & Weitz, 
2009). Regarding the impact of these laws on abortion practices, there have been no differences 
in abortion outcomes (e.g., safety, efficacy) between facilities that are up to ACS standards 
compared to those that are not. Instead, in order to adhere to the new requirements, services at 
ASC clinics are more expensive (Jones & Weitz, 2009). Additionally, TRAP laws caused many 
clinics to close because they could not keep providers on staff with hospital admitting privileges 
or find locations within the required vicinities (Guttmacher Institute, 2017i). However, when 




to close were ruled unconstitutional and therefore courts were able to temporarily block them 
from being enacted (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). Though this was a monumental step 
in retaining reproductive options for women across the country, it remains to be seen what the 
long-term impact will be. 
 Viability. Many states have passed an unconstitutional ban on abortion before viability 
(i.e., “the point at which a fetus can survive outside the uterus”; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a) or 
limit abortion after viability (Nash et al., 2017). Many of these restrictions apply to late-abortions 
but several states are currently trying to ban the dilation and evacuation procedure in its entirety; 
four states have passed a ban on D&E procures (Nash et al., 2017). Forty-three states have 
imposed prohibitions after a certain point in pregnancy (e.g., fetal viability, third trimester) and 
22 states require the involvement of a second physician (i.e., attendance or certification of 
medical necessity) during a late-abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017j).  
Preoccupation with late-abortions gained attention with the use of “partial birth” 
discourse when describing these abortions in the 2000’s (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007). In 2000, the 
court case Sternberg v. Carhart attempted to ban the “intact” dilation and evacuation/dilation and 
extraction (D&X) procedure but the Supreme Court ruled the ban as unconstitutional and, 
therefore, the procedures remained legal (Stenberg v. Carhart 530 U.S. 914, 2000). However, the 
appointed judges of George W. Bush reheard the case in 2007 as Gonzales v. Carhart and ruled 
that it was not unconstitutional, resulting in a ban on “intact” procedures with the exception of 
life/health endangerment, rape, or incest depending on the state (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007; 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S.Ct. 1610, 2007; Guttmacher Institute, 2017j). These exceptions to the 
ban, such as the health exception, are often rare occurrences, meaning that most women will not 




is banned altogether (with exceptions such as health and life of mother), have discussed the 
health exception as a gateway to more liberal interpretation. That is, having this loophole could 
improve access if physicians were to apply the exception to any physical, mental, or social “risk” 
to women’s health instead of waiting until harm has occurred (Gonzalez & Velez, 2012). 
Regardless, some “pro-choice” activists argue that limiting abortion to “emergencies,” such as 
victims of rape or violence, re-victimizes those women (Ludlow, 2008). 
 Overturn of Roe v. Wade. With the current presidential administration’s ideology on 
abortion, some states have enacted restrictions of abortion in preparation for an event in which 
Roe v. Wade could get overturned (Nash et al., 2017). Eighteen states have declared their intent 
to ban abortion in virtually all circumstances or retain bans that were in place before Roe, 
whereas eight states assert that if Roe falls, they would operate under the same parameters they 
are operating under now such as the trimester framework dictated by their state (Guttmacher 
Institute, 2017e). That is, some states have passed these laws to protect women from interference 
with their reproductive decisions at the state level, regardless of the status of the federal 
precedent (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). 
States that have passed policies that would protect the right to abortion in the absence of 
Roe include states on the west and east coasts (i.e., California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and Washington; Guttmacher Institute, 2017e). Those who support 
overturning Roe may rationalize their stance by telling women who seek abortions to go to states 
where it is legal. However, these laws would increase travel and costs for women who live in 
states in the middle of the country that would prohibit abortion in a post-Roe world. Not 
coincidentally, these states that would ban abortion if Roe fell, coincide with states that have 




would mean women would not have an accessible way to keep from getting pregnant or to 
terminate a pregnancy. 
Currently, the dangers of overturning Roe v. Wade or imposing numerous restrictions 
such that abortion is not practically accessible can be observed in countries where abortion is still 
not legal. Women will continue to seek abortions despite status of legality as demonstrated in 
other countries; almost 20 million women a year undergo unsafe abortions worldwide, the 
majority of which live in the developing world (Sedgh, Henshaw, Singh, Ahman, & Shah, 2007; 
World Health Organization, 2007). Untrained providers provide illegal abortions in unclean 
conditions and many women must go to a hospital afterwards to complete the abortion or treat 
heavy bleeding, sepsis, or intra-abdominal injury (Kitulwatte & Edirisinge, 2015).  
Even now in the U.S., reports of women self-sourcing abortion have increased, especially 
in places where abortion is heavily restricted (e.g., ban on telemedicine) or stigma/harassment is 
rampant (Grossman et al., 2010). Almost 10 years ago, Grossman and colleagues (2010) 
conducted a qualitative examination of women who reported a self-induction attempt which 
indicated that they did so by taking medications or substances (oral contraception, injections, 
laxatives, beverages, plants), inserting objects into or using force to damage the uterus, and 
increasingly, using non-prescribed misoprostol to induce uterine contractions. Of the 30 women 
interviewed in the study, only 3 were successful in their attempt (all successful completions used 
misoprostol) and the rest experienced a range of bleeding, and injury, resulting in hospital 
admittance (Grossman et al., 2010). Experimenting with different substances (e.g., laxatives) and 
inserting objects into the uterus to induce abortion are dangerous strategies and can result in 
negative health outcomes; these cases will only increase if the U.S. Supreme Court rules to 




However, there has been an increase in research to examine self-sourcing or self-
managing of medication abortions (i.e., women purchasing misoprostol or misoprostol in 
combination with mifepristone online to terminate their pregnancies). Recent research analyzed 
the efficacy of many websites that offer abortion pills (i.e., by buying said pills, examining 
intactness of packaging, and sending them to a lab to test for chemical makeup) and determined 
that the majority of the websites and pills were legitimate (Murtagh, Wells, Raymond, Coeytaux, 
& Winikoff, 2018). Murtagh and colleagues (2018) concluded that self-sourcing was a viable 
option and could result in successful abortions (as many women do not need an ultrasound or 
clinician to take the pills and many do so at home anyway; Jelinska & Yanow, 2018). While, 
Aiken (2018) expresses wariness that some of these websites may not have adequate information 
to understand risks or recognize complications and do not offer sources of support, advocates 
and researchers realize that this could be a new realistic frontier for access, especially in a post-
Roe world (Aiken, 2018; Jelinska  & Yanow, 2018; Murtagh et al., 2018). 
 Restrictions for physicians. Abortion restrictions that target physicians who provide 
abortions are not technically on the Guttmacher Institute’s list of 10, however, these laws in 
conjunction with the aforementioned restriction categories affect the provision of abortion in 
many states. Legislation regulates how, when, and where abortions may be provided. 
Additionally, there are “physician-only” laws that limit who can administer services. Several 
states prohibit both procedural and medication abortions from provision by advanced practice 
clinicians (i.e., certified nurse-midwives, nurse practitioners (NP), and physician assistants 
(PA)). There is limited to no medical basis for these restrictions given that these providers have 
the necessary and relevant skills to administer these procedures with the same risk of 




health professionals to provide abortions would improve access, especially for low-income and 
women of color, as they are more likely to be cared for by NPs and PAs in public health 
departments or community health centers (Grumbach, Hart, Mertz, Coffman, & Palazzo, 2003; 
Schacht, 2008; Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz et al., 2013). Further, many states have given 
physicians an out with “conscientious objection” laws, which dictate that physicians can refuse 
to administer medical processes (e.g., filling prescriptions for birth control, abortions) if they cite 
“a moral, ethical, or religious objection” (Meyers & Woods, 1996, p. 115), decreasing the pool 
of willing providers. Forty-five states have these laws that allow health care providers to refuse 
to provide abortion services (Guttmacher Institute, 2018a) There has been much debate regarding 
these laws and Savulescu (2006) argues that physicians who cite these objections must ethically 
ensure that there are sufficient doctors willing to provide the service they are refusing. Given the 
scarcity of abortion providers, there is little room for objecting physicians. 
According to Vandewalker (2012), moral opposition is at the heart of all abortion 
restrictions. He argues that abortion patients face infinitely more regulations that patients who 
undergo other procedures with similar “risk profiles” (p. 7) and these restrictions are a form of 
gender discrimination in that they only apply to women. Moreover, Vandewalker (2012) argues 
that restrictions which require or encourage physicians to be paternalistic and impose their own 
morality onto a woman’s decision (e.g., biased counseling laws, conscientious objection) violates 
the tenets of informed consent (a patient should have access to all of the correct information prior 
to deciding a procedure) and the three principles of health care: respect for autonomy, 
beneficence, and justice. 
Knowledge of abortion laws. In addition to low knowledge of abortion, many studies 




Lara et al., 2015; Stone & Waszak, 1992; White et al., 2016). A qualitative study about women’s 
knowledge of state abortion laws revealed that even those who had had an abortion in that state, 
did not have an increased awareness of the laws (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010). Lara and colleagues 
(2015) explored low-income immigrant women of color’s knowledge of abortion laws and found 
significant effects on correct knowledge by their recruitment city (i.e., New York, Boston, San 
Francisco), higher education level, generational status (i.e., second or third generation), and the 
language spoken at home (i.e., English). Another study examined Texas women’s awareness of 
Texas abortion laws and found that the majority of women (75%) were not aware of the laws; of 
the women who were aware, only 19% supported them and 46% were not sure how they felt 
(White et al., 2016). A large public opinion poll by PerryUndem and Vox Media asked 1,060 
registered voters across the country about various aspects of abortion and found that the majority 
(60% and over) were not sure if the listed abortion legislations applied to the U.S. (insurance 
coverage, who could provide them, clinic standards, ultrasound). Further, almost half of the 
sample (46%) reported they did not think there was a law that would make doctors give 
medically inaccurate information, demonstrating that awareness of laws is low and knowledge is 
inaccurate. 
Knowledge of abortion and laws is low, yet, the majority of Americans (59%) also think 
abortion laws should be made much more or somewhat more strict (Bowman & Sims, 2017). 
Large national polls (e.g., Gallup) show that the majority of people (70% and higher) favor 24-
hour waiting periods, parental consent for minors, and doctors informing patients of alternatives 
or “possible risks.” However, regarding the latter, it is possible that when answering these 
questions, they assume that physicians would only inform them of “possible risks” grounded in 




not know that these “risks” (e.g., breast cancer, negative psychological health outcomes) are not 
supported with medical evidence. To that end, polls that ask about support for “partial birth” 
abortions should be subject to the same critique as they are potentially capturing attitudes based 
on inaccurate information. In large national polls, 60-70% of the samples reported they thought 
“partial birth” abortions should be banned, but only 45-50% reported support for “bans at 20 
weeks” (Bowman & Sims, 2017). While these percentages are still high, it remains to be seen 
whether or not the general population are aware of what fetal development looks like around 20 
weeks and if their attitudes would stay the same if they did.  
Weitz and colleagues (2008) comment that some people report being in favor of certain 
laws (e.g., mandatory counseling laws) because they believe they benefit women’s health (e.g., 
lessens the harm of abortion on women’s mental health outcomes). Weitz et al. (2008) give the 
example of mandatory waiting periods and how someone people may think it gives women time 
to make an informed decision when actually it delays abortion, makes the experience more 
expensive (e.g., travel, lodging), and may even result in seeking illegal abortion instead. 
Therefore, support for abortion restrictions may not be because people oppose abortion- but 
because they are not privy to the affect-based side of abortion restrictions (i.e., what they really 
mean for women). 
Voting on abortion. With a lack of knowledge on abortion and abortion laws but, in 
some cases, an overestimation of knowledge (Kavanaugh et al., 2013), studies have examined 
how attitudes and knowledge are intertwined with voting behaviors. Voting on abortion has been 
examined through the lens of political party, characteristics of legislators, and comparing the 




 Political party. In the 80’s, national political parties formalized their “issue ownership” 
of abortion resulting in democrats as the “pro-choice” party and republicans as the “pro-life” 
party (Highton, 2004; Jelen & Wilcox, 2003) but Adams (1997) points out that these have not 
always been each party’s stance. In fact, in years’ prior, republican masses were more “pro-
choice” and democratic masses were more “pro-life” in their ideology. He posits that, gradually, 
“elites” in politics (e.g.., candidates, political staff) dictated their party’s abortion view regardless 
of their corresponding constituency’s stance, indicating that views on abortion run from elites to 
masses instead of elites representing their constituencies (Adams, 1997; Jelen & Wilcox, 2003).  
Legislator characteristics. In most cases, partisanship dictates a legislator’s issue 
position but abortion attitudes seem to be less predictable. Studies have indicated that legislators 
often divorce their party’s position on abortion and vote based on their own characteristics (e.g., 
religious affiliation, gender) instead of characteristics of the constituencies or national party 
(Highton, 2004; Jelen & Wilcox, 2003; Richardson & Fox, 1972; Schecter, 2003). For instance, 
male legislators are more likely to vote “pro-life,” legislators from an urban area are more likely 
to vote “pro-choice,” and Catholic and Jewish legislators are more likely to vote “pro-choice” 
(Oldmixon & Hudson, 2008; Schecter, 2001). 
Additionally, morality could be a foundation for voting behaviors related to social issues. 
Haidt and Graham’s (2007) Moral Foundations Theory posits that liberals and conservatives 
differ on social issue stance because they consult different components of morality. That is, 
autonomy (harm/care and fairness/reciprocity) motivates liberals and therefore social justice is 
half of their moral motivation. Conservatives are motivated by autonomy, community 
(ingroup/loyalty and authority/respect), and divinity (purity/sanctity) and therefore social justice 




(2007) discuss what these motivations mean for each political group’s issue stance and, for 
example, suggest that “avoidance of carnal pleasures” (p. 101) as a principle of purity/sanctity is 
an equal factor in morality for conservatives. As abortion is an outcome of pregnancy, which is a 
result of sex, this principle might be a source of conflict for conservatives when considering their 
abortion stance. 
Despite the influence of these personal characteristic, Schecter (2003) postulates 
“legislators are in a constant balancing act concerning constituent influences, private influences, 
and how they perceive their own roles as state representatives” (p. 62). To explore these 
influences, Medoff and Dennis (2011) analyzed predictors of TRAP law enactments and found 
that they were not enacted as a result of high abortion rates in the state, religious make-up of the 
constituency, public anti-abortion attitudes, or state ideology. Instead, the political ideology of 
the legislators was a significant predictor of whether TRAP laws were in effect (i.e., republican 
was positively associated with TRAP law enactment and democrat was negatively associated; 
Medoff & Dennis, 2011). Therefore, even though they may be balancing influences from many 
parties, research indicates that legislators’ own interests often weigh in the most dominant. Given 
that it appears the majority of people (80%) believe women should have access to abortion under 
at least some circumstances when asked on surveys (Bowman & Sims, 2017; Smith & Son, 
2013), yet state-level legislation continues to restrict access, there seems to be a schism between 
constitutes’ abortion opinions and state legislatures. Either legislators are not listening to 
constituents’ attitudes toward abortion or certain constituents are failing to vote with abortion 
views in mind, or failing to vote at all. 
Legislator vs. constituents. Interestingly, the most mobilized people in America on the 




the time of Roe, often through church congregations (di Mauro & Joffe, 2007). Still, only a small 
to moderate portion (27-43%) of the population report abortion views are “very” or “extremely” 
important regarding which candidate to support and this portion tends to be predominantly anti-
choice (Bowman & Sims, 2017). One might assume that abortion is a “woman’s issue,” which 
may have an impact on the fact that women are more likely to factor their stance into voting 
behaviors (Simon et al., 2010). Regardless, abortion is considered by national polls conducted by 
Pew Research Center a “lower tier issue for both men and women” with 52% of women and 38% 
of men considering it an important issue (Chaturvedi, 2016) . Even if people report that it is in an 
important issue, only 5% said it was the single most important factor for candidate selection 
(59% indicated “the economy” as the most important issue) and only 20% reported they would 
only vote for a candidate that shared their abortion view, with more “pro-life” respondents 
reporting this than “pro-choice” (Bowman & Sims, 2017). Interestingly, in a recent Gallup Poll, 
63% of “pro-life” adults reported that were unfamiliar with Donald Trump’s abortion views 
(Saad, 2016).  
Even though attitudes about abortion are generally supportive under at least some 
circumstances, the majority of people think it should be restricted in some way. Yet, knowledge 
of abortion and laws are low indicating that they may think abortion restrictions are good in 
theory but lack the understanding of their impact on women, especially low-income women of 
color, who have to adhere to these laws. For example, parental consent laws have high 
endorsement in large national polls (Bowman & Sims, 2017) but to our knowledge, no studies 
have explored whether people are aware of factors/consequences that go into a minor being 
required to tell a parent they are pregnant and ask for their permission to get an abortion. We 




Therefore, we aim to test whether residents know what restrictions are in their states and whether 
they approve of those restrictions in an “extremely hostile” state (i.e., Arkansas) with myriad 
restrictions to choose from; then, after an intervention that educates them on restrictions on their 
implications for women, we aim to test if their knowledge and attitudes change. 
5. Abortion in Arkansas 
Although overall abortion rates have decreased nation-wide (Dreweke, 2017), rates in 
Arkansas have increased in recent years from 7.6 to 8.0 abortions per 1,000 women of 
reproductive age (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). Yet, Arkansas is among the top three states in the 
U.S. with the most abortion restrictions (22) passed between 2011 and 2015 (Guttmacher 
Institute, 2016b) and introduced more anti-abortion bills than any other state during the 2017 
legislative session (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). It is considered an “extremely 
hostile” state with restrictions in 8 of the 10 major categories (Guttmacher Institute, 2017k; Nash 
et al., 2017): 
• Parental involvement: Yes, Arkansas minors must provide consent from a parent 
prior to abortion. 
• Pre-abortion counseling: Yes, Arkansas physicians must give information on 
fetal pain to women who are 20 weeks’ gestation or further (which is prohibited 
with exception of life endangerment, rape, or incest). 
• Waiting period: Yes, women must wait 48 hours between pre-abortion 
counseling and abortion provision in Arkansas. 
• Ultrasound: No, Arkansas does not require a non-medically indicated ultrasound 




• Federal funding: Yes, Medicaid funding of abortion in Arkansas is banned 
except in cases of life endangerment, rape, or incest. Additionally, Arkansas does 
not use state funds to cover low-income women enrolled in Medicaid. 
• Private funding: No, Arkansas does not restrict abortion coverage in private 
health insurance plans. 
• Medication abortion: Yes, Arkansas imposes medically inappropriate 
restrictions on medication abortion such as physicians must give inaccurate 
information on reversing medication abortion and pre-abortion counseling must 
be provided in person (i.e., ban on telemedicine). 
• Abortion facilities: Yes, Arkansas enacted a law that requires ASC standards of 
their facilities, however they are temporarily blocked while in litigation (Center 
for Reproductive Rights, 2018). 
• Viability: Yes, Arkansas prohibits abortion after 20 weeks except in cases of life 
endangerment, rape, or incest and if such an exception occurs, a second physician 
must be present at viability during the abortion. This law is currently blocked 
while it is in litigation (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). 
• Overturn of Roe v. Wade: Yes, Arkansas has expressed intent to limit abortion to 
the maximum extent permitted. 
Consequently, Arkansas’ myriad restrictions have resulted in only three facilities in the entire 
state (Cartwright, Karunaratne, Barr-Walker, Johns, & Upadhyay, 2018) able to provide abortion 
services for approximately 600,000 women of reproductive age (i.e., 15-44; March of Dimes, 
2019). In addition, the restrictions deprive 97% of Arkansas counties the ability to maintain 




accessible facility in their county (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). Facilities are only available in 
Washington County (i.e., Planned Parenthood- Fayetteville Health Center, which only offers 
medication abortion) and Pulaski County (i.e., Little Rock Family Planning Services, Planned 
Parenthood- Little Rock Health Center).  
In Arkansas, a state that is 79.4% White, 15.7% Black, and 7.3% Latino/a (United States 
Census Bureau, 2016), a disproportionate number of low-income residents are people of color 
(i.e., 28.9% Black and 26.7% Latino, whereas only 14.1% White are low-income; Center for 
American Progress, 2017). Therefore, at a state level, restrictions placed on abortion have the 
ability to disproportionately impact Arkansan women of color, a segment of the population 
already at increased risk for experiencing unintended pregnancy (Arkansas Department of 
Health, 2010). Research examining Arkansans’ knowledge and attitudes toward abortion 
restrictions (and their impact on low-income women of color) is lacking. A qualitative study with 
Midwestern and Southern women recruited from facilities that offer abortion suggested that they 
had high concern for women’s equality and did not approve of restricting abortion for poor 
women (Cockrill & Weitz, 2010). However, a more representative national sample through the 
Gallup poll indicated that 40% favored prohibiting health clinics from receiving “federal funds,” 
which directly affects poor women (Bowman & Sims, 2017). 
 Although Arkansas is portrayed as a “red” state, and in the most recent election, about 
60% of Arkansans voted republican for president, senators, and house representatives (New York 
Times, 2017), only 53.1% of Arkansans actually voted (McDonald, 2016). Further, according to 
a study assessing a convenience sample of young adults from Arkansas and Oklahoma, 
approximately 67.7% indicated support for abortion access (Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 




according to the Arkansas Poll (2017), a phone survey of residents from across the state on 
political issues, about 60% of Arkansans thought abortion should be legal under at least some 
circumstances (Parry, 2017), which may suggest that Arkansans are not as “red” on abortion as 
state abortion restrictions might suggest. Yet, data on voting according to abortion stance 
indicates that many Arkansans fail to see it as important or critical. Furthermore, no studies have 
explored Arkansan’s knowledge and/or support for abortion restrictions in their state, which may 
affect importance of abortion as a voting issue. Therefore, there is need to examine baseline 
knowledge of and support for abortion restrictions in Arkansas, particularly for the majority of 
Arkansans that support abortion access under at least some circumstances but may fail to see it as 
an important issue in candidate selection or lack the knowledge to make an informed decision. 
6. Interventions with Abortion 
With much public scrutiny and legislative opposition, many facets of abortion require 
intervention or improvement at either a macro-level (e.g., waning number of providers, barriers 
to access due to restrictions) or a micro-level (e.g., reducing abortion stigma, increasing abortion 
importance in candidate selection, increasing knowledge of restrictions). Researchers and 
advocacy groups have certainly enacted interventions at both levels.  
At a macro-level, there are initiatives that focus on training new providers, awareness 
campaigns and petitions to repeal certain restrictions, and strategies at a legal level. For example, 
organizations such as the Family Planning Fellowship, Society of Family Planning, and National 
Abortion Federation provide abortion support, training, and scientific examination of abortion to 
improve conditions of provision (as very few medical schools require abortion training in their 
preclinical curriculum; Espey, Ogburn, Chavez, Qualls, & Leyba, 2005; Norris et al., 2011). 




are aging and there will be no one to replace them—providers decreased by 38% between 1982 
and 2005 (Jones & Kooistra, 2011). Centers such as the University of California San Francisco 
(UCSF) Bixby Center have trained over 5,200 providers with their Fellowships and training 
programs (Bixby Center for Global Reproductive Health, 2018). With these training programs, 
the demographic of abortion providers is changing (ten years ago, the majority of abortion 
providers in the U.S. were White men over the age of 55 who had been practicing for over a 
decade; O’Connell et al., 2008). More recently, research examined demographics of private 
practice obstetrician-gynecologists (ob-gyns) who provide abortions and found that young 
female physicians were more likely to provide them if encountering a patient who sought one 
(Stulberg, Dude, Dhalquist, Farr, & Curlin, 2012). However, the majority of abortion providers 
are not private practice physicians and research shows that 97% of the ob-gyns in Stulberg and 
colleagues’ sample (2012) reported having been solicited for abortion services by patients but 
only 14% provided them. Another study examining abortion provision and referrals among ob-
gyns in the United States revealed that of the physicians who reported they would not provide 
abortions, 35% also said they would not provide a referral for a physical who would (Desai, 
Jones, & Castle, 2018). Therefore, these training programs for physicians are continually needed. 
Another example of macro-level interventions is the All* above All (2013) petition and 
social media campaign to raise awareness about the harmfulness of the Hyde Amendment 
(Boonstra, 2016). A third example is the “Voices Brief,” a document consisting of women’s 
abortion narratives submitted to the Supreme Court by the National Abortion Rights Action 
League (NARAL Pro-Choice America) to convey the reality of abortion in women’s lives. 
Although the Supreme Court has never publicly cited this brief, Levit and Verchick (2016) point 




macro-level initiatives (e.g., changing policy and practices) have the ability to impact individual 
attitudes as well (Lipp, 2011).  
Scholars have discussed strategies at an interpersonal or intrapersonal (micro-) level to 
increase normalization and decrease stigmatization. Examples of these strategies include 
changing the way “pro-choice” people distance themselves from “good” and “bad” abortions, 
making an effort to use plain and simple language in social interactions (e.g., “products of 
conception”), and forming groups to empathize with others who have had abortions (Link & 
Phelan, 2001; Lipp, 2011; Norris et al., 2011). Empathy has been well studied as a mechanism to 
change affect-based attitudes; however, few studies have examined empathy building with a 
general population to increase knowledge of and decrease support for abortion restrictions.  
Changing affect-based attitudes with empathy. In general, empathy is a result of 
perspective-taking that “occur[s] when people can seemingly understand the underlying reasons 
for the behavior of someone other than themselves” (Plumm & Terrance, 2009, p. 191). Scholars 
have examined two primary types of empathy: trait and state (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 
1995; Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). One cannot manipulate trait 
empathy easily, as it results from an individual’s similarity with the population in question (e.g., 
personal characteristics such as gender and race). State empathy is a result of an individual’s 
ability to put themselves in the shoes of another person (i.e., perspective-take) based on 
presented situational factors; it can be induced and, therefore, experimentally manipulated 
(Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Trait and state empathy are linked in that if a person has trait 
empathy (similarities with the target population), one will be more likely to induce state empathy 
(i.e., put themselves in the shoes of another; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Research suggests that 




someone who has experienced rape) lead to higher levels of state empathy (Glynn & Sen, 2015; 
Moyer & Haire, 2015; Wiener, Felman Wiener, & Grisso, 1989). Moreover, women are 
generally more likely than men to have higher levels of empathy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; 
Hoffman, 1977), but there has been effective experimental induction of state empathy for men 
regardless of trait empathy (Plumm & Terrance, 2009).  
In addition to studying what characteristics are more conducive to empathy building, 
literature has elucidated different types of responses to empathy (e.g., cognitive, attitudinal, or 
behavioral; Davis, 1996). Behavioral response to empathy has been studied in the legal system, 
such as examining empathy’s effect on judges’ decisions on who to side with in gender-related 
cases (Glynn & Sen, 2015; Moyer & Haire, 2015) and mock jurors’ rating of homicide defendant 
responsibility (Plumm & Terrance, 2009). These studies have shown that empathy shifted 
cognition and therefore resulted in the reevaluation of the stigmatized party (e.g., the woman). 
For example, with an increase in empathy, mock jurors were more likely to understand why a 
battered woman would kill her abusive husband and consequently, be more likely to shift blame 
off the defendant and onto the system that failed her (Plumm & Terrance, 2009).  
The role of perspective-taking. More empathy research has focused on the role of 
perspective-taking on attitudes toward and engagement with stigmatized populations. Research 
shows that perspective-taking is an effective strategy to decrease stereotyping, reduce prejudicial 
evaluation, and allow people to see themselves in others (Batson et al., 1997; Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000). Batson and colleagues (1997) proposed three steps that explain how empathy 
can improve feelings toward a stigmatized group as a whole: first, adopting a person’s 
perspective leads to empathetic feelings; second, those feelings lead to the perception of 




a whole. Wang and colleagues (2014) found that perspective-taking increased the degree of 
engagement with stigmatized groups (e.g., sitting in close proximity or willingness to meet 
homeless individuals and Ah Beng individuals (stigmatized population in Singapore)). Another 
study found that prosocial conformity affected empathy induction (Nook, Ong, Morelli, Mitchell, 
& Zaki, 2016). That is, participants that observed others having high empathy toward a homeless 
population were more likely to increase their own feelings of empathy and behavioral response 
(i.e., donate to a homeless shelter).  
Empathy and abortion. Many of the studies on perspective-taking and stigmatized 
populations have been conducted with homeless individuals (Batson et al., 1997; Nook et al., 
2016; Wang et al., 2014), individuals who have committed homicide (Batson et al., 1997; Plumm 
& Terrance, 2009), individuals with illness or disability (Batson et al., 1997; Lor et al., 2015). 
Whereas the few empathy interventions that have focused on abortion, have targeted either 
health professionals or populations (e.g., Pace et al., 2008; Turner and colleagues, 2008) or 
specifically aimed for conflict resolution among “pro-life” vs. “pro-choice” populations 
(LeBaron & Carstaphen, 1997), but not the individuals who experience abortion. These 
interventions, however, have been successful in changing attitudes and knowledge toward 
abortion.  
For instance, “values clarification” workshops conducted in Vietnam, Nepal, and South 
Africa with health care providers, community members, and policymakers aimed to get 
participants to examine their moral reasoning and values around abortion and achieve empathy 
for women who had second-trimester abortions (Turner and colleagues, 2008). These workshops 
found a positive impact on participants’ attitudes but, perhaps, generated less defined change 




hearing the narratives of women and people in abortion care. For example, members of Medical 
Students for Choice have the opportunity to participate in an annual Reproductive Health 
Externship (RHE) program where they spend time working in facilities that provide abortion, 
sitting in on counseling and procedures, and talking with providers and patients. Pace and 
colleagues (2008) indicated that following their RHE, students’ support for abortion increased, as 
did their knowledge and empathy for patients and intention to become providers. 
Sharing stories and hearing others’ perspectives has been effective with more general 
populations as well, such as in self-identified “pro-life” and “pro-choice” community members 
who participated in workshops run by conflict resolution practitioners (LeBaron & Carstaphen, 
1997). These workshops, designed to break down stereotypes of the other side and find common 
ground, resulted in fostering empathy and relationship building. In addition to knowledge and 
attitudes about abortion in general, the effect of empathy can extend to feelings about 
restrictions. A qualitative study by Cockrill and Weitz (2010) explored women’s perceptions of 
abortion regulations and found that participants who expressed empathy for women seeking an 
abortion were more likely to argue against restrictions that would make it harder to get one (e.g., 
require travel long distances). It is important to note that this study was done with a small sample 
size with women who were recruited at facilities that offer abortion. We are aiming to examine 
further these links between empathy, knowledge, and support for restrictions with a more general 
population, specifically, in a hostile state. 
Manipulating empathy and knowledge. As there are cognitive and affective 
components to abortion attitudes, targeting both sides with empathy induction and education 
could stand to make an impact. Many methods and limitations have been discussed in order to 




several limitations to their three steps of improving attitudes toward stigmatized groups with 
empathy that are important to consider with our chosen population. They mention the possibility 
that empathy induction could be successful for the individual in the experiment but could fail to 
generalize to the population because there are subgroups within a population that could 
experience more or less stigmatization. For example, within the AIDS community, gay men, 
drug users, women, and children are stigmatized at different levels and one could empathize with 
a child with AIDS but not with the rest of the group. Batson et al. (1997) also caution for victim 
responsibility (i.e., participants thinking the population has brought their plight upon 
themselves). We aim to test if there are differences in empathy between subgroups by 
manipulating the race of the woman who delivers a testimonial about her personal abortion 
experiences. Additionally, we aim to test victim responsibility by manipulating perceived 
pregnancy responsibility. That is, the woman in the intervention video will either report 
becoming pregnant because of rape or because of consensual sex. We expect there to be 
differences in empathy and support for abortion restrictions based on these aspects and an 
increase in knowledge about abortion and restrictions. 
With increased knowledge, one can better take a person’s perspective and even change 
attitudes (Currier & Carlson, 2009). Plumm and Terrance (2008) state that in order to take 
another person’s perspective, one must also learn about the “contextual and structural 
constraints” that contribute to that person’s perspective (p. 189). A qualitative study of abortion 
providers that examined their approach to training medical students illustrates the power of the 
combination of knowledge and empathy. Participating providers indicated that, even for medical 




addition to observing patients, students developed empathy and an increased appreciation for 
providers (Freedman et al., 2010).  
In order to induce empathy, some studies have included activities such as disability 
simulations (e.g., engaging in a classroom with loss of dominant hand, vision, or speech; Lor et 
al., 2015) and assessments testing ability to decipher facial expressions (Drwecki, Moore, Ward, 
& Prkachin, 2011; Sherman, Lerner, Renshon, Ma-Kellams, & Joel, 2015). Other empathy 
experiments have had success by having participants watch, listen to, or read a testimonial and 
then instructing them to think about how the other person might be feeling (Davis, 1996; 
Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). In order to increase knowledge, 
experiments that involve video-based interventions have been effective (Conceicao, Pedro, & 
Martins, 2017; Blas et al., 2010; Parker, Stradling, & Manstead, 1996; Roberto, Meyer, Johnson, 
& Atkin, 2000; Warner et al., 2008). Specifically, the use of audio or video-based testimonials to 
increase knowledge and/or empathy appear to result in longer lasting attitude changes than 
written testimonials or education initiatives alone (Batson et al., 1997; Blas, et al., 2010; 
Braverman, 20008; Parker et al., 1996; Roberto et al., 2000). Therefore, we plan to test the effect 
of a video intervention aimed to increase knowledge of abortion restrictions, paired with an 
(state) empathy-inducing video testimonial to decrease support for said restrictions and increase 
empathy for women who have abortions.  
7. The Current Study 
In order to increase knowledge of and decrease support for restrictions, we administered a 
video intervention containing persuasive messages. However, the effectiveness of these 
messages depend on type (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). That is, persuasion efforts aimed at shifting 




and judgments) are most effective when there is a match between the message with the type of 
attitude (i.e., emotional messages with affective attitudes and informational messages with 
cognitive attitudes; Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). Attitudes toward abortion are unique in that they are 
often both emotional (e.g., considering how the woman must feel) and cognitive (e.g., scientific 
statements against existence of fetal pain, plausibility of being able to financially provide for a 
child), which can lead to complex feelings about abortion and feelings of ambivalence (Alvarez 
& Brehm, 1995; Craig et al., 2002; Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & Crawford, in preparation; 
Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018). Ambivalent attitudes are relatively unstable and may be 
easier to change (Ryffel & Wirz, 2014). 
Therefore, in order to persuade a person to decrease support for abortion restrictions, one 
must address both the affective and cognitive sides of these attitudes. To address the cognitive 
side, we aimed to raise awareness regarding the extent of restrictions enacted in Arkansas as a 
baseline intervention. In addition, as a manipulated variable, to address the affective side, we 
aimed to increase empathy for women who seek abortions by offering a testimonial from 
someone who has had to face these restrictions.  
The current study consisted of several video interventions that addressed either the 
cognitive side of abortion attitudes (i.e., knowledge of abortion and legislation) or the 
combination of cognition and affect (i.e., empathy for women who seek abortions). The control 
video consisted of the knowledge portion only (i.e., a news anchor giving information about 
abortion and restrictions in Arkansas) and the intervention videos consisted of four different 
testimonials from actors portraying women who sought out abortion in Arkansas. We 
manipulated several variables (i.e., race of the woman, perceived pregnancy responsibility) in the 




We compared control vs. intervention video conditions by examining pre-test, post-test, 
and follow-up differences of knowledge of current restrictions in Arkansas, support for those 
restrictions, and empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas. We explored the following 
research questions (described in further detail in Chapter 3): 
RQ1. Does watching a video with an empathy-inducing personal story in addition to an 
informational component (intervention) induce significantly different outcomes than watching a 
video that only contains an informational component (control) on pre-test, post-test, and follow-
up scores for 1) knowledge of abortion restrictions and 2) support for abortion restrictions? 
RQ2. Do the variables manipulated in the intervention empathy-inducing testimonials 
(race and pregnancy responsibility) produce different empathy characteristic scores between the 
five different video conditions (White woman, raped; White woman, consensual sex; Black 
woman, raped; Black woman, consensual sex; control (no testimonial))? 
8. Theoretical Framework 
Intersectionality 
Conceptually, the theory of Intersectionality offers an explanation as to why abortion is 
highest among young low-income women of color (particularly residing in rural areas) and 
simultaneously, they are the most vulnerable to restrictions (Boonstra, 2016; di Mauro & Joffe, 
2007; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011). Intersectionality is a Black feminist theoretical framework 
credited to Kimberle Crenshaw (1989) but additionally developed by other scholars in the late 
1980s/early 1990s such as Debarah King, Patricia Hill Collins, Cherrie Moraga, Gloria 
Anzualdua, and Nira Yuval-Davis (Gamson & Moon, 2004; McCall, 2005; Nash, 2008; Price, 




and oppression at a micro-level and a macro-level. It further dictates that oppressions at a macro-
level compound as more micro-level social identities intersect (Crenshaw, 1989).  
Dhamoon (2011) discusses the different terminologies used across intersectionality 
scholars and emphasizes Collins’ (2000) key notion that systems of oppression (e.g., patriarchy, 
racism, sexism, capitalism) are “interlocking.” She posits that it is rare to find a “pure” victim or 
oppressor because an individual can be a member of an oppressed group and a group of 
oppressors at the same time (Collins, 1990; Nash, 2008). Dhamoon (2011) stresses that in order 
to study an issue with an intersectional lens, one cannot only focus on the micro-level identities, 
and one must acknowledge the associated systems of oppression. 
Price (2011) discusses some methods to approaching research methodology with an 
intersectional approach. She says, “Researchers have shown that race is an important predictor in 
abortion behavior, but this only skims the surface of an intersectional analysis. We still have to 
figure out why race is such a strong predictor and how it may be mitigated by other factors, such 
as socioeconomic status and cultural norms” (p. S56). We aim to study the effect of race and 
perceived pregnancy responsibility with low-income women. Kumar (2013) points out that 
“socially excluded” (e.g., low-come women, women of color) experience already stigmatization 
and discrimination so scholars should be careful not to lump every inequality in as “abortion 
stigma.” However, we acknowledge that the women who are already at a social disadvantage 
when they “enter the abortion landscape” (Kumar, 2013, p. e330) and that their obstacles are 
exacerbated as they navigate an abortion experience. To apply this framework to our population, 
we will describe each micro-level identity with respect to abortion and discuss examples of the 




• Gender: The intervention videos only depicted women in the testimonials, as the 
vast majority of people who have abortions are women. (It is important to note 
this is not always the case, however, there is a lack of data collection and 
discourse around trans* men and women, gender queer, or non-binary individuals 
who have abortions. Therefore, there is need for specifically focused research in 
the future to elucidate unique issues that arise with these populations). Abortion-
seeking women experience sexist oppressions stemming from the patriarchy 
(which privileges men over women). First, women experience a sexual double 
standard which encourages women to limit their sexual partners for fear of social 
repercussions (whereas men are encouraged to have many sexual partners; e.g., 
Wiederman, 2005) and discourages the use of birth control because of its inherent 
negative connotation with sexual activity and promiscuity (Campbell, Shin-
Hodoglugil, & Potts, 2006). Even if women were to overcome these norms, they 
experience a lack of comprehensive sex education and contraceptive access, 
which leads to an increased likelihood of unintended pregnancy. Prevention of 
and responsibility for pregnancy falls inevitably on women (Kimport et al., 2011) 
and when deciding which outcome to choose, women face stigma (shame, guilt) 
of failing their societal expectations as a woman (e.g., wanting motherhood; 
Kumar et al., 2009) and of needing a “good” reason for abortion (Norris et al., 
2011). Although, Kumar and colleagues (2009) point out that not all women face 





• Age + Gender: The intervention videos only depicted young women in their 20’s 
as they represent the majority (60%) of abortion patients (Jerman et al., 2016). 
Young women experience an aspect of sexism that enables society to scrutinize 
and police their sexuality (United Nations, 2004). For example, adults can feel 
paternalistic toward young women’s sexuality and make reproductive health 
decisions for them via legislation (e.g., parental consent laws; Blasdell, 2002) or 
conscientious objection by health professionals (e.g., pharmacists refusing to refill 
young women’s birth control pills; Savulescu, 2006). Additionally, they are 
particularly vulnerable to a structural lack of resources such as education, 
(reproductive) health, and experience higher rates of sexual assault and violence 
(United Nations, 2004), which can increase risk of unintended pregnancy and, 
therefore, increase abortion rates. 
• Class + Age + Gender: The intervention videos only depicted low-income young 
women as they represent the majority (75%) of abortion patients (Jerman et al., 
2016). In addition to sexism, low-income women experience classist oppressions 
stemming from capitalism in the U.S. (which privileges the wealthy). With an 
increased incidence of unintended pregnancy among low-income women (i.e., 
more than 5 times that of women with an income at or above 200% of the poverty 
level; Finer & Zolna, 2016), more low-income women are in a position where 
they are seeking abortions and have to find ways to pay for an abortion. Low-
income women already lack financial resources and if they are on public 
assistance, the Hyde Amendment restricts insurance coverage for abortion. Due to 




paying for their abortion out of pocket (Henshaw & Finer, 2003; Jones, Finer, & 
Singh, 2010). If they come up with the money for an abortion (often by deferring 
payment on rent, bills, or groceries; Dreweke, 2017), state restrictions that 
increase travel distance and procedural regulations (e.g., ultrasound) necessitate 
two trips to the facility, which further increases the financial burden. As 
mentioned above, if they are unable to come up with the money, they will often 
be forced to carry the pregnancy to term, which propagates the cycle of poverty 
because of worse educational and economic outcomes (Boonstra, 2016; Upadhyay 
et al., 2015). 
• Race + Class + Age + Gender: The intervention videos examined the extent to 
which race (White women in comparison to Black women) plays a role in the 
testimonial portion. White women have the lowest rates of abortion and 
experience racial privilege and Black women have the highest rates of abortion 
and experience racial marginalization (Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011). To add to 
sexism and classism, low-income young women of color experience prejudice and 
discrimination as a result of racism (which privileges White individuals). First, 
low-income women of color have an elevated incidence of unintended pregnancy 
because of disparities in access to health care and therefore, they are less likely to 
have health care, have gone to a health provider in the last year, or use 
contraceptives (Lara et al., 2015; Levit & Verchick, 2016). Second, the Hyde 
Amendment overwhelmingly affects low-income women of color because, due to 
socioeconomic inequality stemming from racism, women of color are more likely 




15–44 are enrolled in Medicaid, compared with 14% of White women; Boonstra, 
2016; Frohwirth, 2014). Because of racial prejudice, people see women of color 
as less worthy of protection and in need of intervention on behalf of fetuses and 
children (Harrison, 2016). Women of color uniquely face the concurrent 
problematizing of their sexuality (e.g., hypersexual; Gamson & Moon, 2004) and 
criminalizing of their pregnancies (Smith, 2005). Thus, they lack support before 
they become pregnant, as pregnant women, or in terminating their pregnancies. 
Finally, we examined circumstance of pregnancy in addition to race (controlling for class, age, 
and gender). These oppressions affect all aspects of a woman’s unintended pregnancy, including 
how others perceive her. This last aspect could or could not be considered an identity. That is, 
depending on the situation in which a pregnancy occurred (e.g., consensual sex, rape), a woman 
could take on the identity of “rape victim” but some women who experience rape never label 
themselves as such (Koss, Gidycz, & Wisniewski, 1987). Other people perceive these 
“identities” differently based on their moral foundation; how one conceptualizes morality is 
important to abortion attitudes and can influence whether people think certain women should 
have access (Haidt & Graham, 2007). Specifically, the pregnancy circumstance can affect how 
others perceive her responsibility based on internalized sexism, racism, and classism. A woman 
who is pregnant as a result of consensual sex will likely be judged harsher for seeking an 
abortion than a woman who was raped on the assumption that people will think the woman who 
became pregnant as a result of consensual sex had some control over her risk of pregnancy (Hans 
& Kimberly, 2014). Adding biases toward young low-income women and women of color (e.g., 




the gap between privileged and oppressed women with social minority statuses (e.g., low-






CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
The Current Study 
Abortion is safe (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Kulier et al., 2011), but there is discourse 
perpetuating misconceptions (e.g., abortion leads to negative health outcomes). Abortion is legal 
(Ellison, 2003; Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 1973), but there are numerous restrictions that limit 
access. And abortion is prevalent (Dreweke, 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017f; Jones & Jerman, 
2017b), but low-income women of color have the highest rates and are the most vulnerable to 
restrictions (Jones & Jerman, 2017b). Given this environment, abortion remains a contentious 
social issue. Knowledge of abortion and abortion restrictions is low (Bessett et al., 2015; 
Kavanaugh, Bessett, & Littman, 2013; Cockrill & Weitz, 2010; Gondor et al., 1996; Lara et al., 
2015; White et al., 2016), but attitudes toward abortion are complex (e.g., Hans & Kimberly, 
2014; Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018), and may lead to unfounded or misled support for 
abortion restrictions (Weitz et al., 2008). Previous interventions have attempted to improve 
conditions of abortion at a macro-level (e.g., Boonstra, 2016; Levit & Verchick, 2016) and 
attitudes toward abortion at a micro-level (e.g., Link & Phelan, 2001; Lipp, 2011; Norris et al., 
2011) using empathy building strategies. Many studies that use empathy induction strategies 
have had success with video testimonials (Blas, et al., 2010; Braverman, 20008; Parker et al., 
1996; Roberto et al., 2000). Intervention is particularly needed to raise awareness of restrictions 
and increase empathy for women who seek abortions in extremely hostile southern states, such 
as Arkansas. 
To date, no media-based interventions have attempted to address abortion knowledge and 
empathy in a hostile Southern state, specifically targeting perceived pregnancy responsibility, 




an empathy-based, video intervention via a randomized-controlled experiment with Arkansas 
residents to increase awareness about abortion legislation in Arkansas and decrease support for 
restrictions. 
The current study consisted of several video interventions designed to increase empathy 
for women seeking abortion by either only increasing knowledge of abortion and abortion 
restrictions (control- cognition only) or increasing knowledge combined with increasing empathy 
for a woman telling a personal story about how restrictions affected her experience getting an 
abortion (intervention- cognition + affect). There were four different testimonials given for the 
affective portion of the intervention condition. The testimonial was either delivered by a White 
woman or Black woman. Both told a story of obtaining an abortion in Arkansas after becoming 
pregnant as result of rape or consensual sex. Participants assigned to the intervention condition 
received one of the four testimonial versions. We compared control and intervention video 
conditions by examining pre-test, post-test, and follow-up differences of knowledge of current 
restrictions in Arkansas, support for restrictions, and empathy for women who seek abortions in 
Arkansas. Additionally, we compared outcome scores between all five conditions (control and 
four interventions) to examine the effects of potential internalized biases on empathy generated 
(based on manipulated variables: race and perceived pregnancy responsibility). 
Research Design 
The intervention was a randomized-controlled design and participants were randomly 
assigned to one of five videos. A pre-test and two post-tests were administered to all participants 
(see Figure 3.1 for flow diagram). All participants (i.e., control and intervention conditions) took 
the same pre-test and watched a video clip about current restrictions in Arkansas 




abortion restrictions. The control condition then immediately received a post-test. The 
intervention conditions watched one of four testimonial video clips (affective/testimonial 
portion) after the knowledge clip of a woman speaking about her experience of how restrictions 
made obtaining an abortion in Arkansas more difficult:  
• Intervention 1: Knowledge + Testimonial (White woman, Raped) 
• Intervention 2: Knowledge + Testimonial (White woman, Consensual Sex) 
• Intervention 3: Knowledge + Testimonial (Black woman, Raped) 
• Intervention 4: Knowledge + Testimonial (Black woman, Consensual Sex) 
After the testimonial clip, the intervention condition received the post-test. Two weeks later, both 
conditions received a second post-test to test for rebound effect (Johansson-Love & Geer, 2003). 
All conditions received one $10 e-gift card after post-test 1 and another one after the follow-up 
post-test as incentives to participate and improve attrition rate. All procedures were approved by 





Figure 3.1. Flow diagram for randomization and allocation to groups. 
Videos. The content of the videos (e.g., casting, script, visual aids) were guided by 
persuasion in media literature (e.g., establishing credibility, using second-person pronouns to 
create personal relevance; Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989; Petty & Priester, 1994) and 
Intersectionality (Crenshaw, 1989). Evidence-based reasoning in video content development is 
detailed in Appendix A. 
Cognitive (knowledge) portion. In this portion, a news anchor briefly informed 




restrictions) patients and doctors must follow in order for abortion in Arkansas (see Appendix A 
for a table of script language and corresponding survey questions).  
Affective (testimonial) portion. Using an intersectional approach to analyses and 
discussion, we manipulated variables based on social identities of the person in the video. We 
controlled for social identities such as gender, socioeconomic status, and age—all people in the 
video presented as women, indicated that they are low-income, and appeared to be in their 20’s 
to parallel salient characteristics of the majority of abortion patients (75% and 60% respectively; 
Jerman et al., 2016). Alternatively, we manipulated three variables: video content (control vs. 
empathy testimonial), race of the woman in the video (White woman vs. Black woman), and 
degree of perceived pregnancy responsibility in the testimonial (raped vs. consensual sex). In the 
video, the woman described her experience becoming pregnant and the obstacles that made 
obtaining an abortion in Arkansas more difficult (see Appendix A for script language and 
corresponding Chapter 2 abortion topic). We counterbalanced the two intervention scripts in 
terms of length and content (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). 
Procedures 
Before the survey administration, we pilot tested the instrument with a convenience 
sample (n=10) of researchers to assess for clarity/readability. After the instrument was finalized, 
we administered an online video-based randomized-controlled trial with Arkansas residents 
(18+) (N=369) through Qualtrics survey software. A convenience sample of participants were 
recruited through specialized social media (e.g., Arkansas specific Reddit and craigslist pages, 
Facebook), word of mouth, email, and listservs. Group sample sizes (n=90) were generated from 





First, participants who received the survey link were directed to an introductory page 
providing them with information about the study. After clicking to the next page, they were 
directed to an informed consent form which notified them that by completing the survey, they 
were indicating their consent to participate. Interested participants clicked to the next page, 
which began the online survey (see Appendix B for all online survey materials). The participants 
started with a pre-test that included: 1) demographic information (including three initial 
screening questions on age, residency, and native language that automatically ended the survey 
for those that are younger than 18, not currently living in Arkansas, or non-native English 
speakers that did not attend primary education in an English speaking school), 2) political 
behaviors (voting and media consumption), 3) general knowledge about abortion, 4) knowledge 
of Arkansas abortion restrictions, 5) attitudes toward people who seek abortions (i.e., revised 
from Batson et al., 1997), 6) Social Dominance Orientation (Ho et al., 2015), 7) identification of 
Empathic Concern and Perspective-Taking (Davis, 1983), and 8) the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale-Short Form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 1982). After completing the pre-test, 
participants were randomly assigned to an intervention or control group (see Figure 3.1 flow 
chart).  
After viewing the assigned video (control or one of four intervention videos), a post-test 
with similar questions to the pre-test was administered to assess effects. In addition, the post-test 
included assessments of empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas (i.e., 6 
characteristics from Batson et al. (1997) and a pictorial scale based on the IOS scale (Aron, Aron 
& Smollan, 1992). Based on previous literature (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Johansson-Love 
& Geer, 2003), a follow up post-test was administered two weeks after the intervention to 




test was chosen to model a methodologically similar study by Johansson-Love and Geer (2003). 
They conducted a study using a pre-test, post-test, follow-up (PPF) design to administer a video-
based intervention. This intervention used a testimonial (control vs. experiment) to shift attitudes 
toward a contentious social topic (e.g., rape myths) and found consistency in responses between 
the first post-test and follow-up post-test, arguing reliability of the data over the two-week 
period. 
The follow-up post-test included similar questions to the post-test 1 in addition to 1) an 
assessment of source credibility (the actors in the video) (Ohanian, 1990) and 2) an inquiry about 
any media consumption related to abortion or abortion restrictions in the 2-week period between 
post-test 1 and follow-up post-test. See Figure 3.2 for a diagram of study protocol. 
 






The pre-test survey (see Appendix C) will include the following measures: 
Demographic questions. The demographic section included questions on age, state 
residency, native-language, zip code (current and of hometown), length of Arkansas residency, 
gender, race/ethnicity, household income (i.e., in relation to the Arkansas poverty line ~ $16,000; 
United States Census Bureau, 2016), relationship status, education, employment, sexual 
orientation, religious attendance and importance, religious denomination, political ideology (i.e., 
social issues and economic issues) and party, and abortion experience (e.g., self, others). We also 
asked about abortion identity via two questions: identification with “pro-life”/“pro-choice” labels 
and to what extent they think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal 
abortion on a 6-point Likert scale (Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & Crawford, forthcoming).  
Voting behaviors. The voting behaviors section included Gallup Poll questions 
regarding registered voter status, perception of the extent to which they follow politics, 
frequency of voting behaviors, likelihood of voting and importance of abortion for candidates in 
the next state election. We chose to slightly augment Gallup’s language (from presidential 
elections to state elections) because our intervention concerns restrictions that apply specifically 
to Arkansas. 
Media consumption behaviors. We asked two questions that assess the consumption of 
different types of political media participants. Participants were asked to specify from where they 
get their information on current events (e.g., television, print, websites, podcasts). After, they 





SDO7 scale. The Social Dominance Orientation7 scale (Ho et al., 2015) is a measure of 
“support for inequality between social groups and has been shown to play a central role in a 
range of intergroup attitudes, behaviors, and policy preferences” (Ho et al., 2015, p. 1004). It 
includes 16 items about group-based inequality on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly oppose) to 7 (strongly favor). Example items include “Some groups of people must be 
kept in their place” and “It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other 
groups are at the bottom.” Higher scores indicate higher endorsement of inequality between 
groups. 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI). The IRI (Davis, 1980) is a 28-item “self-report 
measure consisting of four 7-item subscales, each tapping some aspect of the global concept of 
empathy” (Davis, 1983, p. 113) The current study only used two subscales that relate to our 
aims: Empathic Concern which “assesses ‘other-oriented’ feelings of sympathy and concern for 
unfortunate others” (p. 114) and Perspective-Taking which “assesses the tendency to 
spontaneously adopt the psychological view of others” (p. 113). Each subscale is 7 items and is 
rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me 
very well). An example of an item on the Empathic Concern subscale is “I often have tender, 
concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” and an example item on the Perspective-
Taking scale is “I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.” 
Abortion restrictions in Arkansas. The abortion restrictions section included questions 
assessing perceptions of legality and difficulty of access to abortion and support for 
permissiveness of restrictions (e.g., more strict, less strict) in the U.S. and Arkansas. 
Additionally, we offered a list of possible abortion restrictions in the 10 major restriction 




Arkansas (to measure knowledge) and 2) to what extent do they agree or disagree (on a 5-point 
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)) with each restriction.  
Knowledge of abortion. To measure general knowledge of abortion, we used Bessett 
and colleagues’ (2015) knowledge questions on risks and prevalence of abortion but updated 
some of the information (i.e., 24% of women will have an abortion by the age of 45 instead of 
the original answer of 33%, which was true at the time of publishing). We also included a 
question to assess participants’ knowledge of types of abortion and wrote questions guided by 
information from Guttmacher Institute (2017a) and Jones and Jerman (2017b) that assess 
participants’ knowledge of common abortion patient characteristics.  
Attitudes toward women who seek abortions. To assess attitudes toward women who 
seek abortions, we modeled our questions after Batson and colleagues’ (1997). Originally, they 
wrote 7 items each to assess empathy for three populations: individuals with AIDS, individuals 
who are homeless, and “convicted murderers” modeled off McConahay’s (1986) 7-item 
“Modern Racism Scale.” Our scale includes 12 items on a 9-point Likert scale and examples of 
items include: “Women who seek an abortion have no one to blame but themselves for getting 
pregnant” (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) and “How much do you personally care 
about the well-being of women who seek an abortion?” (1 = not at all, 9 = very much). 
Marlowe-Crowne desirability scale-short form. This scale (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 
1982) assesses the degree to which participants’ self-report data may be susceptible to social 
desirability bias. The short form is 11 items rated “true” or “false” as it pertains to the 




when answers might meet social disapproval, whereas high scores may mean participants are 
highly concerned with social approval. 
The post-tests (see Appendix C) include selected questions from the pre-test and the 
following measures: 
Empathy for women seek abortions in Arkansas. To measure empathy induced for 
women who have abortions in Arkansas, participants indicated to what extent they experienced 
six specific feelings (Batson, 1991; Drwecki et al., 2011) after viewing their assigned video. 
Feelings include “tender,” “softhearted,” “warm,” “compassionate,” “moved,” and 
“sympathetic” on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Additionally, 
participants were asked in an open-ended follow-up: what aspect of the video caused you to feel 
the way you did while watching it? 
Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale. The IOS scale (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 
1992) is a “single-item, pictorial measure of closeness” (p. 598) to assess to what extent 
participants experienced self-other overlap (an important component of perspective-taking; 
Decety & Jackson, 2004). Participants in both control and intervention conditions indicated 
“which picture best describes how you feel about yourself (self) in relation to a woman who has 
had an abortion (other)?” Participants in the intervention condition who receive the testimonial 
video portion completed the scale again in relation to “the woman you watched in the video who 
told her story about seeking an abortion.” Additionally, both conditions were asked to describe 
why they picked the picture they did in an open-ended response. 
Source-Credibility scale (Ohanian, 1990). In the follow-up post-test, participants were 




Credibility scale, 15 items on a 9-point bipolar scale assessing the attractiveness, trustworthiness, 
and expertise of the source. An example of an attractiveness item is assessing the source from 
“Attractive” to “Unattractive” on a 9-point scale. An example of a trustworthiness item is rating 
the source from “Dependable” to “Undependable” and an example of an expertise item is rating 
the source from “Qualified” to “Unqualified.” Lower scores indicate more credibility of the 
source. 
Confounding factors. In the 2 weeks between post-test 1 and the follow-up post-test, we 
asked participants if they sought out any media relevant to abortion or abortion restrictions. 
Additionally, participants were asked if they knew anyone who sought an abortion in the last two 
weeks and if they knew anyone (actors) in the videos they watched to account for biases related 
to familiarity. 
Reading checks. There were two reading checks in the pre-test -- one in the IRI in the 
pre-test and one in the Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions scale in post-test 1 and the follow-up 
post-test. These checks instructed participants to select a certain answer (e.g., “please select 3”) 
to assess attention to reading. 
Videos 
Production. The investigators sent out a casting call seeking three actors (i.e., one news 
anchor and two testimonial women- one White and one Black) to the Theater department listserv 
at the institution of data collection. Interested parties responded with their headshot and resume 
and were chosen based on appearance (e.g., met specific characteristics of the role) and acting 
experience. The selected actors were given instruction on visual aesthetic choices (e.g., clothing, 




wore a navy blazer and natural make-up with her hair down. The two testimonial women were 
instructed to wear their hair down with natural make-up as well. Additionally, they were told to 
wear clothing with no visual brands or logos.  The script and tone instruction for the 
informational portion was intended to be neutral (e.g., facts only) whereas the testimonial portion 
was intended to be more emotional, inducing empathy for the woman telling the story.  
We hired a freelance video production specialist from the institution of data collection to 
shoot, edit, and produce the video content. The news portion was shot in a meeting room with a 
“news” desk at the institutional of data collection. The testimonials were shot outside in to 
simulate an on-site interview. All four associates were compensated for their time and expertise. 
Content. Several media persuasion strategies guided the development of the content of 
five versions of the intervention videos (e.g., casting, script development, visual aids). For 
example, to establish credibility of the news anchor as a source of information (Petty & Priester, 
1994), she opened the segment stating that she was a graduate student in public policy at the 
institution of data collection who is an expert in reproductive health policy. By tying her to the 
well-known institution of data collection, as well as delivering the story about the state in which 
participants currently live, the audience is more likely to pay attention to the information 
(Devereux, 2007; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009). Furthermore, 
she used second-person to create personal relevance when explaining restrictions in Arkansas, 
(e.g., “if you’re under 18, you have to get permission from a parent…”; Burnkrant & Unnava, 
1989). To enhance comprehension (e.g., Lee, Lee, Liao, & Wang, 2015) and break up the 
monotony of information delivery in the news story, the first author created visual aid graphics, 
which were projected with each restriction. The graphics were reviewed by 12 research assistants 




with 1 as “pro-choice,” 3 as neutral, and 5 as “pro-life”). Graphics that were rated as having poor 
design (e.g., color, font) or leaning too far “pro-choice” or “pro-life” were augmented. The script 
was reviewed by a team of five experts (in media effects, women’s reproductive health, 
sociology, and public health) for clarity and wording. 
Informational portion. The informational portion consisted of a news story aimed to 
increase awareness of the myriad abortion restrictions in Arkansas. The news anchor introduces 
herself and briefly informs participants about the safety, legality, and types of abortion (e.g., 
“Abortion, which is when a pregnancy is ended so that it does not result in the birth of a child, 
has been legal in all 50 US states for over 40 years”). She describes the magnitude with which 
restrictions have burdened states, particularly Arkansas, in recent years (e.g., “Arkansas is in top 
three states with the newest laws restricting abortion access”). Then she describes the nine 
legislative restrictions in the ten major categories of restrictions (Nash et al., 2017) that apply to 
Arkansas (e.g., “If you’re under 18, you have to get permission from a parent. Research shows it 
delays the procedure or teens may travel to states without these laws to get an abortion”), each 
with an accompanying visual graphic. Finally, the news anchor ends the clip describing how 
these restrictions have affected accessibility in Arkansas (i.e., “Now there are only 4 clinics in 2 
cities in the state that can offer abortion services to the 1 million women that live in Arkansas”). 
Testimonial portion. All four versions of the testimonial portion began with an 
introduction by the news anchor (e.g., “The largest group of women who get abortions in the US 
are in their 20’s and low-income like Mia, who is here to tell us a personal story about her 
experience with these Arkansas laws”). The four versions varied by race of the woman giving the 
testimonial (i.e., Black or White) and incidence of pregnancy (e.g., pregnancy as a result of rape 




(Ryffel & Wirth, 2016). The testimonial begins as the woman, “Mia,” describes her experience 
becoming unexpectedly pregnant and seeking an abortion. In the both pregnancy circumstance 
versions, she states that she did not know the person with whom she became pregnant and 
“didn’t tell anyone about it for a long time.” In the rape version, she begins with “last year, I was 
raped. I was coming out of work being attached in the parking lot” and in the consensual sex 
version, she begins with “last year, I became pregnant.” She outlines the time it took for her to 
realize she was pregnant (i.e., “You count from the first day of your last period so by the time you 
find out you’ve missed a period, you’re already 4-5 weeks pregnant. I rarely get my period on 
time so I didn’t even know I was pregnant until I took a test around 8 weeks”). She details the 
obstacles that made obtaining an abortion in Arkansas more difficult because of restrictions in 
place (e.g., lack of insurance coverage, necessitated travel and waiting period increasing costs). 
She described her economic troubles such as “living paycheck to paycheck” and struggling to 
afford rent and groceries and having to use all of the money in her bank account to pay for the 
abortion—so much that she had to ask a friend for money for the bus ride to the clinic 3 hours 
away and having to sleep in the bus station for two nights since “they make you wait 48 hours.” 
She concludes with the video by stating that these restrictions made it harder for her (i.e., “I was 
sure of my decision and just wanted to get this taken care of as soon as possible, in the safest 
way possible. But these laws made everything go so much slower and so much more expensive 
because I had to take time from work and stay extra days”) and saying that she doesn’t regret it 
and felt relieved afterward. In the consensual version, she says “it wasn’t the right time” and in 
the rape version, she says “I just wanted to put the rape behind me.” 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 




RQ1. Research question 1 aimed to test the effectiveness of the intervention videos 
compared to the control video. That is, does watching a video with an empathy-inducing 
personal story in addition to an informational component (cognitive/knowledge + 
affective/empathy) induce significantly different outcomes than watching a video that only 
contains an informational component (only cognitive/knowledge). To explore the effectiveness 
of the affective/empathy component, we compared outcomes of those who received the control 
condition to those who received the intervention conditions on three sub questions: 
RQ1.1. Does knowledge of abortion restrictions differ between experiment and control 
video conditions across the time points? We hypothesized that H1.1) disregarding video 
condition, all participants will experience an increase in Arkansas abortion restriction 
knowledge; all participants received the same informational component. 
RQ1.2. Does support for abortion restrictions differ between experiment and control 
video conditions across the time points? We hypothesized that H1.2) there would be a larger 
decrease in support for abortion restrictions for those in an intervention condition compared to 
the control video. Those who hear a personal story may be influenced by learning about the 
negative effect on those who seek abortions in Arkansas (Currier & Carlson, 2009; Plumm & 
Terrance, 2009).  
 




RQ2. Research question 2 aimed to test if the variables manipulated in the intervention 
empathy-inducing testimonials (race and pregnancy responsibility) produced different empathy 
outcomes. Comparisons of empathy characteristic scores were made between the five different 
video conditions (White woman, raped; White woman, consensual sex; Black woman, raped; 
Black woman, consensual sex; control (no testimonial)). To explore the impact of these 
variables, we compared empathy outcomes in all five condition groups on three sub questions: 
RQ2.1. Do scores on the six empathy characteristics differ depending on the race of the 
woman in the video? We hypothesized that people who viewed the Black woman’s testimonials 
would have lower scores on the six empathy characteristics than those who viewed the White 
woman given internal racial biases against women of color. 
RQ2.2. Do scores on the six empathy characteristics differ based on perceived pregnancy 
responsibility? We hypothesized that participants who viewed the testimonial where the woman 
became pregnant as a result of rape would have higher scores on the six empathy characteristics 
than participants who heard the woman became pregnant as a result of consensual sex.  
 




RQ2.3. Does watching a certain testimonial produce different empathy sum scores 
compared with the other videos? What other personal experiences/traits contributed to empathy 
sum scores? The variables we evaluated were participants’ sex, previous experience with 
abortion, previous experience with sexual assault, baseline Empathic Concern (how naturally 
empathetic one is), social desirability score (to what degree participants feel pressure to act 
according to what is socially acceptable) and assigned video condition. Specifically, we 
hypothesized that 1) females, 2) people with personal experiences with abortion, 3) people with 
personal experiences with sexual assault, 4) higher baseline Empathic Concern, 5) people with 
higher social desirability scores, and 6) people who viewed the video with a White woman who 
was raped would have the highest empathy sum scores. We examined participants’ race in 
another model but it was not significant and was not included in the final model. 
 
Figure 3.5. Illustration of Hypotheses 2.3. 
Data Analyses 
Data were downloaded from Qualtrics Survey Software into SPSS. Data were analyzed 
by several statistical tests (see Table 1 and Table 2) with the following dependent variables: 
knowledge of abortion restrictions in Arkansas, support for restrictions in Arkansas, and empathy 




Manuscript 1 (RQ1) examined the effectiveness of an intervention that included 
knowledge and testimonial components compared to the control, which only included a 
knowledge component. We examined differences in pre-test, post-test 1, and follow-up post-test 
scores for knowledge, and support for restrictions (RQ1.1-1.2) by conducting repeated-measures 
analyses of variance (ANOVA) with a multivariate approach were used to examine differential 
changes across times on KAR scores (RQ1.1) and SAR scores (RQ1.2) between intervention and 
control groups. When the interaction was significant, we explored the simple effects by 
examining differences between time points (i.e., pre-test and post-test, post-test and follow-up, 
pre-test and follow-up) with a Bonferroni correction. When the interaction effect was not 
significant and the main effects were significant, we conducted a post-hoc univariate tests to 
assess simple effects. Variables and analyses are depicted in Table 3.1. 
 Manuscript 2 (RQ2) specifically examined differences in empathy for women who have 
abortions by the manipulated variables in the four testimonials (race, perceived pregnancy 
responsibility. To measure empathy scores, an aggregated score was calculated post-video from 
Batson et al.’s (1997) scale assessing the extent to which participants experienced six different 
empathy-related characteristics. To account for baseline tendency for empathy, the Empathic 
Concern subscale score on the IRI scale (Davis, 1983) was calculated from the pre-test and 
controlled for during these comparisons.  
To examine each of the six empathy characteristics (sympathetic, moved, compassionate, 
tender, warm, soft-hearted) by the manipulated variables in the testimonials (i.e., race, perceived 
pregnancy responsibility), we conducted chi-squared analyses (RQ2.1-2.2). We conducted a chi-
square for each emotion by race and by perceived pregnancy responsibility. For race, we 




pregnancy responsibility, we compared testimonials in which the woman was raped vs. 
testimonials in which the woman had consensual sex. Additionally, we conducted post-hoc 
pairwise Fisher’s exact tests. 
To assess what factors contributed to empathy sum scores toward women who seek 
abortions, we conducted two hierarchical regressions testing six predictors (i.e., video condition, 
sex, abortion experience, sexual assault experience, social desirability, and baseline Empathic 
Concern)—one at post-test and one at follow-up (RQ2.3). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were 
conducted to assess significant differences in our factors of interest. Variables and analyses are 








Manuscript 1 Analyses  
RQ Description DV (dependent variable) 
IV (independent variable) 
Analytic Plan 
1.1 Does knowledge of 
abortion restrictions differ 
between experiment and 
control video conditions 
across the time points? 
DV: Knowledge of Abortion 
Restrictions (KAR) Score 
IV: Control or Intervention 
Video 
*Descriptive Statistics 
*ANOVA on pre-test scores to 
check for differences by IV 
*repeated-measures ANOVA 
to assess significant differences 
in KAR scores between those 
who watched the Control vs. 
Intervention video at pre-test, 
post-test 1, and post-test 2 
1.2 Does support for abortion 
restrictions differ between 
experiment and control 
video conditions across the 
time points? 
DV: Support for Abortion 
Restrictions (SAR) Score 
IV: Control or Intervention 
Video 
*Descriptive Statistics 
*ANOVA on pre-test scores to 
check for differences by IV 
*repeated-measures ANOVA 
to assess significant differences 
in SAR scores between those 
who watched the Control vs. 
Intervention video at pre-test, 







Table 3.2  
 
Manuscript 2 Analyses 
RQ Description DV (dependent variable) 
IV (independent variable) 
Analytic Plan 
2.1 Are there differences in the 
six empathy characteristic 
scores by the race of the 
woman in the video? 
DV: Six Empathy characteristic 
scores (tender, softhearted, warm, 
compassionate, moved, and 
sympathetic) 
IV: Testimonial with Black 
woman vs. White woman 
*Descriptive Statistics 
*Chi-square analysis per 
empathy characteristic at 
post-test and follow-up 
2.2 Are there differences in the 
six empathy characteristic 
scores by perceived 
pregnancy responsibility? 
DV: Six Empathy characteristic 
scores (tender, softhearted, warm, 
compassionate, moved, and 
sympathetic) 
IV: Rape testimonial vs. 
Consensual testimonial 
*Chi-square analysis per 
empathy characteristic at 
post-test and follow-up 
2.3 Does watching a certain 
testimonial affect empathy 
sum scores compared to the 
other videos? Do other 
personal experiences/traits 
contribute to empathy sum 
scores?  
DV: Empathy Sum Score 
IV: sex, previous experience with 
abortion, previous experience with 
sexual assault, baseline Empathic 
Concern, social desirability, video 
condition 
*Two hierarchical 
regressions testing six 
predictors—one at post-test 





CHAPTER 4: MANUSCRIPT 1 
 
Effectiveness of a video-based media intervention to address knowledge and support of abortion 
restrictions in Arkansas: A randomized-controlled trial 
Abstract 
CONTEXT: U.S. abortion restrictions diminish access and perpetuate a culture of hostility 
toward abortion seekers. Support for restrictions is high—potentially, because knowledge of 
restrictions is low. We implemented an empathy-based intervention to increase awareness of 
abortion legislation and decrease support for abortion restrictions among residents in Arkansas, a 
particularly restrictive state with regard to abortion. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the 
effectiveness of this intervention. 
METHODS: Using a randomized-controlled trial with a pre-, post-, and follow-up design, a 
convenience sample of Arkansas residents (N = 369) were randomly assigned to view a control 
(describing abortion legislation) or intervention (including a scripted abortion testimonial) video. 
Data were analyzed across the study with repeated-measures analyses of variance. 
RESULTS: For knowledge of restrictions, there was a statistically significant interaction 
between the effects of time and video condition. Specifically, post-test scores were significantly 
higher than pre-test and follow-up scores. In terms of support for restrictions, the time main 
effect was significant, but the group main effect was nonsignificant.   
CONCLUSIONS: The intervention was effective in increasing awareness for Arkansas abortion 
restrictions. Knowledge scores were significantly higher among those who watched a 




made the information more memorable. Support for restrictions decreased across the study, 
however, the intervention did not have the hypothesized effect on this outcome. 




 Abortion is a prevalent, safe, and legal reproductive event in the U.S. (Dreweke, 2017; 
Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Guttmacher Institute, 2017f; Jones & Jerman, 2017b). Despite the 
ubiquity of abortion, there has been a significant increase in legislative restrictions at the state-
level (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018; Nash et al., 2017). These restrictions are harmful in 
two main ways. First, they may delay abortions by making it more expensive or 
logistically/legally challenging for women to obtain them (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; Jerman, 
Frohwirth, Kavanaugh, & Blades, 2017; Jones & Weitz, 2009; Roberts et al., 2018). This 
outcome is a significant public health concern; women who are forced to keep a pregnancy after 
seeking an abortion experience hardships compared to women who were able to obtain an 
abortion (e.g., Foster, Biggs, Ralph, Gerdts, Roberts, & Glymour, 2018; Foster, Steinberg, 
Roberts, Neuhaus, & Biggs, 2015; Upadhyay, Biggs, & Foster, 2015). Second, abortion 
restrictions perpetuate and normalize misleading information (e.g., that abortions are unsafe for 
women), creating a culture of hostility toward women who seek abortions. Given these 
consequences, the significant influx of state-enacted restrictions on abortion access is cause for 
concern. 
 According to public polls, support for restrictions is high (Bowman & Sims, 2017; Perry 
Undem & Vox Media, 2016). The majority of U.S. residents (59%) think abortion laws should 
be made somewhat or much stricter (Bowman & Sims, 2017). One reason there is high support 
for restrictions is because people think that abortion is morally unacceptable (Bowman & Sims, 
2017) and thus believe it should be restricted. Another reason for such high support could be 
related to lack of knowledge. People have a limited understanding of abortion and legislative 
restrictions, even among those who have had abortions (e.g., Bessett et al., 2015; Cockrill & 




White et al., 2016). They may be unfamiliar with their state’s abortion legislation or they may 
believe that abortion restrictions protect women’s safety—the latter of which is not supported by 
scientific evidence (Grossman et al., 2015; Jones & Weitz, 2009).  
Accordingly, there is need for intervention to educate the public about what restrictions 
are in place and their potential impact on abortion access. Through intervention, people’s 
attitudes can be shifted--especially in areas like the South with many restrictions and misleading 
messages about abortion. A review of the literature suggests that interventions administered 
through media platforms and empathy induction techniques have been successful in increasing 
knowledge and shifting attitudes (e.g., Braverman, 2008; Batson et al., 1997; Blas et al., 2010; 
Roberto et al., 2000). As such, the current study aimed to test the efficacy of an empathy-based 
media intervention in increasing knowledge and decreasing support for abortion restrictions in 
Arkansas, a state categorized as hostile toward reproductive health access (Nash et al., 2017). We 
hypothesized that watching an empathy-inducing testimonial video in addition to an 
informational video would decrease support for restrictions compared to only watching the 
informational video.  
Abortion Restrictions in Arkansas 
Although every state has at least some legislative regulation of abortion (Guttmacher 
Institute, 2018b), the Midwest and Southern regions of the U.S. are considered highly hostile to 
abortion (Jones & Jerman, 2017a). The restrictions in these areas have an additive effect; 
collectively, abortion legislation has resulted in declines in the number of available clinics and 
providers and an increase in travel time and costs associated with obtaining an abortion 




Arkansas is among the top three states with the most abortion restrictions passed between 
2011 and 2015 (Guttmacher Institute, 2016b) and the Arkansas state legislature introduced more 
anti-abortion bills than any other state during the 2017 legislative session (Center for 
Reproductive Rights, 2018). At the time of the study, Arkansas had laws that restricted abortion 
access by mandating parental involvement, pre-abortion counseling, waiting periods, prohibiting 
coverage from federal funding (e.g., Medicaid), regulating medication abortion and abortion 
facilities beyond what is medically necessary or appropriate, and restricting abortions to pre-
viability. Additionally, in the event Roe v. Wade is overturned, Arkansas declared its intent to 
limit abortion to the maximum extent (Guttmacher Institute, 2017k; Nash et al., 2017). Currently, 
there are only three facilitates in the state of Arkansas able to provide abortion services 
(Cartwright, Karunaratne, Barr-Walker, Johns, & Upadhyay, 2018) for approximately 600,000 
women of reproductive age (i.e., 15-44; March of Dimes, 2019).  
 Despite numerous legislative restrictions in the state, there is a lack of targeted research 
exploring Arkansans’ support for and knowledge of these restrictions. Based on the little public 
opinion research conducted with Arkansans, constituents’ attitudes toward abortion may not be 
as conservative on abortion as their state laws might suggest. Approximately 68% of young 
adults from Arkansas and Oklahoma indicated support for abortion access under all or at least 
some circumstances (Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018). 
Similarly, according to a state-wide Arkansas telephone survey poll conducted in 2017, 
about 60% of Arkansans thought abortion should be legal under at least some circumstances 
(Parry, 2017). However, Arkansans’ general feelings seem to be mixed with regard to women 
who seek abortions. Approximately twenty-two percent of the sample reported feeling extremely 




middle (Parry, 2017). There is no research to date exploring Arkansans’ knowledge of 
restrictions in their state. Arkansans’ attitudes toward abortion restrictions may not actually align 
with those legislators who passed these laws. Instead, potentially because of lack of knowledge, 
support for these restrictions may be high among Arkansans. Therefore, intervention is needed to 
address support for abortion restrictions in their state. This can be done by providing education 
about the potential impact of these laws in terms of limiting women’s access to abortion. 
Knowledge and Support of Restricting Abortion Access 
Research suggests that U.S. residents are conflicted in terms of their feelings on abortion 
restrictions and abortion access. Public opinion data show that the majority of people report they 
believe abortion should be legal under all or at least some circumstances, without burden or 
logistical difficulty, and informed by medically accurate and unbiased information (PerryUndem 
& Vox Media, 2016; Smith & Son, 2013). At the same time, they exhibit high support for laws 
such as 24-hour waiting periods, parental consent for minors, and doctors informing patients of 
alternatives or possible risks of obtaining an abortion (no matter if they are scientifically 
evidenced; Bowman & Sims, 2017; PerryUndem & Vox Media, 2016). These laws directly 
conflict with people’s reported beliefs about abortion access. It seems as though people either do 
not understand that such restrictions are burdens or result in logistical difficulty.  
According to PerryUndem and Vox Media’s (2016) probability-based public opinion 
poll, almost half (46%) of the sample reported they did not think there was a law that would 
require doctors to provide medically inaccurate information about abortion. In reality, twenty-
nine states require physicians to follow a script warning patients about the potential risks and 
side effects of abortion (e.g., breast cancer), which are medically inaccurate or misleading (Nash 




Yet, the issue of abortion restrictions is more complex than simply understanding the 
laws. Even when people have some awareness of the laws in their areas, it does not equate to 
understanding their impact on abortion care. In a sample of Texans who reported they were 
aware of and supported current Texas abortion laws, 42% expressed the main reason for their 
support was because they believed the regulations made abortion safer (White et al., 2016).  
This support is perpetuated by the pretense that restrictions protect women’s safety or 
ensure they have time to deeply consider their decision (Weitz, Moore, Gordon, & Adler, 2008). 
First, researchers indicate there are no differences in the safety or success of abortions when 
conducted in facilities that must adhere to extensive Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers 
(TRAP) laws compared to those that do not (Grossman et al., 2011; Jones & Weitz, 2009). Thus, 
the idea that restrictions protect women’s safety is false. Second, legislation requiring a waiting 
period or biased counseling prior to an abortion increase financial and logistical obstacles 
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017h; Karasek, Roberts, & Weitz, 2016). These restrictions result in a 
patronizing or paternalistic effect, delaying abortion and infringing on bodily autonomy. Further, 
in most cases, these laws rarely change women’s decisions to terminate their pregnancy, because 
women have already deeply considered their decision (Blasdell, 2002; Wiebe & Adams, 2009). 
Therefore, inhibiting women’s ability to obtain an abortion, not health or safety, seems to be the 
primary goal of such restrictions. 
With continued misunderstanding and unawareness of the laws, people who support 
abortion access will continue to support restrictions under the impression that they improve 
abortion experiences. There is little research on Arkansans’ knowledge and support for abortion 
restrictions. If Arkansans’ knowledge about abortion is similar to U.S. adults’ knowledge 




based on misinformation. That is why there is a need to increase awareness of how these laws 
affect people who seek abortion care. This is especially crucial for people who live in highly 
restrictive regions of the U.S.  
The Current Study 
 The purpose of the current study was to create a video intervention to decrease support 
for abortion restrictions in Arkansas. To do this, we aimed to increase awareness about current 
legislation and its effect on Arkansan women who seek abortions. One of the best mechanisms to 
increase knowledge with sexual health topics is to include information in digital form (e.g., 
social media, films; Blas et al., 2010; Conceicao, Pedro, & Martins, 2017; Downs, Murray, de 
Bruin, Penrose, Palmgren, & Fischhoff, 2004; Guse et al., 2012). When knowledge is increased, 
people are more inclined to empathize for another person’s situation and struggles (Currier & 
Carlson, 2009; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). With this in mind, we aimed to decrease Arkansas 
residents’ support for abortion restrictions by increasing their knowledge of the abortion 
landscape in their state via a video news story and several testimonials of women seeking 
abortions in Arkansas.  
The intervention was administered as a randomized-controlled video-based experiment, 
with a pre-test, post-test, follow-up design. There were five versions of the administered videos: 
one control condition and four intervention condition versions. Those in the control condition 
watched the short informational video (a “news anchor” giving a news report about abortion 
legislation in Arkansas). Those in the intervention conditions watched the same informational 
portion followed by an actor delivering one of four different testimonials. The actor described 
the barriers she faced as a result of Arkansas legislative restrictions. For the purposes of this 




hypothesized outcomes than watching a video that only contained an informational component. 
As such, we compared the control to all combined intervention video conditions at pre-, post-, 
and follow-up. The research questions and hypotheses were as follows: 
RQ1. Does knowledge of abortion restrictions differ between experiment and control 
video conditions across the time points? We hypothesized that H1) disregarding video condition, 
all participants will experience an increase in Arkansas abortion restriction knowledge; all 
participants received the same informational component. 
RQ2. Does support for abortion restrictions differ between experiment and control video 
conditions across the time points? We hypothesized that H2) there would be a larger decrease in 
support for abortion restrictions for those in an intervention condition compared to the control 
video. Those who hear a personal story may be influenced by learning about the negative effect 
on those who seek abortions in Arkansas (Currier & Carlson, 2009; Plumm & Terrance, 2009).  
Methods 
Participants 
A convenience sample of Arkansas residents were recruited through social media (e.g., 
Arkansas specific Reddit and craigslist pages, Facebook), word of mouth, email, and listservs to 
take part in a paid research study through Qualtrics survey software. Three pre-screening 
questions were administered to check for eligibility criteria: participants had to be 1) currently 
living in Arkansas, 2) aged 18 or older, and 3) a native English speaker or have attended school 
where English was the primary language from K-12. If a participant met the eligibility criteria, 




The minimum number of participants required was determined by an a priori power 
analysis (G*Power: Faul et al., 2007) with power (1 - β) set at .80, α = .05, two-tailed, and a 
medium effect size of .25 (Cohen, 1977, 1988). Approximately 2,400 people clicked on the 
recruitment link from a social media platform to learn more about the study. Of those, 691 
participants opted to take the survey.  During data cleaning, participants were removed for 
ineligibility, failing reading checks or incomplete surveys, and failure to complete all three 
points of data collection (attrition rate of 33.6%). The exclusion process is described with the 
survey flow in Figure 4.1. The full analytic sample of participants who completed all three waves 
of data collection (N = 369) comprised 106 participants in the control condition and 263 
participants in the intervention conditions (N1 = 62; N2 = 70; N3 = 60; N4 = 71).  




The majority of the participants identified as female (71.5%), White (84.6%), 
heterosexual (89.2%), and “pro-choice” (72.9%). The mean age was 32.07 (SD = 9.44) and 
participants reported living in Arkansas for an average of 21.36 years (SD = 12.14). General 
knowledge of abortion was evaluated at baseline with 16 items on safety, legality, and 
prevalence (based on Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh, Bessett, Littman, & Norris, 2013). We 
performed a median split to create three artificial abortion knowledge levels; the scores ranged 0 
to 16). Most of the sample (71.0%) exhibited a medium level of abortion knowledge, 14.9% had 
a low level (1 SD below the median), and 14.1% had a high level (1 SD above the median). 
Demographic frequencies for the sample are reported in Table 4.1.  
Procedures 
The study was a randomized-controlled trial with a pre-, post-, follow-up design; 
participants were randomly assigned to one of five video conditions (see Figure 1 for survey 
flow). All participants took the pre-test and were triaged into watching a specific informational 
video clip about current restrictions in Arkansas (aimed at increasing participants’ knowledge 
about abortion restrictions). The control condition then immediately received a post-test.  
After the informational portion, participants in the intervention condition watched one of 
four versions of a testimonial video clip. Each testimonial portrayed a woman speaking about her 
difficulty obtaining an abortion in Arkansas because of the restrictions. After the testimonial clip, 
the intervention condition received the post-test. At the end of the post-test, participants were 
asked to provide an email address to receive a $10 e-gift card and the link to the follow-up 
survey two weeks later to test for rebound effects (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Johansson-




then their email was removed from the data. The Institutional Review Board at the institution of 
data collection approved all procedures. 
Intervention Videos 
 Content. A team of five experts in public health, sociology, media communication, and 
an abortion researcher contributed toward creating the video content (e.g., casting, script 
development, visual aids), which was guided by several media persuasion strategies. For 
example, to establish credibility of the source (Petty & Priester, 1994), the news anchor character 
stated that she was a graduate student in public policy who is an expert in reproductive health 
policy at the institution of data collection. By localizing the news anchor (e.g., tying her 
credibility and narrative to Arkansas), the audience is more likely to pay attention to the 
information (Devereux, 2007; Golding & Elliott, 1979; Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009). 
Further, when explaining the restrictions in Arkansas, she framed the information in 
second-person language to create personal relevance (e.g., “if you’re under 18, you have to get 
permission from a parent…”; Burnkrant & Unnava, 1989). The first author created a visual aid 
graphic per each restriction description, which were projected during the news story to enhance 
comprehension (e.g., Lee, Lee, Liao, & Wang, 2015). There were two conceptual portions of the 
video: informational and testimonial (see Script for complete wording). 
Informational portion. This portion consisted of a news anchor, “Michelle,” briefly 
informing participants about the safety, legality, and types of abortion. She describes the 
magnitude with which restrictions have been passed in recent years, particularly in Arkansas. 




and doctors for abortion provision. The news anchor ends the clip describing how these 
restrictions have affected accessibility (i.e., the number of facilities) in Arkansas. 
Testimonial portion. This portion begins with an introduction by the news anchor. Then 
the character, “Mia,” describes her economic troubles and experience becoming unexpectedly 
pregnant and seeking an abortion. She details the obstacles that made obtaining an abortion in 
Arkansas more difficult because of restrictions (e.g., lack of insurance coverage, necessitated 
travel and waiting period increasing costs). She concludes the video by stating that these 
restrictions made it harder for her to obtain an abortion. The four versions varied by race of the 
woman giving the testimonial (i.e., Black or White) and situation that lead to the pregnancy (e.g., 
rape or consensual sex). All versions of the intervention testimonial were similar in terms of 
length and wording (Ryffel & Wirth, 2016).  
Production. The investigators hired three actors (i.e., one news anchor and two 
testimonial women) from the theater department at the institution of data collection to deliver the 
video content. As part of the larger study, we were interested in understanding the role of race 
and perceived pregnancy responsibility on attitudes toward abortion access. We manipulated 
both of these factors in the testimonial video clips. They were manipulated in order to target and 
increase empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas. However, for the purpose of this 
study, we were solely interested in examining the effect of administering a personal story on 
knowledge retention and support for abortion restrictions. As such, we will compare participants 
who received the control—with no testimonial—to participants who received any intervention or 







Knowledge of and support for abortion restrictions. Authors compiled a list of 18 
abortion restrictions in the 10 most common restriction categories in the U.S. (Nash et al., 2017) 
to measure Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions (KAR) and Support for Abortion Restrictions 
(SAR). Before administration, we pilot tested the survey instrument with a convenience sample 
of researchers (n = 14) to assess for clarity and readability. During the experiment, these 
measures were administered at all three data collection points (pre-test, post-test, and follow-up). 
Item examples included “Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it possible for the 
abortion pill to be reversed” and “Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a 
nurse practitioner or other healthcare provider).” The full list of items is included in Tables 4.4 
and 4.5.  
To assess KAR scores, for each item, participants were instructed to indicate, “based on 
what they know or have heard,” which restrictions apply to Arkansas (e.g., select “Yes, current 
law in Arkansas” or “No, not a current law in Arkansas”). Items were coded dichotomously for 
accuracy (i.e., 0 for incorrect or 1 for correct) and were aggregated to yield a score of 0-18, with 
higher scores indicating greater knowledge of abortion restrictions in Arkansas.  
To measure SAR scores, participants were instructed to indicate the extent that they 
agreed that each restriction should be a law in Arkansas [on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)]. Each item had a consistent stem of “It should be a law 
in Arkansas that…” An example branch included “A woman must wait 48 hours after required 
counseling before the abortion can be performed.” Total scores were aggregated and could range 





Marlowe-Crowne desirability scale-short form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 1982). To 
assess the degree to which participants’ self-report data may be susceptible to social desirability 
bias, we administered this scale in the pre-test. The short form is 11 items rated “true” or “false” 
as it pertains to the participant; half are reverse coded. An example item is “I have never been 
irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own.” Low scores indicate that 
participants may be more willing to answer truthfully even when answers might meet social 
disapproval, whereas high scores may mean participants are highly concerned with social 
approval. 
Source-credibility scale (Ohanian, 1990). Two weeks after participants had watched the 
video, they were asked to evaluate their actor (i.e., source) on a series of 9-point bipolar scales. 
The assessment comprised 15 items on attractiveness, trustworthiness, and expertise. Participants 
were shown a picture of the actor(s) that applied to their assigned video condition and rated the 
particular actor on each item. Lower scores indicate more perceived credibility of the source; 
total scores ranged from 15 to 135 and subscale scores ranged from 9 to 45 on each subscale. 
Confounding factors. The follow-up survey included three questions about personal 
experiences in the 2 weeks after post-test. We asked if they sought out any media relevant to 
abortion or abortion restrictions, and if they knew anyone who sought an abortion in the last two 
weeks. We also asked if they knew any of the actors to account for biases related to familiarity.  
Analyses 
All data were downloaded from Qualtrics Survey Software into SPSS 24 for analyses. 
First, we ran analyses to check data quality. We ran chi square analyses on demographic 




were conducted to evaluate group differences between the video conditions and assess for 
accurate randomization. Then, we ran univariate comparisons between participants who 
completed all three points of data collection and those who dropped out after post-test. Last, we 
conducted t-tests and univariate comparisons on source credibility scores, social desirability 
scores, and confounding factors. We accounted for Type I error by using a Bonferroni correction 
in all analyses with multiple comparisons. 
 Following descriptive measures, repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) with 
a multivariate approach were used to examine differential changes across times on KAR scores 
(RQ1) and SAR scores (RQ2) between intervention and control groups. When the interaction 
was significant, we explored the simple effects by examining differences between time points 
(i.e., pre-test and post-test, post-test and follow-up, pre-test and follow-up) with a Bonferroni 
correction. When the interaction effect was not significant and the main effects were significant, 
we conducted a post-hoc univariate tests to assess simple effects. We reported partial eta-squared 
(ηp2) as a measure of effect size for the analyses of variance. A value of .01 indicates a small 
effect size, .06 medium, and .14 large (Cohen, 1988).  
Results 
Baseline 
  First, we ran chi-square analyses to assess differences in demographic variables by video 
condition (see Table 4.2). There were no significant differences between the control and 
experimental group by sex, abortion experience, or level of abortion knowledge. There were 
significant differences by race, [X2(2, N = 369) = 11.443, p = .001], income level, [X2(2, N = 
369) = 11.942, p = .003], education, [X2(3, N = 369) = 22.352, p < .001], and abortion identity, 




correction indicated, in the intervention group, there were significantly higher proportions of 
people who were White (p = .001), low-income (p = .008), had a college degree (p < .001), and 
identified as “pro-choice” (p < .001). In the control, there were significantly higher proportions 
of people who were non-White (p = .001), high-income (p = .002), had completed a GED/high 
school education or less (p = .002), and identified as “pro-life” (p < .001).  
 Next, we examined baseline differences by our dependent variables (i.e., KAR and SAR 
scores). KAR scores violated the normality assumption (p = .006). With equal variances not 
assumed, there were no significant differences between the control group and experimental 
group on KAR scores, [t(159.03) = -1.31, p = .193], at baseline. SAR scores upheld the 
normality assumption (p = .765). With equal variances assumed, there were no significant 
differences between the control group and experimental group on total SAR scores, [t(367) = 
.466, p = .642], at baseline. Because there were no differences in our dependent variables at 
baseline, we did not account for differences in demographics but address them in the discussion. 
Additionally, we compared baseline KAR and SAR scores by participant abortion identity (i.e., 
“pro-life,” “pro-choice,” “other). There were no differences in KAR scores by abortion identity, 
[F(2, 366) = 1.08, p = .339]. There were significant differences in SAR scores by abortion 
identity, [Welch’s F(2, 84) = 50.77, p < .001]. “Pro-life” participants had significantly higher 
support for abortion restrictions than “pro-choice” or “other” (p < .001). 
  We also made comparisons on demographic characteristics and our dependent variables 
between participants who completed all three time points and those who dropped out after the 
post-test (N = 192). There were no differences by sex, abortion experience, or income. However, 
there were differences by level of abortion knowledge [X2(2, N = 556) = 25.510, p < .001], race 




= 556) = 59.883, p < .001]. Post hoc comparisons indicated people with a low knowledge of 
abortion, people who are non-White, and “pro-life” individuals had a higher drop-out rate (all p’s 
< .001). People with a medium level of abortion knowledge and people with some college 
education had a higher rate of completing the study (all p’s < .001). There were no differences on 
KAR scores [F(1, 554) = 2.893, p = .09), but those who continued on throughout the entirety of 
the study had significantly lower baseline SAR scores than those who dropped out [F(1, 554) = 
13.547, p < .001). This difference is discussed in the limitations. 
 Source-credibility. We assessed the degree that participants found the information 
sources (actors) to be credible on a scale of 15--135, with lower scores indicating higher 
perceived credibility (Ohanian, 1990). The mean credibility score was 49.57 (SD = 22.11) for 
Michelle (the news anchor), 64.09 (SD = 22.99) for the White testimonial woman, and 62.80 (SD 
= 27.71) for the Black testimonial woman. Paired-samples t-tests indicated participants found 
Michelle to be significantly more credible overall compared to both the testimonial actors who 
were White, [t(131) = -7.24, p < .001], and Black, [t(130) = -6.16, p < .001]. Univariate 
comparisons indicated there were no significant differences in perceived credibility between the 
two testimonial actors, [F(1, 261) = .169, p = .682].  
Social desirability. We assessed the degree that participants’ self-report data may be 
susceptible to social desirability bias on scale of 0--11, and found the mean score was 5.03 (SD = 
2.15) indicating a need to conform to social desirability as measured by this scale was only a 
moderate factor. There were no differences in social desirability scores between the control and 




Confounding factors.  Only 47 participants (12.7%) reported seeking out media on 
topics related to abortion and abortion restrictions in Arkansas in the two weeks between the 
post-test and follow-up survey. Six participants reported familiarity with an actor. Additionally, 
only 33 participants (8.9%) reported a personal experience with abortion occurring during the 
two-week period. There were no differences in follow-up KAR or SAR scores among those who 
reported seeking out related media [FKAR(1, 362) = .003, p = .954], [FSAR(1, 362) = .035, p = 
.851],  or those who reported familiarity with an actor [FKAR(1, 367) = 1.24, p = .265], [FSAR(1, 
367) = 1.05, p = .305]. However, those who reported abortion experience during that time had 
significantly lower follow-up KAR scores [F(1, 367) = 13.09, p < .001] and higher SAR scores 
[F(1, 367) = 14.173, p < .001] than those who did not. With the small sample size, the difference 
in KAR and SAR scores between these individuals could have had a small impact on the effect 
of the interventions across the study.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Knowledge of abortion restrictions. Mean KAR scores at baseline were 9.68 (SD = 
1.76), indicating that out of 18 restrictions, people correctly identified a little over half. As 
expected, scores increased at post-test (M = 12.32, SD = 2.44). On average, people correctly 
identified 2-3 more restrictions from pre-test to post-test (MGain= 2.64, SD = 2.49). Scores 
decreased slightly two-weeks later (M = 11.21, SD = 1.95); People correctly identified on 
average one less restriction at follow-up than they did at post-test (MGain = -1.10, SD = 2.16). 
However, overall gains across the study, from pre-test to follow-up, indicated they correctly 
identified 1-2 more restrictions at follow-up than they did at baseline (MGain = 1.53, SD = 2.27). 
The top three restrictions correctly identified as applying to Arkansas at pre-test were 




(insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of the rape and 
incest or if the woman’s life is in danger” (71.8%), and “A woman cannot get a dilation and 
extraction abortion which is often performed after the 20th week of pregnancy” (71.8%). On 
average, accuracy percentages increased by 13.4% after watching the video. However, one 
restriction, “A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or 
health is in danger,” increased 71.3% in accuracy from pre-test to post-test. See Table 4.3 for 
descriptive values and Table 4.4 for accuracy frequencies across the study. 
 Support for abortion restrictions. At baseline, average SAR scores were 60.40 (SD = 
19.12) on a range of 18 to 90 with high scores indicating high endorsement of restrictions. 
People began the study highly endorsing about 58% of the restrictions listed. After watching the 
video, the average decreased to 56.41 (SD = 21.43), suggesting the magnitude of people’s 
support for restrictions decreased from pre-test to post-test (GainM = -3.99, SD = 8.75). However, 
at the two-week follow up, support had gone up slightly (M = 57.53, SD = 21.57). The average 
score gain from post-test to follow-up was 1.12 (SD = 8.24). Overall, gain scores across the 
whole study from pre-test to follow-up indicated a decrease in magnitude of support for abortion 
restrictions, albeit small (M = -2.87, SD = 10.06). Despite this decrease, many participants 
indicated support for most restrictions in Arkansas (i.e., selected either strongly agree or agree it 
should be a law in Arkansas).  
At pre-test, the top three restrictions with the highest support were “Abortions have to be 
administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare provider)” (endorsed by 
76.7%), “Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative 
psychological effects” (endorsed by 74.0%), and “Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere 




nursing staff, has to be within a certain distance to a hospital)” (endorsed by 72.6%). These three 
restrictions, licensed doctor, negative psychological effects, and ambulatory surgical standards, 
had the highest support at follow-up as well, although the percentages declines slightly (i.e., 
66.2%, 66.3%, and 66.9% respectively). On average, support for restrictions percentages 
decreased by 3.4% across the study. The restriction with the biggest decrease across the study 
was “Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare 
provider)” with a 10.5% decrease from pre-test to follow-up. See Table 4.3 for descriptive values 
and Table 4.5 for frequencies at the opening (e.g., pre-test) and close of the study (e.g., follow-
up).  
Repeated Measures 
 Knowledge of abortion restrictions. First, we examined if there were differences in 
KAR scores by video condition across the three time points (RQ1). Our findings suggest there 
was a statistically significant interaction between the effects of time and video condition, [F(2, 
366) = 8.51, p < .001; Wilks’ λ = .96, ηp2 = .04]. This significant interaction indicates there were 
differences in knowledge scores across the study by intervention or control. However, the overall 
effect size was small. Simple effect comparisons indicated those in the intervention condition 
had significantly higher KAR scores than those in the control at post-test, [F(2, 366) = 151.94, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .454] and at follow-up, [F(1, 367) = 25.96, p < .001, ηp2 = .066]. Specifically, 1) 
pre-test knowledge scores (M = 9.62) were significantly lower than post-test (M = 12.09) and 
follow-up scores (M = 10.93), 2) post-test scores were significantly higher than pre-test and 
follow-up scores, and 3) follow-up scores were significantly higher than pre-test but significantly 




knowledge scores for those in the intervention video condition were significantly higher than 
those in the control video condition (see Figure 4.2 for graphical illustration).  
 
Figure 4.2. Graphic illustration of results of repeated-measures of variance that examined the 
effect of time (pre-test, post-test, and follow-up) and video condition (control and intervention) 
on Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions scores. 
Support for abortion restrictions. Next, we examined if there were differences in SAR 
scores by video condition across the three time points (RQ2). Our findings suggested that the 
interaction between the effects of time and video condition was not statistically significant, [F(2, 
366) = 2.93, p = .055; Wilks’ λ = .98, ηp2 = .02], indicating there were no differences in support 
scores across the study by video condition. There was a main effect for time [F(2, 366) = 27.123, 
p < .001; Wilks’ λ = .871, ηp2 = .13], such that there were significantly higher SAR scores at pre-
test (M = 60.40, SD = 19.11) than post-test (M = 56.41, SD = 21.43) and follow-up (M = 57.53, 
SD = 21.57). Post-test scores were significantly lower than pre-test and follow-up, and follow-up 
scores were significantly lower than pre-test but significantly higher than post-test. The effect for 




hypothesis 2 was not supported because there were no differences in SAR scores by video 
condition (see Figure 4.3 for graphical illustration). 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Graphic illustration of results of repeated-measures mixed analyses of variance that 
examined the effect of time (pre-test, post-test, and follow-up) and video condition (control and 
intervention) on Support for Abortion Restrictions scores. 
Discussion 
 The purpose of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of a video intervention 
intended to increase awareness of abortion restrictions in Arkansas and decrease Arkansans’ 
support for these restrictions. Overall, Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions (KAR) scores 
significantly increased after watching the informational video (at post-test) and declined slightly 
two-weeks later (at follow-up); there was still an increase in knowledge from baseline to the two-
week follow-up. Additionally, for KAR scores, there was a significant interaction between time 
and video condition, although the effect size was small. Contrary to our hypothesis, knowledge 
scores of those who received an intervention video were significantly higher at post-test and 




Overall, Support for Abortion Restrictions (SAR) scores decreased after watching the 
video; SAR scores decreased from pre-test to post-test and slightly increased two weeks later at 
follow-up. However, there were no significant differences in SAR scores by video condition. 
This finding was inconsistent with our hypothesis. 
Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions 
We intended for the informational portion to increase knowledge of abortion restrictions 
over time and we achieved those results. The effect size was small and, thus, the implications for 
these results should be approached with caution. A strength of this study was that people 
received evidence-based information from a person who they perceived as credible—source-
credibility for the news anchor was high. Opposing what we expected (e.g., no differences 
between video conditions), participants who received the intervention condition (i.e., watched a 
personal testimonial following the news story) had significantly higher knowledge scores 
compared to those who received the control condition. There are several possible explanations 
for these findings.  
First, it may be that those in the intervention condition had higher overall KAR scores 
because they received repeat information on restrictions specific to Arkansas. For example, the 
news story described 48-hour waiting periods as a restriction in Arkansas. Then, the woman in 
the testimonial described her experience waiting 48 hours to get her abortion. The reiteration 
could have led to better knowledge retention for those that watched a testimonial in addition to 
the news video compared to those who only watched the news video.  
Second, differences in demographic characteristics of our sample could have affected 




there were proportionally more people who identified as White, low-income, “pro-choice,” and 
with a college degree. In contrast, there were more participants in the control who identified as 
non-White, higher-income, “pro-life” and who had not attended college. Those who identify as 
“pro-choice” and who are more highly educated may have been more open to learning about 
abortion restrictions. Research shows these demographic factors are associated with permissive 
attitudes toward abortion (e.g., Smith & Son, 2013; Strickler & Danigelis, 2002; Wang, 2004). 
The same can be said for people who are low-income; they may have been able to identify with 
the economic struggles described by the woman in the testimonial (Woodhams et al., 2016). 
Educated “pro-choice” people also may have also started the study with knowledge about 
abortion restrictions. Thus, the effect size might have been small because the magnitude of 
knowledge gain may have been affected by this. 
To our knowledge, there is no recent evidence-backed reason as to why race might affect 
knowledge retention about abortion. Research on race and abortion attitudes indicates varied 
trends, but suggests African American or Black people have more permissive attitudes toward 
abortion than White people, citing an impact from the Reproductive Justice movement (Forward 
Together, 2019; Strickler & Danigelis, 2002). However, older literature suggests that racial 
differences are confounded by other demographic factors (e.g., religion, gender; Hall & Ferree, 
1986; Lynxwiler & Gay, 1994; Secret, 1987). Thus, especially with our small non-White sample 
size, the difference in race between video conditions could have had little effect on the difference 
in knowledge scores across the study. Interestingly, these demographic differences did not have 
an effect on support for restrictions by video condition (discussed in the next section).  
Last, people in the experimental condition could have had better retention because they 




people are more inclined to empathize with another person’s situation and want to lessen their 
struggles (Currier & Carlson, 2009; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Therefore, people who heard a 
testimonial may have been more open to hearing the story because their awareness of the 
restrictions had increased. Then, in turn, connecting what they learned to their feelings for the 
testimonial could have reinforced what they had learned. When people are more educated about 
the legislative environment associated with a particular issue, an intervention may be more 
effective in shifting attitudes about the legislation. As such, it may be important for educators 
and researchers to be thorough in providing context when using testimonial interventions.  
However, another contribution to people’s support for restrictions may be related to their 
personal experiences. In the two weeks between post-test and follow-up, the 33 people who 
reported either a primary or secondary abortion experience had significantly higher support for 
restrictions and significantly lower knowledge. One would expect that if they had experienced 
these obstacles first hand, they would have higher knowledge and lower support for restrictions. 
It is possible these experiences were not positive or our participants were not intimately involved 
in the process. Thus, their knowledge did not increase and they remained supportive of 
restricting access. We did not assess for more information about these recent experiences so we 
cannot glean potential reasons for having higher support and lower knowledge scores. These 
differences suggest personal experiences may be just as important on people’s support for 
restrictions.  
Support for Abortion Restrictions 
Although the intervention video increased knowledge, there were no differences in 
support for restrictions by video condition. We predicted that a story demonstrating the real-life 




video that only disseminated information (i.e., no testimonial). The testimonial did not have the 
hypothesized effect. 
Disregarding video condition, results indicated that support for restrictions at the end of 
the study was significantly lower than those at baseline. However, support for restrictions at 
follow-up remained higher than anticipated. An explanation may be that even though the 
majority of participants identified as “pro-choice,” people may want to restrict abortion access or 
may not understand how restrictions truly impact people’s lives. Adjusting attitudes on this 
subject may require a larger cultural shift. 
This cultural shift necessitates the widespread debunking of the myth that restrictions are 
mechanisms of health and safety for women seeking abortions (Weitz, Moore, Gordon, & Adler, 
2008). To illustrate the way these restrictions perpetuate this myth, we describe several examples 
of the laws that were addressed in the informational portion of our video. For each, the news 
anchor described the Arkansas restriction and briefly explained the consequence of this mandate. 
Yet, these examples retained support from over half of the sample at the end of the study. 
For example, the news anchor stated that in Arkansas “[an] abortion has to be performed 
by a licensed doctor, which means if you usually go to a health professional like a nurse 
practitioner, you have to go to a different place.” At the conclusion of the study, 66.2% of the 
sample agreed that requiring abortions to be provided by a licensed physician should be a law in 
Arkansas. Ostensibly, it seems positive that abortions should only be provided by “licensed 
physicians”. However, as a result, advanced practice clinicians (i.e., certified nurse-midwives, 
nurse practitioners (NP), and physician assistants (PA)) are unable to provide either procedural 




the fact that these providers have the necessary and relevant skills to provide these services with 
the same risk of complications compared to physicians (Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz et al., 2013).  
Preventing these health professionals from providing abortion services limits locations 
that can offer abortion care. These laws further divide those who are able to afford abortions and 
those who are not. Often, low-income individuals and women of color are more likely to receive 
care at public health departments or community health centers, where NPs and PAs provide the 
majority of healthcare services (Grumbach, Hart, Mertz, Coffman, & Palazzo, 2003; Schacht, 
2008; Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz et al., 2013). Therefore, these populations are particularly 
negatively impacted by these laws because they do not typically have access to physicians. It is 
possible that this outcome is not obvious with a basic interpretation of restrictions, among people 
with privilege who do not have to think about what categories of health professionals they have 
access to. Two-thirds of our sample reported being mid-income or higher and the majority 
identified as White, therefore such privilege may apply to many of our participants. The 
implications of this mandate are complicated and may be difficult for someone to fully 
appreciate on their own. Perhaps more explicit linking of these restriction to real life implications 
is necessary in the video beyond what was already provided. 
Another example of a restriction painted as a health and safety measure is parental 
involvement laws. In the video, the news anchor describes this Arkansas law as: “If you’re under 
18, you have to get permission from a parent. Research shows it delays the procedure or teens 
may travel to states without these laws to get an abortion.” Parental permission was endorsed by 
60.1% of the sample at the conclusion of the study. People may support parental laws for reasons 




understand any procedures, and provide emotional support (American College of Pediatricians, 
2016).  
Often, regardless of laws, minors do involve parents in their medical decisions. However, 
Blasdell (2002) points out that if a minor decides not to involve their parents, their decision is 
due to safety or necessity (e.g., threat of domestic violence, getting kicked out). In the years 
following the implementation of these laws (i.e., 1974-1988), the overall number of teen 
abortions did decrease dramatically (Blank et al., 1996). But rates of abortions after 13 weeks 
and teens traveling to another state to obtain an abortion also increased (Blasdell, 2002; Dennis, 
Henshaw, Joyce, Finer, & Blanchard, 2009). Therefore, these laws often result in either 
increased financial and logistical burden on minors to obtain an abortion while avoiding 
involving their parents, forced birth, or risk to their safety.  
For these reason and others, the leading medical groups in the U.S. (e.g., American 
Public Health Association, American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics) 
publicly oppose parental involvement laws (American Civil Liberties Union, 2018). Laypersons 
may endorse this restriction because they feel minors should involve their parents in the decision 
to have an abortion. But such restrictions privilege minors who have positive relationships with 
their parents and penalize those who do not (e.g., victims of incest). 
A final example is biased counseling laws. Regarding this topic, the news anchor states: 
“During the counseling session, doctors are required to tell patients that it is possible for a 
medication abortion to be reversed after the first dose of pills, which is not backed up with 




the link between abortion and breast cancer or negative mental health outcomes. None of this 
information is evidenced by medical research.”  
In spite of this information, at the end of the study, 66 percent of the sample agreed 
physicians should be required to give pre-counseling information on negative psychological 
outcomes following abortion. Fifty-five percent agreed counseling should include the link with 
abortion and increased risk of breast cancer (54.5%). And 59.5% agreed doctors in Arkansas 
should tell women about the reversal of a medication abortion. If people think that abortion 
really does increase breast cancer, depression, and can be reversed, then doctors being required 
to tell patients about these risks seems positive. However, these claims are not supported by 
methodologically sound evidence (e.g., Charles, Polis, Sridhara, & Blum, 2008; Grossman et al, 
2015; Grossman & White, 2018; Guttmacher Institute, 2017g; National Academy of Sciences, 
2018). As these messages continue to be perpetuated by politicians and trusted doctors who are 
required to say them, people will continue to doubt whether women should freely make decisions 
about their bodies. 
Even though support for abortion restrictions in Arkansas decreased over the study, they 
remained problematically high. Until there is a cultural shift that debunks these myths, there will 
continue to be difficulties decreasing support for restrictions. Because these laws are marketed as 
helpful to women who seek abortions, an opposing stance “appears unsupportive of women” 
(Weitz et al., 2008, p. 87). With the norming of “call-out culture” (Mendes, Ringrose, & Keller, 
2018, p. 1) with respect to sexism and gender discrimination (e.g., the #MeToo movement), 
some people may feel pressured to conform to a societal norm in which they support (or appear 
to support) women. In a culture of hostility toward women’s reproductive choice, it seems to be 




with abortion and ensure they are provided with an opportunity to consider their options. If these 
laws appear to protect and help women, people end up simultaneously supporting abortion access 
and the laws that would restrict access  (Bowman & Sims, 2017). It is important that people 
realize that with these restrictions, women will only continue to have theoretical access to 
abortion, not practical access. And it is imperative that people, especially those who live in 
hostile states like Arkansas, work to understand and abolish the mechanisms that obstruct access 
to bodily autonomy. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Using a randomized-controlled design, this study examined the effects of an innovative 
media intervention on abortion knowledge and endorsement of abortion restrictions in Arkansas. 
Although the design was rigorous, there are several limitations worth mentioning. The sample 
consisted of current residents of Arkansas who volunteered to participate in a study about 
attitudes toward abortion. Therefore, although they were randomly assigned to conditions, they 
were not randomly selected from the population and therefore findings are not fully 
generalizable to the population of Arkansas. Participants who continued on throughout the 
entirety of the study had significantly lower baseline SAR scores that those who dropped out. 
Thus, it is possible that participants who self-selected to complete the study were already either 
engaged with the abortion movement. It is also possible people who are more supportive of 
restricting abortion (higher SAR scores) may have seen the videos and dropped out because they 
did not like messages that pointed out negative outcomes to abortion restrictions. We offered 
compensation to increase motivation so even people who were indifferent or opposed abortion 
would be more inclined to participate in the study. Future research should assess efficacy of 




As with limitations of media interventions, it is possible participants did not watch or pay 
attention to the whole video even though the survey settings made it so they could not leave the 
page until the entirety of the video had played. Also, there was a risk that people could have 
looked up answers to the knowledge questions, as it was administered online, or accuracy scores 
could have been partially a function of random guessing. However, a very small amount of 
people reported seeking related media in the two weeks between pre-test and follow-up and there 
were no differences in outcome scores between those who did and did not report seeking out 
related media. We cannot infer causality from the effect of the videos. This was an exploratory 
study with a potential to have implications for future research and intervention work. However, 
effect sizes were small and implications should be approached with caution. 
Finally, we did not ask participants who reported abortion experience if they had personal 
experience with any legislative restrictions. Future research should address this directly to assess 
if they were aware of restrictions based on personal experience. Even more, we did not 
specifically ask if participants believed each restriction was helpful or harmful to women. In 
order to glean the reasoning behind their support, future research should address this gap. 
Conclusion 
Overall, the empathy-based media intervention increased participants’ knowledge and 
decreased support for abortion restrictions across the study. A personal testimonial in addition to 
an information portion significantly changed knowledge over time but did not affect support for 
restrictions. To increase knowledge of abortion restrictions, it seems there is the potential for 
success with a video intervention including a credible news source followed by a personal 




Targeting support for restrictions, though, may require a different strategy. Endorsement 
of individual abortion restrictions remained moderately high in the sample, potentially because 
people lack the understanding of the magnitude of how these restrictions impact women in 
Arkansas, fully appreciate the implications of each restriction on own’s own, or actually want 
abortion to be further restricted. As these restrictions do not actually help women or protect their 
autonomy and instead make it more difficult to receive abortion care, it is important for people to 
understand that supporting restrictions is contradictory to supporting access. Future interventions 
should work to de-mystify abortion regulations so that people who prioritize reproductive choice 
understand that these restrictions are unnecessary. In order to understand the contradictory nature 
of supporting restrictions and supporting access, one has to be aware of what restrictions are in 
place, the structural factors that contribute to their occurrence, and the outcomes that take place 
as a result.   
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Participant Demographics (N = 369)  
Characteristic N (%) Characteristic N (%) 
Sex  Sexual Orientation  
     Male 104 (28.2)      Heterosexual 329 (89.2) 
     Female 264 (71.5)      Gay/Lesbian 14 (3.8) 
Race       Bisexual 20 (5.4) 
     White or Caucasian 312 (84.6)      Queer 6 (1.6) 
     Black or African 
American 
24 (6.5) Education Level  
     Latino/a 12 (3.3)      High school graduate/GED 39 (10.6) 
     Asian or Asian American 4 (1.1)      Some college/associate degree 104 (28.2) 
     Bi- or Multi- racial 8 (2.2)      College degree 183 (49.6) 
Income Level       Graduate degree 41 (11.1) 
     Low 23 (6.2) Political Party  
     Lower-Middle 102 (27.6)      Republican 120 (32.5) 
     Middle 126 (34.1)      Democrat 139 (37.7) 
     Upper-Middle 57 (15.4)      Libertarian 58 (15.7) 
     High 61 (16.5)      None 39 (10.6) 
Relationship Status  Abortion Identity  
     Married 218 (59.1)      “Pro-Life” 66 (17.9) 
     In a relationship 68 (18.4)      “Pro-Choice” 269 (72.9) 
     Single and not dating 43 (11.7)      Neither 13 (3.5) 
     Single and dating 28 (7.8)      Both 18 (4.9) 
Abortion Experience (self 
and/or others) 
 Sexual Assault Experience (self 
and/or others) 
 
     Yes 275 (74.5)      Yes 306 (82.9) 
     No 65 (17.6)      No 47 (12.7) 







Chi-Square Results for Demographic Characteristics and Video Condition (N=369) 
 Control 
28.7% 
n = 106 
Intervention 
71.2% 
n = 263  
 
 n % n % c2 Cramer’s V 
Sex     1.01 .052 
     Male 33 31.7 71 68.3   
     Female 73 27.7 191 72.3   
Abortion Experience     3.43 .096 
     Yes 86 31.3 189 68.7   
     No 14 21.5 51 78.5   
     Not Sure 6 20.7 23 79.3   
Abortion Knowledge Level     1.83 .070 
     Low 19 34.5 36 65.5   
     Medium 70 26.7 192 73.3   
     High 17 32.7 35 67.3   
Race     11.44** .176 
     White 79 25.3 233 74.7   








Table 4.2 (Cont.) 
 Control 
28.7% 
n = 106 
Intervention 
71.2% 
n = 263  
 
 n % n % c2 Cramer’s V 
Income     11.94** .180 
     Low 25 20.0 100 80.0   
     Medium 34 27.0 92 73.0   
     High 47 39.8 71 60.2   
Education     22.35*** .246 
     HS or less 21 51.2 20 48.8   
     Some College 39 37.5 65 62.5   
     College degree 35 19.1 148 80.9   
     Graduate degree 11 26.8 30 73.2   
Abortion Identity     19.04*** .227 
     “Pro-Life” 33 50.0 33 50.0   
     “Pro-Choice” 62 23.0 207 77.0   
     Other 11 32.4 23 67.6   













n = 106  
Intervention  
n = 263 Time Treatment Time´Treatment 
M SD  M SD F (h2) F (h2) F (h2) 
aKAR      151.94*** (.45) 25.96*** (.07) .956*** (.04) 
Pre-test 9.47 2.07  9.76 1.61 
   
Post-test 11.57 2.81  12.62 2.21 
   
Follow-up 10.25 2.42  11.60 1.57    
bSAR      27.12** (.13) 1.10 (.003) 2.93 (.02) 
Pre-test 61.13 18.70  60.11 19.31 
   
Post-test 58.14 21.57  55.72 21.38 
   
Follow-up 60.25 21.36  56.44 21.59    
Note. aKAR =  Knowledge of Abortion Restrictions (range of 0-18 with high scores indicating high knowledge);  bSAR = Support for 
Abortion Restrictions (range of 18-90 with high scores indicating more support for restrictions) 









Knowledge of the Main Types of Abortion Restrictions in the U.S. at Pre-test, Post-test, and Follow-up  
Restriction 
Correctly identified 
whether it was a 
law in Arkansas at 
Pre-test 
Correctly identified 
whether it was a 
law in Arkansas at 
Post-test 
Correctly identified 
whether it was a law 
in Arkansas at 
Follow-up 
Applies to Arkansas N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion 325 (88.1) 361 (97.8) 330 (89.4) 
For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors 
have to counsel that that a fetus can feel pain 
279 (75.6) 311 (84.3) 290 (78.6) 
A woman must wait 48 hours after required counseling before the abortion 
can be performed. 
221 (59.9) 325 (88.1) 302 (81.8) 
Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover 
abortions in cases of the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger 
265 (71.8) 322 (87.3) 308 (83.5) 
Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or 
other healthcare provider) 
317 (85.9) 332 (90.0) 339 (91.9) 
Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., 
online video session) for people who live far away 
246 (66.7) 255 (69.1) 245 (66.4) 
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the 
abortion pill to be reversed 
214 (58.0) 308 (83.5) 296 (80.2) 
A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her 
life or health is in danger 
78 (21.1) 341 (92.4) 321 (87.0) 
A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion 250 (67.8) 256 (69.4) 218 (59.1) 
A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often 
performed after the 20th week of pregnancy 






Table 4.4 (Cont.) 
Restriction 
Correctly identified 
whether it was a 
law in Arkansas at 
Pre-test 
Correctly identified 
whether it was a 
law in Arkansas at 
Post-test 
Correctly identified 
whether it was a law 
in Arkansas at 
Follow-up 
Does not apply to Arkansas N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t 
need permission. 
251 (68.0) 278 (75.3) 251 (68.0) 
Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link 
between breast cancer and abortion 
94 (25.5) 69 (18.7) 57 (15.4) 
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause 
negative psychological effects  
80 (21.7) 94 (25.5) 65 (17.6) 
A woman must wait 24 hours after required counseling before the abortion 
can be performed. 
167 (45.3) 292 (79.1) 266 (72.1) 
A woman must wait 72 hours after required counseling before the abortion 
can be performed. 
238 (64.5) 310 (84.0) 284 (77.0) 
A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the 
pregnancy) before an abortion  
88 (23.8) 147 (39.8) 93 (25.2) 
Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United 
Healthcare) can require people to pay more or buy special insurance to 
cover abortion 
246 (66.7) 117 (31.7) 86 (23.3) 
Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical 
standards (e.g., hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing 
staff, has to be within a certain distance to a hospital) 









Support for the Main Types of Abortion Restrictions in the U.S. at Pre-test and Follow-up  
Restriction 
Agreed it 







it should be 















 N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can 
get an abortion. 
211 (57.2) 54 (14.6) 104 (28.2) 221 (60.1) 32 (8.7) 115 (31.3) 
For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of 
pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel that that a 
fetus can feel pain 
211 (57.2) 50 (13.6) 108 (29.3) 210 (56.9) 31 (8.4) 128 (34.7) 
A woman must wait 48 hours after required 
counseling before the abortion can be performed. 
194 (52.6) 53 (14.4) 122 (33.1) 187 (50.7) 35 (9.5) 147 (39.8) 
Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) 
can only cover abortions in cases of the rape and 
incest or if the woman’s life is in danger 
205 (55.6) 36 (9.8) 128 (34.7) 220 (59.8) 25 (6.8) 123 (33.4) 
Abortions have to be administered by a licensed 
doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare provider) 
283 (76.7) 42 (11.4) 44 (11.9) 243 (66.2) 48 (13.1) 76 (20.7) 
Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through 
telemedicine (e.g., online video session) for people 
who live far away 
180 (48.8) 53 (14.4) 136 (36.9) 143 (38.8) 46 (12.5) 180 (48.8) 
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is 
possible for the abortion pill to be reversed 








Table 4.5 (Cont.) 
A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of 
pregnancy unless her life or health is in danger 
218 (59.1) 41 (11.1) 110 (29.8) 208 (56.4) 51 (13.8) 110 (29.8) 
A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion 192 (52.2) 78 (21.2) 98 (26.6) 177 (48.1) 63 (17.1) 128 (34.8) 
A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion 
which is often performed after the 20th week of 
pregnancy 
211 (57.2) 55 (14.9) 103 (27.9) 207 (56.3) 45 (12.2) 116 (31.5) 
Minors must tell a parent before they can get an 
abortion but they don’t need permission. 
148 (40.1) 56 (15.2) 165 (44.7) 116 (31.4) 55 (14.9) 198 (53.7) 
Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there 
may be a link between breast cancer and abortion 
233 (63.1) 58 (15.7) 78 (21.1) 201 (54.6) 47 (12.8) 120 (32.6) 
Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the 
abortion can cause negative psychological effects  
273 (74.0) 43 (11.7) 53 (14.4) 244 (66.3) 36 (9.8) 88 (23.9) 
A woman must wait 24 hours after required 
counseling before the abortion can be performed. 
186 (50.4) 60 (16.3) 123 (33.3) 166 (45.0) 39 (10.6) 164 (44.4) 
A woman must wait 72 hours after required 
counseling before the abortion can be performed. 
162 (43.9) 33 (8.9) 174 (47.2) 146 (39.6) 28 (7.6) 195 (52.8) 
A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a 
picture of the pregnancy) before an abortion  
210 (56.9) 36 (9.8) 123 (33.3) 213 (57.7) 24 (6.5) 132 (35.8) 
Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross 
Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can require people to 
pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion 
178 (48.2) 55 (14.9) 136 (36.9) 187 (50.8) 44 (12.0) 137 (37.2) 
Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to 
ambulatory surgical standards (e.g., hallways have to 
be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to 
be within a certain distance to a hospital) 






CHAPTER 5: MANUSCRIPT 2 
 
Do race and pregnancy situation affect empathy for women who seek abortions in Arkansas?: A 
randomized-controlled video intervention 
Abstract 
CONTEXT: Despite the safety and prevalence of U.S. abortions, people who seek them 
encounter barriers from two main sources: legislation and stigmatization. Empathy induction 
may reduce these barriers, especially in highly restrictive states like Arkansas. This study 
examines factors that contribute to empathy induction among Arkansans who watched a video 
intervention.  
METHODS: A sample of Arkansas residents (N = 369) completed an online survey comprising a 
pre-test, video intervention, post-test, and two-week follow-up. There were five video conditions, 
varying by actor’s race and pregnancy narrative. The surveys assessed baseline Empathic 
Concern and post-video feelings of empathy. Chi-squared analyses were used to assess 
differences in six empathy characteristic scores (e.g., moved, tender) by video condition. 
Hierarchical regressions examined factors (e.g., video condition) contributing to post-video 
empathy sum scores.  
RESULTS: Participants who watched a testimonial where the woman was raped had higher 
individual empathetic feeling scores. Post-test empathy sum scores were a function of 
respondents’ sex, experience with abortion and sexual assault, baseline Empathic Concern, and 
video condition. The testimonial depicting a Black woman who was raped induced the most 
empathy at post-test. In the two-week follow-up, only personal experiences with abortion and 




CONCLUSIONS: Prior personal experiences and internalization of abortion stigma can affect 
empathy induction. People were more empathetic for the woman who experiences rape rather 
than consensual sex. The hierarchy of abortion narratives may influence perceptions of abortion 
seekers. Future interventions to shift attitudes toward abortion seekers should incorporate 
personal experiences and a variety of abortion narratives to normalize abortion experiences and 
reduce stigma. 
 





 Despite its high prevalence and low risk, abortion remains a contentious topic in the U.S. 
(Dreweke, 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Guttmacher Institute, 2017f; Jones & Jerman, 
2017b). People who seek abortions face numerous barriers stemming from two main sources: 
restrictive legislation and stigma. Midwestern and Southern states, such as Arkansas, have 
particularly high rates of these laws restriction abortion (Nash et al., 2017). Stigmatization is 
another source of impediment. People often conceptualize abortion seekers as either worthy or 
unworthy patients, depending on circumstances, and perpetuate these conceptualizations in 
interactions with others. This stigma can affect abortion seekers’ decisions or make their 
reproductive journey more difficult (e.g., Norris et al., 2011). 
Together, state laws and stigmatization delay abortions, making them more difficult to 
get, expensive, and riskier than abortions obtained earlier in pregnancy (Bitler & Zavodny, 2001; 
Jones & Weitz, 2009). Those who are denied abortion access suffer many negative outcomes 
compared with those who obtain a sought after abortion. These outcomes include increased 
depression and anxiety, decreased career or education advancement, and increased poverty 
(Foster et al., 2015; Foster et al., 2018; Gipson, Koenig, & Hindin, 2008; Upadhyay et al., 2015). 
As such, focusing on abolishing these barriers is a way to reduce negative health outcomes for 
people who seek reproductive care. 
A possible mechanism to reduce support for legislative barriers and abortion stigma is to 
create empathy for those who seek abortions. Indeed, empathy induction has been a successful 
tactic in shifting people’s attitudes toward stigmatized populations (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; 
Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Nook et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2014). Video-based interventions 




Braverman, 2008; Roberto et al., 2000). Therefore, the current study examines the efficacy of an 
empathy-based video intervention with residents of Arkansas, a state categorized as hostile 
towards reproductive health access (Nash et al., 2017). We also examined contributing factors 
toward feelings of empathy (i.e., sex, personal experiences, baseline Empathic Concern) for 
Arkansans who seek abortions.  
Barriers to Abortion Access 
Arkansas is among the top three states in the U.S. with the most legislative abortion 
restrictions passed between 2011 and 2015 (Guttmacher Institute, 2016b). Additionally, the 
Arkansas state legislature introduced more anti-abortion bills than any other state during the 
2017 legislative session (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018). It is considered an “extremely 
hostile” state (Guttmacher Institute, 2017k; Nash et al., 2017) with barriers stemming from two 
sources: legislative restrictions and stigmatization.   
Legislative barriers. In recent years, state legislatures have introduced myriad laws 
restricting access to reproductive health services, including abortion and contraception; the 
Center for Reproductive Rights (2018) estimates that 2,556 bills of this nature have been 
introduced in the U.S. since 2011, and 370 have been made law. The ten most common types of 
abortion restrictions include: 1) mandating parental involvement, 2) requiring pre-abortion 
counseling, 3) mandating waiting periods, 4) mandating ultrasounds, 5) prohibiting coverage 
from federal funding, 6) inhibiting coverage from private funding, 7) regulating medication 
abortion, 8) micromanaging abortion facilities, 9) restricting abortions based on viability, and 10) 
preparing for the overturn of Roe v. Wade (Nash et al., 2017). At data collection for this study, 





As a result, Arkansas only has three facilities in the state that provide abortion services 
(Cartwright, Karunaratne, Barr-Walker, Johns, & Upadhyay, 2018) for approximately 600,000 
women of reproductive age (i.e., 15-44; March of Dimes, 2019). Because these clinics are 
located in two cities across the entire state, women’s ability to seek and access an abortion is 
severely limited. Additionally, with only three clinics total in the state, when women go to one of 
these facilities, their private choices become public. If abortion was more accessible in Arkansas 
(e.g., health professionals were not hindered in providing abortions in hospitals and other 
healthcare settings), women would be afforded more privacy in making these reproductive 
choices. 
 Stigmatization. Many studies have examined sources and outcomes of stigma that 
abortion seekers face (e.g., Kimport, Foster, & Weitz, 2011; Kimport, Weitz, & Freedman, 2016; 
Norris et al., 2011). These studies often collect stratified data with representation from people in 
the South and Midwest. However, if there are Arkansans in these samples, they are combined 
with other Southerners or Midwesterners. Arkansans do not have the same experiences as other 
Southerners or Midwesterners. Lawmakers in Arkansas enacted more anti-abortion laws than any 
other state in 2017 (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018), but convenience samples of 
Arkansans suggest the majority support abortion legality; it is unknown to what extent 
Arkansans understand the practical impact that abortion restriction have on individual women 
(Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018; Parry, 2017). To study how Arkansans feel about abortion, 
additional research is needed.  
There is limited research specifically examining Arkansans’ internalized stigmatization 
toward women who seek abortions. Instead, we can examine national data to assess sources of 




there are three specific biases that are consistently related to abortion attitudes: 1) beliefs about 
women and their role in motherhood, 2) beliefs about race, and 3) perceived pregnancy 
responsibility (e.g., Hans & Kimberly, 2014; Kumar, 2013; Kumar et al., 2009; Norris et al., 
2011). 
Beliefs about women. Most people who seek abortions face prejudices related to the 
general societal pressures of women. Kumar and colleagues (2009) posit that women who seek 
abortions are marked as “inferior” (p. 628) by violating the three ideals of 
womanhood/femininity: women must have sex only for procreation, women must aspire to 
become mothers, and women must act on their instinct to nurture the vulnerable. Likewise, 
Ellison (2003) argues that stigmatizing women who have abortions is a form of “structural 
violence” (p. 323) and therefore perpetuates that there are “good” and “worthy” women (e.g., 
married women who become pregnant and have babies) and socially deviant women (e.g., those 
who are not married, those who end their pregnancies).  
Beliefs about race. While all women experience gender pressure, women of color face 
even greater stigma compared with White women. Kumar (2013) points out that “socially 
excluded” women (e.g., women of color) already experience stigmatization and discrimination 
without seeking an abortion. Therefore, scholars should be careful not to lump every inequality 
in as “abortion stigma.” There are women who are already at a social disadvantage when they 
“enter the abortion landscape” (Kumar, 2013, p. e330) and their obstacles are exacerbated as 
they navigate an abortion experience. For instance, young women of color experience prejudice 
and discrimination as a result of racism. Paradoxically, these women, who experience the most 
barriers to access, have the highest rates of abortion (Guttmacher Institute, 2017a; Jones & 




The Hyde Amendment is an example of a barrier that heavily affects women of color. 
This law prohibits federal funding from covering abortion care, which overwhelmingly affects 
low-income women of color. Women of color are more likely to be use Medicaid due to 
socioeconomic inequality stemming from racism (i.e., 30% of Black women and 24% of 
Hispanic women aged 15–44 are enrolled in Medicaid, compared with 14% of White women; 
Boonstra, 2016; Frohwirth, 2014). Also, because of racial prejudice, people perceive that the 
state has the right and responsibility to intervene in the reproductive decisions of women of color 
on behalf of their fetuses and children (Harrison, 2016). For example, pregnant women of color 
are more likely to be policed by hospitals for engaging in behaviors that are detrimental to the 
fetus (e.g., drug use) even though pregnant White women are just as likely to engage in the same 
behaviors. 
Perceived pregnancy responsibility. Another internal bias that contributes to 
stigmatization is the circumstances under which a woman became pregnant and consequently 
their perceived responsibility for the pregnancy. Overwhelmingly, the U.S. public supports 
abortion under at least some circumstances (Smith & Son, 2013), yet, many people harbor 
conflicting attitudes. People conceptualize abortion seekers as worthy or unworthy based on 
women’s characteristics or circumstances (Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & Crawford, 
forthcoming; Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018; Smith & Son, 2013). For instance, people 
conceptualize a worthy abortion seeker when there is a “good” reason and an unworthy abortion 
seeker when there is a “bad” reason. Rape is a pregnancy circumstance often supported by the 
public as an “acceptable” or understandable reason for abortion (Mikolajczak & Bilewicz, 2015; 
Smith & Son, 2013). A woman who is pregnant as a result of consensual sex, a “bad” reason, 




people will assume the woman who became pregnant as a result of consensual sex had some 
control over her risk of pregnancy compared with someone who may not have had a choice 
(Hans & Kimberly, 2014).  
In this study, we aimed to examine the impact of restrictions and factors that contribute to 
stigmatization of women (e.g., race, perceived pregnancy responsibility) as they relate to 
empathy induction for Arkansan women who seek abortions. 
Empathy  
Those who have sought or obtained an abortion report experiencing stigma and 
discrimination from their partners, family, friends, and the larger society (Norris et al., 2011). 
This stigma can result from a lack of understanding, or empathy, about women’s decisions to 
obtain an abortion. Empathy is the result of perspective-taking that “occur[s] when people can 
seemingly understand the underlying reasons for the behavior of someone other than themselves” 
(Plumm & Terrance, 2009, p. 191). As such, targeting empathy may increase people’s 
understanding of abortion seekers’ circumstances. In turn, their attitudes about people who seek 
abortions may shift.  
There are two primary types of empathy: trait and state (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 
1995; Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Trait empathy results from an 
individual’s similarity with the population in question (e.g., personal characteristics such as 
gender and race), whereas state empathy is a result of an individual’s ability to position take with 
another person. It is difficult to manipulate or target trait empathy as it requires sharing similar 
characteristics with another person; however, researchers can increase people’s ability to 




A person’s life experiences can facilitate higher levels of state empathy. For example, 
facing discrimination or knowing someone who has been raped can lead to an increased chance 
of shifted attitudes for populations in need of empathy (Batson et al., 1997; Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Glynn & Sen, 2015; Moyer & Haire, 2015; Wang, Tai, Ku, & Galinsky, 2014; 
Wiener, Felman Wiener, & Grisso, 1989). Literature indicates women are more likely than men 
to have higher empathy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Hoffman, 1977). Taken together, we 
hypothesized women who have had a personal abortion experience seem to be most likely feel 
empathy for abortion seekers. 
Researchers have designed interventions using empathy induction techniques to change 
people’s attitudes toward stigmatized populations. For instance, interventions have been 
conducted to increase empathy for homeless individuals (Batson et al., 1997; Nook et al., 2016; 
Wang et al., 2014), individuals who have committed homicide (Batson et al., 1997; Plumm & 
Terrance, 2009), and individuals with illness or disability (Batson et al., 1997; Lor et al., 2015). 
These interventions increased people’s empathy toward these vulnerable populations and 
successfully shifted people’s attitudes toward these groups. Therefore, empathy appears to be an 
underlying cognitive construct that can influence attitudes.  
There is limited research using empathy as a tool to adjust people’s attitudes toward 
women who seek abortions (Norris et al., 2011). The few empathy interventions focused on 
abortion have targeted either health professionals (e.g., Pace et al., 2008; Turner and colleagues, 
2008) or specifically aimed for conflict resolution among “pro-life” vs. “pro-choice” populations 





Strategies to Induce Empathy 
To induce empathy, experiments have had success with testimonials, or stories of 
personal experiences told by members of the group in question. In these experiments, 
participants have either watched videos, listened to audio tracks, or read these stories. Then they 
were instructed to think about how the other person might be feeling to elicit an empathetic 
response (Davis, 1996; Haegerich & Bottoms, 2000; Plumm & Terrance, 2009). Specifically, 
audio- or video-based testimonials appear to have resulted in longer lasting attitude changes than 
written testimonials or education initiatives alone (Batson et al., 1997; Blas, et al., 2010; 
Braverman, 2008; Parker et al., 1996; Roberto et al., 2000). Further, some interventions that 
involved interacting with and hearing the narratives of people who obtain and work in abortion 
care generated successful attitude change (LeBaron & Carstaphen, 1997; Pace et al., 2008).  
The Current Study 
The goal of this study was to examine the effectiveness of a video-based intervention that 
used empathy induction as a tool to adjust people’s views on Arkansas women who seek 
abortions. All participants received the same educational information about abortion restrictions 
in Arkansas. For participants randomized to the intervention arm, we tested two variables across 
four conditions in the intervention—race and pregnancy circumstance. For race, participants in 
the intervention condition either viewed a Black or White woman discussing her difficulties 
obtaining an abortion in Arkansas. For pregnancy circumstance, participants in the intervention 
condition heard one of two stories: the woman became pregnant through consensual sex or as a 
result of a rape. We aimed to see if these two intervention variables affected feeling the six 




to test which factors, including testimonial version, predicted empathy sum scores for women 
who seek abortions in Arkansas.  
RQ1. First, we examined if people felt the six empathy characteristics differently 
depending on the race of the woman in the video. We hypothesized that people who viewed the 
Black woman’s testimonials would have lower scores on the six empathy characteristics than 
those who viewed the White woman given internal racial biases against women of color. 
RQ2. Second, we examined if people felt the six empathy characteristics differently 
based on perceived pregnancy responsibility. We hypothesized that participants who viewed the 
testimonial where the woman became pregnant as a result of rape would have higher scores on 
the six empathy characteristics than participants who heard the woman became pregnant as a 
result of consensual sex.  
RQ3. Last, we examined if other personal experiences/traits contributed to empathy sum 
scores. Particularly, we aimed to see whether watching a certain testimonial would affect 
empathy sum scores above and beyond personal experiences/traits. The variables we evaluated 
were participants’ sex, previous experience with abortion, previous experience with sexual 
assault, baseline Empathic Concern (how naturally empathetic one is), social desirability scores 
(to what degree participants feel pressure to act according to what is socially acceptable), and 
assigned video condition. Specifically, we hypothesized that people who 1) are female, 2) have 
personal experiences with abortion, 3) have personal experiences with sexual assault, 4) have 
higher level of baseline Empathic Concern, 5) people with high social desirability scores, and 6) 




scores. We examined participants’ race in another model but it was not significant and was not 
included in the final model. 
Methods 
Participants 
A sample of Arkansas residents (N = 369) completed an online survey that entailed a pre-
test, intervention, post-test and two-week follow-up. We recruited participants through targeted 
social media advertising in Arkansas (e.g., Arkansas specific Reddit and Craigslist pages, 
Facebook), word of mouth, email, and listservs. Eligibility criteria included currently living in 
Arkansas, being at least 18 years old, and being a native English speaker or attending school 
where English was the primary language from K-12. The minimum number of participants 
required was determined by an a priori power analysis (G*Power: Faul et al., 2007) with power 
(1 - β) set at .80, α = .05, two-tailed, and a medium effect size of .25 (Cohen, 1977, 1988). All 
group sizes used in analyses exceeded this minimum (n = 34 per group). Twenty-four hundred 
people opened the introductory page and 556 qualified for the study.  
After data were collected, we removed individuals for failing reading checks, incomplete 
surveys, and failure to complete all three points of data collection (attrition rate of 33.6%); See 
Figure 5.1 for attrition rates and final sample size in each condition. The final analytical sample 
included 369 participants who completed all three waves of data collection (N = 263 in 
intervention conditions and N = 106 in control condition).  
The majority of the sample identified as female, White, heterosexual, and “pro-choice.” 
The mean age was 32.07 (SD = 9.44) and, on average, participants had lived in Arkansas for 
21.36 years (SD = 12.14). The majority of the sample reported having a personal experience with 




abortion and/or had experienced a sexual assault before. Frequencies of demographic data are 









Figure 5.1. Sample size and survey flow.  
Procedures 
The study followed a randomized-controlled pre-test, post-test, follow-up (PPF) design. 
After completing the pre-test, participants were randomly triaged into watching one of five video 
clips. All clips began with the same informational portion about current legislative restrictions on 
abortion in Arkansas. Participants were then either assigned to the control condition (i.e., moved 
into post-test questionnaire) or one of the four testimonials. A testimonial depicted a woman 
discussing the difficulty she had in seeking an abortion in Arkansas because of state restrictions. 
Following the testimonial, participants in the intervention conditions received the post-test. In 
closing, we asked all participants to provide their email to be sent the two-week follow-up survey 




follow-up survey via email to test for rebound effects (Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992; Johansson-
Love & Geer, 2003). Participants received an additional $10 e-gift card as incentive for 
participating in the follow-up survey. The Institutional Review Board at the institution of data 
collection approved all procedures. 
Intervention Videos 
Content. Several media persuasion strategies guided the content development of the 
videos (e.g., casting, script development, visual aids). For example, to establish credibility of the 
woman giving the testimonial as a source of information (Petty & Priester, 1994), the news 
anchor introduces her as someone “who is here to tell us a personal story about her experience 
with these Arkansas laws.” By tying her to the state where participants currently live, the 
audience is more likely to pay attention to the information (Devereux, 2007; Golding & Elliott, 
1979; Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2009). A team of five experts in media communication, 
public health, sociology, and abortion research reviewed the script for clarity and wording. The 
two video portions are briefly described below. See the Appendix A for the full script. 
Informational portion. The informational portion aimed to increase awareness of the 
myriad abortion restrictions in Arkansas via a news story. All participants watched this clip. The 
news anchor introduces herself and briefly provides context about the safety, legality, and types 
of abortion. Then she describes the major legislative restrictions on abortion in Arkansas, each 
with an accompanying reiterative graphic. The news anchor ends the clip specifying how these 
restrictions have diminished access to abortion services. 
Testimonial portion. There were four intervention groups, each watching a different 




Wirth, 2016). Participants either watched a Black woman or a White woman give one of two 
different pregnancy scenarios: consensual sex or rape. In constructing the testimonials, we aimed 
to maximize the empathy people would feel for the character. In the consensual version, the 
woman, “Mia,” describes her experience becoming unexpectedly pregnant and seeking an 
abortion. She states that she did not know the person by whom she became pregnant and “didn’t 
tell anyone about it for a long time.” She outlines the time it took for her to realize she was 
pregnant and details the restrictions that made obtaining an abortion in Arkansas more difficult 
(e.g., lack of insurance coverage, necessitated travel and waiting period increasing costs). She 
describes her economic troubles such as “living paycheck to paycheck,” struggling to afford rent 
and groceries, and having to use all of the money in her bank account to pay for the abortion. She 
divulges that she had to ask a friend for money for the bus ride to the clinic 3 hours away and 
had to sleep in the bus station for two nights during the 48-hour waiting period. She concludes 
with the statement “I don’t regret the abortion. I felt relieved. It wasn’t the right time.”  
In the rape testimonial, the woman, “Mia” begins saying “Last year, I was raped. I was 
coming out of work and someone attacked me the parking lot. I didn’t know the guy and I didn’t 
tell anyone about it for a long time.” In the same words as the consensual version, she outlines 
the time it took for her to realize she was pregnant. She also details the same restrictions and 
economic troubles that made it more difficult for her to seek an abortion. In this version, she says 
“I also knew I definitely did not want to have the baby of the person who raped me” and “My 
insurance wouldn’t cover me because I didn’t report the rape. I didn’t want people to know.” She 
details the ordeal of getting to the clinic and having to sleep in the bus station, just like the other 
version. She concludes with a statement of certainty: “I don’t regret the abortion. I felt relieved. I 





First, we pilot tested the pre-test, post-test, and follow-up instruments with a convenience 
sample of graduate and undergraduate researchers (n = 14) to assess for clarity, readability, and 
length. The pre-test measures of interest in this study included: screener questions to assess 
eligibility, demographic questions (e.g., sex, experience with abortion and sexual assault), and 
one subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)-- Empathic Concern (Davis, 1980). The 
post-test had an assessment of empathy feelings (Batson, 1991; Drwecki et al., 2011) to evaluate 
immediate effects after the videos (i.e., control (0), White woman, rape testimonial (1), White 
woman, consensual sex (2), Black woman, rape (3), Black woman, consensual sex (4)). 
Participants took the feelings of empathy assessment again in the two-week follow-up 
assessment in addition to a source-credibility scale (Ohanian, 1990) assessing for confounding 
factors. 
Feelings of empathy. Participants indicated to what extent they experienced six empathy 
characteristics (Batson, 1991; Drwecki et al., 2011) after viewing their assigned video and again 
at the two-week follow-up. At post-test, they were asked “After hearing the news story, to what 
extent did you experience feeling…” At follow-up, instructions included, “A few weeks ago, you 
watched a news story about abortion laws in Arkansas. When thinking about this video clip, 
what are your current feelings?” The six characteristics consisted of tender, softhearted, warm, 
compassionate, moved, and sympathetic on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much). Scores were aggregated to form a total score (ranging 6 to 42) in addition to analyzing 
each feeling score separately (ranging 1 to 7). The empathy characteristics were found to be 
reliable at post-test and follow-up (6 items; α = .916, α = .914 respectively). In analyzing the 




= very much) into three categories: lack of [feeling] (scores of 1, 2, and 3), neutral on [feeling] 
(scores of 4), and positive report of [feeling] (scores of 5, 6, and 7). 
Sex. In the pre-test, participants were asked one question about their sex. They could 
have responded with male (1), female (2), or other (3) and specified their answer. 
 Experience with abortion and sexual assault. In the pre-test, participants were asked to 
report personal experiences with abortion and sexual assault. First, they were asked, “Have you 
or anyone you know had an abortion?” and “Have you or anyone you know experienced sexual 
assault?” For both questions, participants could have answered yes (1), no (2), or I’m not sure 
(3).  
 Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980). The IRI is a 28-item measure 
consisting of four 7-item subscales, “each tapping some aspect of the global concept of empathy” 
(Davis, 1983, p. 113). The current study used one subscale related to the study aims: Empathic 
Concern which “assesses ‘other-oriented’ feelings of sympathy and concern for unfortunate 
others” (Davis, 1983, p. 114). An example item on the Empathic Concern subscale was “I often 
have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.” Each item was rated on a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (does not describe me well) to 5 (describes me very well). 
Higher scores indicated a higher self-reported tendency to experience empathy. The Empathic 
Concern scale was found to be reliable (7 items; α = .789).  
 Source-credibility scale (Ohanian, 1990). At the end of the follow-up survey, 
participants were asked to evaluate the actor(s) in the video they watched. Participants were 
shown a picture of the actor(s) of their assigned video condition and scored them on a 9-point 




items with a total score range of 15 to 135, with lower scores indicating more perceived 
credibility of the source. The source-credibility scale was found to be reliable (15 items; α = 
.957). 
Analyses 
All data were downloaded from Qualtrics Survey Software into SPSS 24 for analyses. 
First, we ran univariate analyses on the pre-test Empathic Concern scores to assess group 
differences between the five video conditions. As part of assessing for confounding factors, we 
examined differences in the actors’ perceived credibility score with univariate comparisons. We 
accounted for Type I error by using a Bonferroni correction in all analyses with multiple 
comparisons (α = .05/5 = .01). 
RQ1 and RQ2. We examined each of the six empathy characteristics (sympathetic, 
moved, compassionate, tender, warm, soft-hearted) by the manipulated variables in the 
testimonials (race and perceived pregnancy responsibility), using chi-squared analyses. For race, 
we compared White woman’s testimonials vs. Black woman’s testimonials. For perceived 
pregnancy responsibility, we compared testimonials in which the woman was raped vs. 
testimonials in which the woman had consensual sex. Additionally, we performed post-hoc 
pairwise Fisher’s exact tests. We reported Cramér’s V as a measure of effect size for all 
significant chi-square results. A φ-value of .10 indicates a small effect size, .30 medium, and .50 
large (Kline, 2004). 
 RQ3. To assess what factors contributed to empathy sum scores toward women who seek 
abortions, we conducted two hierarchical regressions testing six predictors (i.e., video condition, 




Concern)—one at post-test and one at follow-up. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted 
to assess significant differences in our factors of interest.  
Results 
 At baseline, participants had a medium to high tendency for Empathic Concern (M = 
25.03 SD = 5.20; range 5-35). Regarding the six feelings of empathy, the mean total score was 
31.81 (SD = 7.59) at post-test and 30.11 (SD = 8.32) at follow-up. The scores ranged from 6 to 
42 indicating relatively high feelings of empathy for the woman giving the testimonial. Mean 
scores of the six empathy characteristics at post-test and follow-up are reported in Table 5.2.  
There were no significant differences between groups on Empathic Concern scores at 
baseline, [F(4, 364) = 2.312, p = .057], indicating an effective randomization. As part of as 
assessing for confounding factors, we examined differences in the actors’ perceived credibility 
score. Univariate comparisons indicated no significant differences between the Black actor and 
White actor in total score, p = .682, Attractiveness, p = .991, Trustworthiness, p = .631, or 
Expertise, p = .534. 
Effects of Interventions 
RQ1 and RQ2. There were no significant differences in empathy characteristic scores by 
race at post-test or follow-up. However, at post-test, there were differences on empathy 
characteristic scores by perceived pregnancy responsibility (α = .05/3 = .017). There were no 
significant differences by video condition for individual Sympathetic scores, Moved scores, 
Compassionate scores, or Warm scores. There were significant differences for Tender scores, 
[X2(2, N = 263) = 12.19, p = .002] and Soft-hearted scores, [X2(2, N = 263) = 8.11, p = .017]. See 




We calculated post hoc pairwise Fisher’s exact tests for post-test feelings to identify 
which video condition was associated with difference empathy measures. Participants who 
watched a testimonial in which the woman was raped had a positive report (scores of 5, 6, 7) of 
feeling Tender (p = .001) and Soft-hearted (p = .011) compared with those who watched a 
testimonial where the women became pregnant from consensual sex. Participants who watched a 
consensual testimonial reported feeling neutral (scores of 4) on the Tenderness scale (p = .026) 
compared to those who watched a rape testimonial. Last, participants who watched a consensual 
testimonial reported feeling a lack of (scores of 1, 2, 3) Tenderness (p = .022), and a lack of Soft-
heartedness (p = .016) compared to those who watched a rape testimonial.  
At the two-week follow-up there were no significant differences on empathy 
characteristic feelings. 
 RQ3. First, we examined what factors would predict feelings of empathy at post-test and 
two-week follow-up. We first entered baseline Empathic Concern, social desirability score, and 
sexual assault experience as our independent variables as controls because of their high 
correlations with the dependent variable. Then we added experience with abortion, sex, and, last, 
video condition. Our findings suggest that all of our independent variables, except social 
desirability, predicted empathy sum scores after watching the video, at post-test, [F(6, 357) = 
15.636, p < .001]. The model accounted for 20.8% of the variance in empathy sum scores (R2 = 
.208, adjusted R2 = .195); see Tables 5.4 and 5.5. Post hoc comparisons suggested higher 
empathy sum scores among those who watched the testimonial of a Black woman who was raped 




Next, we examined if our factors of interest predicted empathy at the two-week follow-up 
entering independent variables in the same order. Only four factors were predictive of empathy 
sum scores: baseline Empathic Concern, sex, sexual assault experience, and abortion experience, 
[F(6, 357) = 12.659, p < .001], accounting for 17.5% of the variance (R2 = .175, adjusted R2 = 
162); see Table 5.4 and 5.6. 
Discussion 
 This study aimed to adjust feelings of empathy for women who seek abortions in 
Arkansas via a randomized-controlled video experiment. Our results suggest that several prior 
experiences and feelings can affect the empathy induced by the intervention. In examining the 
empathy characteristic scores (e.g., tender, soft-hearted), there were only differences by 
perceived pregnancy responsibility; people who watched a rape testimonial reported higher 
scores on several emotions compared to the consensual testimonial. There were no differences in 
empathy characteristic scores by race of the video subject. In assessing contributions to the 
empathy sum scores, only one video condition was related to greater feelings of empathy for the 
actor; this condition depicted the Black woman who became pregnant by rape. However, these 
results were only sustained at post-test; there was no impact of video condition on empathy at the 
two-week follow-up. Interestingly, we found that personally experiencing or knowing someone 
who experienced sexual assault or abortion increased empathy for our actor at both post-test and 
follow-up.  
Effect of Race on Empathy 
 There were no differences when we compared scores on each individual emotion (e.g., 
moved, tender) between those who watched a White woman’s testimonial and those who 




feelings (i.e., 5, 6, 7, with 7 being I experienced this feeling “very much”). The lack of 
differences by race could have been a function of the homogeneity of our sample. Over half of 
participants had a college degree or higher and reported being liberal or strongly liberal. 
Research shows that education and liberal opinions are often associated with social tolerance 
(Kozloski, 2010). It may be that people in our study are more attuned to discrimination and 
therefore, the woman’s race did not affect individual empathetic emotions for her.  
 Although there was no effect of race in individual feeling scores, there was one 
testimonial--the Black woman who was raped--that had a significant effect on total empathy 
score (i.e., all of the feelings scored together). We hypothesized that individuals would have 
more empathy for the White actress because of internalized racial bias against Black women. 
However, the Black woman induced more empathy. If the education and liberal opinions of our 
sample are associated with higher social tolerance, perhaps feeling more empathy for the Black 
woman was related to understanding women of color experience marginalization and are 
afforded less privilege and means than White women in society (e.g., Boonstra, 2016; Jones & 
Kavanaugh, 2011).  
Alternatively, our participants’ empathy for the Black woman who was raped could have 
manifested from a feeling of supervision or authority. Baker (2015) argues that White Americans 
favor giving aid to people of color as a function of an “underlying racial paternalism” (p. 93). 
That is, instead of feeling empathy because the system of reproductive circumstances is stacked 
against her, people may have felt she needed help because of internalized prejudice. Indeed, 
some scholars attest that health care professionals intercede for pregnant women of color more 
than pregnant White women to ensure they are maintaining their pregnancy to certain standards 




abortion, feeling “moved” or “sympathetic” may stem from thinking her situation--being in 
poverty, being Black, and being raped--warrants an “acceptable” reason for termination. If this 
sense of paternalism is a contributor in our sample, educational initiatives may need to address 
cognitive processes behind abortion attitudes related to underlying racism in addition to shifting 
empathy. 
Effect of Perceived Pregnancy Responsibility on Empathy 
As we predicted, people who watched a testimonial with a rape narrative had higher 
individual empathy scores compared with those who watched a consensual narrative. Rape 
survivors are typically viewed as less at fault for their pregnancy and worthier of pregnancy 
termination than those who had consensual sex (Ludlow, 2008; Mikolajczak & Bilewicz, 2015; 
Smith & Son, 2013). Again, in examining total empathy scores, it was only the Black woman 
who was raped that induced significantly higher scores. Though there were no differences when 
looking solely at race, perhaps the combination of the rape scenario and race were what created 
the more empathetic combination.  
This finding, though unexpected, contributes to Ludlow’s (2008) argument that abortion 
narratives are subconsciously hierarchized. That is, people in abortion care and advocacy easily 
talk about the abortions from rape and trauma because they are more “acceptable” reasons for 
pregnancy termination; these scenarios induce empathy. People often do not feel sorry for 
abortion seekers when they perceive them to have been in control of the situation resulting in 
pregnancy or if they do not have an “acceptable” reason for ending a pregnancy (Hans & 
Kimberly, 2014; Ludlow, 2008). Thus, these narratives (e.g., lack of finances, readiness) are not 




only use narratives of people who seek abortions out of trauma or emergency, empathy may be 
learned for certain pregnancy situations and not others.  
Effect of Personal Experiences and Traits on Empathy 
 Past experiences of abortion and sexual assault experience affect empathy scores. Our 
results are consistent with research that having a previous relevant experience will increase 
empathy (e.g., Glynn & Sen, 2015; Moyer & Haire, 2015; Wiener, Felman Wiener, & Grisso, 
1989) and knowing just one person who is part of a stigmatized population can affect attitudes 
toward that population (DellaPosta, 2018). Many of the people in our study had abortion 
experience and therefore, may have empathized with the testimonial woman because they were 
linking her experience to theirs. 
 This is an important implication for future interventions with empathy for abortion 
seekers—focusing on people and experiences that are personal to them. However, abortion is an 
easily concealable event. A safe and complete abortion allows for some invisibility because there 
are no visibly obvious lasting outcomes, which permits women to keep it to themselves (Kumar 
et al., 2009). With the prevalence of abortion, chances are, most people know someone who has 
had an abortion (Dreweke, 2017; Guttmacher Institute, 2017a). Yet, the people who may have 
the least permissive attitudes toward abortion seekers may not know they know someone who 
has had one. Individuals who have had an abortion may be hesitant to share this with people in 
their lives that are unsupportive of reproductive choice, especially if their stories involve seeking 
an abortion for an “unacceptable” reason (e.g., not wanting to have a child, multiple abortions).  
This lack of transparency affects the empathy people are conditioned to feel. On the 




trauma abortion narratives, their capacity for empathy may be skewed. If they hear the story of a 
person who sought an abortion because they did not use a condom, they may differentiate which 
pregnancy scenarios are worthy of termination. Therefore, it is important that people and 
partners with any abortion story share more openly. This could create more empathy among their 
networks and normalize the experiences of many abortion seekers without an “acceptable” 
reason. There are some advocacy projects (e.g., Shout Your Abortion, the Sea Change Program, 
1 in 3 Campaign) that have focused on sharing complete or untold abortion narratives via an 
online media platform. However, few of these projects have the format (e.g., means of data 
collection) to track the impact these stories have on the people who view them. Combining 
lessons learned from this project with the strategies used in those videos could normalize the 
open sharing of abortion narratives. Normalizing abortion narratives could lessen stigma so the 
general population could connect their personal experiences to testimonial interventions and 
educational initiatives. 
Limitations 
This study had many strengths including its randomized-controlled design, innovative 
approach to intervention, and focus on abortion seekers in Arkansas. However, there were also  
several limitations to note. The sample, although randomly assigned to conditions, were not 
randomly selected from the population of Arkansas and therefore, not fully generalizable to all 
Arkansans. There is the possibility of self-selection bias. However, we offered compensation for 
participants to increase motivation so even people who were indifferent about abortion would be 
more inclined to participate.  
As with experimental interventions, we cannot infer causality from the effect of the 




whereas the White testimonial actor was a third-year undergraduate student. Although they both 
had similar levels of acting experience (i.e., involvement in numerous productions), there may be 
a difference in the perceived quality of their acting. It could have been that the actor who was 
Black was more effective at inducing empathy than the actor who was White. However, there 
were no significant differences in source credibility and if this was the sole factor, there should 
have been a significant difference in empathy for those who watched the Black woman who had 
consensual sex as well. 
Additionally, there may be limitations related to social desirability bias and the format of 
online media interventions. Participants may not have watched or paid attention to the whole 
video. However, the survey settings prevented participants from leaving until the entire video 
had played.  
Implications and Future Directions 
Findings from this study have implications for future research and intervention work. 
First, we encourage health educators and researchers to use video-based testimonials in their 
programs and studies to lend a story to their statistics. Utilizing personal experiences may 
enhance the effects of interventions. Making this issue personal will increase empathy and make 
it easier to perspective-take. Research indicates that empathy induction can increase prosocial 
behavior (e.g., willingness to engage with stigmatized populations; Wang, Tai, Ku, & Galinsky, 
2014). Lessening stigma for people who seek abortions triggers a feedback loop so they will be 
more comfortable to share their stories, people they interact with will hear their story, making 





To apply the implications from this study, future research should intervene with people 
who are opposing, unsure, or ambivalent about abortion. Educators and researchers should focus 
on those who do not think they know anyone who has had an abortion, then reveal that they most 
likely do know someone who had an abortion to further explore the effect of personal 
experiences and empathy induction. 
Second, it is important to be strategic with the abortion narratives used in this work. 
“Socially acceptable” narratives (e.g., rape) create an emotional buy in so it may be wise to start 
with those stories. But it is also important to address other mundane reasons for abortion (e.g., 
finances) so as to not further perpetuate stigmas of “worthy” and “unworthy” abortions. A 
woman of color was effective in inducing empathy in this study. However, the majority of this 
sample were White women. In the future, researchers should examine trait empathy among 
women of color and men to see if race and perceived pregnancy responsibility are viewed 
differently among these populations.  
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Participant Demographics (N = 369)  
Characteristic N (%) Characteristic N (%) 
Sex  Sexual Orientation  
     Male 104 (28.2)      Heterosexual 329 (89.2) 
     Female 264 (71.5)      Gay/Lesbian 14 (3.8) 
Race       Bisexual 20 (5.4) 
     White or Caucasian 312 (84.6)      Queer 6 (1.6) 
     Black or African 
American 
24 (6.5) Education Level  
     Latino/a 12 (3.3)      High school graduate/GED 39 (10.6) 
     Asian or Asian American 4 (1.1)      Some college/associate degree 104 (28.2) 
     Bi- or Multi- racial 8 (2.2)      College degree 183 (49.6) 
Income Level       Graduate degree 41 (11.1) 
     Low 23 (6.2) Political Party  
     Lower-Middle 102 (27.6)      Republican 120 (32.5) 
     Middle 126 (34.1)      Democrat 139 (37.7) 
     Upper-Middle 57 (15.4)      Libertarian 58 (15.7) 
     High 61 (16.5)      None 39 (10.6) 
Relationship Status  Abortion Identity  
     Married 218 (59.1)      “Pro-Life” 66 (17.9) 
     In a relationship 68 (18.4)      “Pro-Choice” 269 (72.9) 
     Single and not dating 43 (11.7)      Neither 13 (3.5) 
     Single and dating 28 (7.8)      Both 18 (4.9) 
Abortion Experience (self 
and/or others) 
 Sexual Assault Experience (self 
and/or others) 
 
     Yes 275 (74.5)      Yes 306 (82.9) 
     No 65 (17.6)      No 47 (12.7) 
     Not Sure 29 (7.9)      Not Sure 16 (4.3) 







Mean Scores of Empathy Characteristics for Women who seek Abortions/Woman in Video at 
Post-test and Follow-Up 
 Post-test Follow-Up 
 M SD M SD 
Sympathetic 5.54 1.32 5.44 1.45 
Moved 5.15 1.46 5.04 1.46 
Compassionate 5.58 1.31 5.35 1.42 
Tender 5.21 1.59 5.03 1.58 
Warm 5.05 1.72 4.81 1.67 
Soft-hearted 5.30 1.60 4.93 1.57 
Sum Score 31.81 7.59 30.11 8.32 






Chi-Square Results for Post-test Empathy Characteristic Scores and Perceived Pregnancy Responsibility Video Condition (N = 263) 
 Rape Testimonial 
46.4% 
(n = 122) 
Consensual Testimonial 
53.6% 
(n = 141)  
 
 n % n % c2 Cramer’s V 
Sympathetic     7.672* .171 
     No 5 25.0 15 75.0   
     Neutral 4 25.0 12 75.0   
     Yes 113 49.8 114 50.2   
Moved     7.937* .174 
     No 8 28.6 20 71.4   
     Neutral 12 33.3 24 66.7   
     Yes 102 51.3 97 48.7   
Compassionate     3.364 .113 
     No 5 27.8 13 72.2   
     Neutral 10 40.0 15 60.0   
     Yes 107 48.6 113 51.4   
Tender     12.192** .215 
     No 11 28.9 27 71.1   
     Neutral 7 25.9 20 74.1   
     Yes 104 52.5 94 47.5   
Warm     7.230* .166 
     No 17 32.7 35 67.3   
     Neutral 10 35.7 18 64.3   
     Yes 94 51.6 88 48.4   
Soft-hearted     8.106* .176 
     No 9 26.5 25 73.5   
     Neutral 14 38.9 22 61.1   








Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations for Empathy Sum Scores and Predictor Variables (N = 364)  
Variable M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
Post-test Empathy 
Sum Score 




30.43 7.821 .184*** .114* -.351*** -.224*** .211*** -.070 
Predictor variable         
1. ECa  24.99 5.174 -- .183*** -.025 .143** -.016 .088* 
2. Social 
Desirability 
5.04 2.163  -- .021 -.013 -.094* -.093* 
3. SA Expb      -- .423*** -.280*** .167 
4. Abortion Expc      -- -.360*** .146 
5. Sex        -- .136 
6. Video Condition        -- 
Note. aEC = Empathic Concern; bSA Exp. = Sexual Assault Experience; cAbortion Exp. = Abortion Experience. Three correlation 
types are reported per variable type: Pearson r, point-biserial, and phi correlation. Means and standard deviations are only reported for 
continuous variables. 









Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Post-test Empathy Sum Scores with Empathic Concern, Social Desirability, Sexual 
Assault Experience, Abortion Experience, Sex, Video Condition (N = 364) 
Variable B  SE B ß p R2 
Step 1     .150*** 
EC a  .217 .073 .148** .003  
Social Desirability .164 .174 .047 .348  
SA Exp. b -5.234 .731 -.348*** <.001  
Step 2     .179*** 
EC a  .260 .073 .177***  <.001  
Social Desirability .133 .172 .038 .440  
SA Exp. b -4.400 .756 -.293*** <.001  
Abortion Exp. c -2.282 .637 -.182*** <.001  
Step 3     .198*** 
EC a  .251 .072 .170** .001  
Social Desirability .187 .171 .053 .275  











Table 5.5 (Cont.) 
 
Variable B  SE B ß p R2 
Abortion Exp. c -1.718 .659 -.137** .009  
Sex 2.549 .866 .151** .003  
Step 4     .208*** 
ECa .235 .072 .160** .001  
Social Desirability .227 .171 .065 .184  
SA Exp. b -4.226 .762 -.281*** <.001  
Abortion Exp. c -1.774 .656 .152** .007  
Sex 2.557 .862 .101* .003  
Video Condition .514 .246 -.137** .037  
 
Note. aEC = Empathic Concern Score; bSA Exp. = Sexual Assault Experience; cAbortion Exp. =  Abortion Experience. 
ß = Standardized coefficient; B = Unstandardized coefficient; SE B = Standard error; R2 = variance explained by the model. 









Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting Follow-up Empathy Sum Scores with Empathic Concern, Social Desirability, Sexual 
Assault Experience, Abortion Experience, Sex, Video Condition (N = 364) 
Variable B  SE B ß p R2 
Step 1     .138*** 
EC a  .241 .075 .160** .001  
Social Desirability .329 .180 .091 .069  
SA Exp. b -4.825 .755 -.313*** <.001  
Step 2     .164*** 
ECa .283 .075 .187*** <.001  
Social Desirability .299 .178 .083 .094  
SA Exp. b -4.021 .783 -.261*** <.001  
Abortion Exp. c -2.202 .660 -.171** .001  
Step 3     .175*** 
EC a .275 .075 .182*** <.001  
Social Desirability .340 .178 .094 .057  
SA Exp. b -3.727 .791 -.242*** <.001  
Abortion Exp. c -1.770 .686 -.138* .010  






Table 5.6 (Cont.) 
 
Variable B  SE B ß p R2 
Step 4     .175*** 
EC a .279 .075 .185*** <.001  
Social Desirability .331 .179 .091 .066  
SA Exp. b -3.678 .798 -.238*** <.001  
Abortion Exp. c -1.757 .688 -.137* .011  
Sex 1.953 .903 .113* .031  
Video Condition -.120 .258 -.023 .641  
 
Note. aEC = Empathic Concern Score; bSA Exp. = Sexual Assault Experience; cAbortion Exp. = Abortion Experience. 
ß = Standardized coefficient; B = Unstandardized coefficient; SE B = Standard error; R2 = variance explained by the model. 








CHAPTER 6: OVERALL CONCLUSION 
This study aimed to shift the way people think about abortion via a YouTube video, a medium 
many people use to get their information (Pew Research Center, 2017). In conceptualizing this 
project, I was inspired by the campaign and website Shout Your Abortion (see Figures 6.1 and 
6.2). It is a space for people to share abortion stories through text and videos to describe and 
normalize abortion experiences. Some video narratives portray people who had fulfilling and 
empowering experiences obtaining an abortion. Some narratives portray guilt or coming to terms 
with their abortion decision. No matter the story, they all contribute to the Shout Your Abortion 
motto: Abortion is normal.  









After completing the project, I learned of other advocacy endeavors that focus on telling 
the untold and complete stories of abortion—some in the form of written word or video diary 
(e.g., The Sea Change Program, Echoing Ida, the 1 in 3 project). Each operates under the idea 
that the more exposure to abortion stories in the public, the more abortion stigma can be broken 
down. However, I questioned the primary audience of these websites—most people who visit 
them are probably not people looking to challenge their anti-choice ideology. Research shows 
people do not seek out media that conflicts with their beliefs (Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng, 
2009). In order to reach a broader audience, I used what I learned from my health education 
coursework and research experience to create and distribute an intervention using Shout Your 
Abortion-style narratives. 
Living in Arkansas, I recognized a unique opportunity to test this intervention in one of 
the most restrictive states for abortion access in the U.S. (Center for Reproductive Rights, 2018; 
Guttmacher Institute, 2016b; Nash et al., 2017). Nationwide, research indicates that people are 
underinformed about abortion legislation (e.g., Bessett et al., 2015; Kavanaugh, Bessett & 
Littman, 2013; Cockrill & Weitz, 2010; PerryUndem & Vox Media, 2016; White et al., 2016). 
My intervention specifically addressed how these legislative restrictions affect people living in 
the state of Arkansas. I did not want to administer an intervention showing abortion narratives if 
the audience members were unaware of the abortion landscape in their state. Thus, there had to 
be an informational component first. Inspired by Shout Your Abortion, I created videos to 
increase awareness of restrictions in Arkansas and show narratives of women’s experiences 






Overall Findings and Implications  
 The purpose of the intervention videos was to decrease support for abortion restrictions 
by increasing knowledge and shifting empathy in Arkansas residents. The purpose of the study 
was to examine the efficacy of the intervention on Arkansans’ knowledge and support of 
restrictions and empathy for abortion seekers. In executing this project, five findings emerged 
with potential implications for future intervention work.  
Finding 1: Watching a testimonial helped knowledge retention. Contrary to our 
hypothesis, those who viewed an empathy-based intervention video had significantly higher 
knowledge scores at post-test and follow-up than those in the control. Giving people information 
in combination with a story that reiterated facts in another way (e.g., what a 48-hour waiting 
period means for someone who lives 3 hours from a clinic) may have reinforced knowledge 
retention. As such, it may be important for educators and researchers to use a narrative when 
administering informational interventions. 
Finding 2: Disregarding video condition, support for restrictions was higher than 
expected. We predicted that a story demonstrating the real-life implications of abortion 
restrictions in Arkansas would decrease support for these laws compared to a video that only 
disseminated information (i.e., no testimonial). Results indicated that support for restrictions did 
decrease across the study. However, there were no differences in support scores by testimonial 
and, instead, support for restrictions at follow-up remained higher than anticipated. Adjusting 
attitudes on this subject may require a larger cultural shift, especially in hostile states like 
Arkansas. Future interventions might focus on debunking the myth that restrictions are 





Finding 3: The rape narratives were more effective in inducing empathy than the 
consensual-sex narratives. In designing our testimonials, we aimed to see if factors that 
contributed to the pregnancy played a role in empathy for abortion seekers. People who watched 
a testimonial with a rape narrative had higher individual empathy characteristic scores (e.g., 
warm, tender) compared with those who watched a consensual-sex narrative. This finding 
contributes to Ludlow’s (2008) argument that abortion narratives are subconsciously 
hierarchized. Those in abortion care and advocacy easily talk about the abortions from rape and 
trauma because they are more “acceptable” reasons for pregnancy termination; these scenarios 
induce empathy (Hans & Kimberly, 2014; Ludlow, 2008; Martin, Hassinger, Debbink, & Harris, 
2017; Smith & Son, 2013). Thus, “unacceptable” narratives (e.g., lack of finances, readiness) are 
not often spoken about even though they are the norm (Ludlow, 2008). If educators and 
advocates only use narratives of people who seek abortions out of trauma or emergency, 
empathy may be learned for certain pregnancy situations and not others. People leading 
interventions, discussions, and advocacy initiatives must work to share all abortion narratives 
equally. 
Finding 4: The testimonial portraying a Black woman who was raped created the 
most empathy. Although there was no effect of race of the actor in individual feeling scores, 
there was one testimonial--the Black woman who was raped--that had a significant effect on total 
empathy score (i.e., all of the feelings scored together). Our sample was highly education and 
leaned more liberal than conservative; if the education level and liberal opinions of our sample 
were associated with higher social tolerance (Kozloski, 2010), perhaps feeling more empathy for 
the Black woman was related to understanding Black women’s societal marginalization (e.g., 




women; Boonstra, 2016; Jones & Kavanaugh, 2011). Alternatively, the empathy from our 
participants for the Black woman who was raped could have manifested from an “underlying 
racial paternalism” (Baker, 2015, p. 93). If this sense of paternalism was a contributor in our 
sample, educational initiatives may need to address cognitive processes related to underlying 
racism behind abortion attitudes in addition to shifting empathy. 
Finding 5: Personal experiences are key to inducing empathy about abortion. 
Finally, factors that consistently predicted empathy induction at post-test and follow-up were 
past experiences with abortion and sexual assault experience. Many of the people in our study 
had abortion experience and therefore, may have empathized with the woman in the testimonial 
because they were linking her experience to theirs. Focusing on experiences that are personal to 
them is imperative to inducing empathy for abortion seekers. 
However, abortion is an easily concealable event and stigma contributes to a lack of 
transparency among people who have had abortions (Norris et al., 2011). This affects the 
empathy people are conditioned to feel. Health education programs should encourage dialogue 
so that people and partners with an abortion story will share their experiences more openly. This 
could create more empathy among networks and normalize the experiences of many abortion 
seekers without an “acceptable” reason, especially because these experiences are among the most 
common (Ludlow, 2008). Normalizing abortion narratives could lessen stigma so the general 
population could connect their personal experiences to the reproductive rights movement. 
Contributions to the Field 
 There are many reproductive health research teams across the country that focus on 




Project). Many of these teams track outcomes of abortion restrictions or conduct qualitative 
interviews to understand the experiences of people who have sought or obtained abortion care. 
Findings from these studies have been used to inform policy and improve provision of abortion.  
For example, the Turnaway Study, conducted by the ANSIRH team, headed by Diana 
Greene Foster, PhD, conducted 8,000 interviews with women from 2010 to 2015. They recruited 
participants from abortion facilities across the country. All the women in the study sought 
abortions; some were able to obtain them and some were turned away. Of the “turnaways,” some 
women were able to obtain an abortion at a different location or time; some carried their 
pregnancies to term because they were past the gestational limit. This study’s findings offered 
empirical evidence that women who are forced to keep a pregnancy after seeking an abortion 
report health and wellbeing hardships compared to women who were able to obtain an abortion 
(e.g., Foster, Biggs, Ralph, Gerdts, Roberts, & Glymour, 2018; Foster, Steinberg, Roberts, 
Neuhaus, & Biggs, 2015; Upadhyay, Biggs, & Foster, 2015). Further, it demonstrates that 
denying women abortion care has serious consequences, which can be cited when arguing the 
harm of abortion restrictions. 
Although the current study was not as large-scale (or well-funded) as studies from these 
abortion research teams, it does offer several additions to the field and a jumping off point for 
subsequent studies. The first addition is in its innovative design. It is the first video-based 
intervention experiment, to our knowledge, that focused on abortion restrictions and empathy. 
Advocacy projects (e.g., Shout Your Abortion, the Sea Change Program, 1 in 3 Campaign) have 
also focused on sharing complete or untold abortion narratives as a way to induce empathy via an 




collection) to track the impact these stories have on the people who view them. We were able to 
compare data from baseline, to after viewing a video, to two-weeks later.  
Second, this study used a state-specific sample and asked state-specific restriction 
questions. Other surveys have focused on state-specific restrictions, but did not have a state-
specific sample. For example, the Vox Media Poll (2015) asked about attitudes towards Texas 
restrictions in the time leading up to the Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt (2016) Texas 
court case. However, their sample was a nationally representative group of U.S. residents. 
Although their data were representative of people’s attitudes across the U.S., asking someone 
who does not live in Texas about laws in Texas may yield attitudes about restrictions that are 
abstract or hypothetical. Asking an Arkansan about Arkansas laws encourages critical thinking 
about restrictions that could actually affect them. 
With this project, we also incorporated race and perceived pregnancy responsibility into 
the dialogue about social inequalities regarding abortion. Using an intersectional lens to the 
analyses and discussion, we aimed to assess underlying biases that are discussed less often in 
conversations about abortion access. Scholars have made a concerted effort to draw attention to 
the racial inequalities within reproductive access (e.g., Kumar, 2013; Price, 2011). Regarding 
pregnancy circumstance, rape is a commonly accepted exception to abortion restrictions 
(Guttmacher Institute, 2017d; Mikoajczak & Bilewicz, 2015; Nash et al., 2017; Smith & Son, 
2013). However, the intersection of race and perceived pregnancy responsibility had yet to be 
explored.  
We assumed an implicit bias against Black women would result in higher empathy for the 




results than we anticipated—that of underlying racial paternalism. This also fits in with 
hierarchizing abortion narratives (e.g., having more empathy for women who are raped). In both 
topics, people differentiate circumstances under which they support abortion and circumstances 
under which they do not (i.e., circumstantial caveats; Hunt, Marcantonio, Jozkowski, & 
Crawford, forthcoming; Jozkowski, Crawford, & Hunt, 2018; Smith & Son, 2013). In order to 
induce empathy, it is important to draw attention to these caveats so people may realize there are 
conflicts within their attitudes. Yet, having any caveat with abortion attitudes perpetuates 
paternalism—that one can inflict their opinion on an abortion seeker’s circumstances. This leads 
to, arguably, the crux of shifting people’s attitudes toward abortion: how do we get people to 
trust and support women unconditionally? How do we get rid of caveats? Empathy and education 
may be strategical components to achieving this goal. However, one must pay special attention to 
incorporating social inequalities, addressing internal biases related to racism and abortion 
narrative hierarchy, and drawing on one’s personal experiences.  
Future Directions 
 I aim to publish and present the subset of data I analyzed from this project. First, I plan to 
submit abstracts to the American Public Health Association and the Society of Family Planning 
annual meetings with data from these two manuscripts. I intend to submit the first manuscript 
(knowledge and support for restrictions) to Sexuality Research and Social Policy because of its 
restriction focus. The second manuscript (empathy) is intended for Perspectives on Reproductive 
Health. 
I have two projects in progress with colleagues from Arkansas and Michigan. Concurrent 
with the dissertation, I have been working with a University of Arkansas Masters student on her 




attitudes (scale modified from Batson et al., 1997) and Empathic Concern. She will complete her 
thesis and we will prepare a manuscript from this analysis.  
Additionally, I met with a collaborator from the University of Michigan, Sara 
McClelland, PhD, who is familiar with the Inclusion of Other in the Self (IOS) scale (Aron, 
Aron, & Smollan, 1992). We are planning to write a paper together on the video’s effect on 
affinity people feel for a woman who has had an abortion using the IOS scale. We plan to submit 
an abstract to the Forum with these data as well. 
In planning outcomes from this study, a secondary aim was to examine how attitudes 
may affect voting behaviors and encourage individuals to act by supporting progressive 
candidates. Findings indicated a lack of awareness and high support of restrictive laws in 
Arkansas, which can certainly influence people’s voting intentions. I plan to analyze these data 
for a future manuscript.  
I received a 2018-2019 HHPR graduate student research grant to collect more data on this 
project. I plan to re-administer the experiment to gather a different sample. Since the first 
experiment was administered, changes in the make-up of the Supreme Court have increased 
threats to Roe v. Wade. Closer to the election year I intend to compare abortion influence on 
voting intention data from the first wave of data collection to the second wave.  
Finally, I am looking forward translating these data to a more applied approach. On my 
interview at Western Washington University, the job I accepted for the fall, I met with the person 
who coordinates the health peer education program. She used to work for Planned Parenthood 




study, to work with peer educators and community members to create an abortion education 
program. 
Research Trajectory 
This project inspired subsequent projects and identified gaps within the current abortion 
literature. I have two projects planned for the immediate future. To build on the support for 
abortion restrictions finding of this project, I plan to conduct in-depth interviews exploring 
people’s perceptions of abortion legislation--do they think restrictions harm or help abortion 
seekers? Additionally, I am interested in where people’s perception of abortion experiences 
come from. I have experience with content analysis of media. There is one study by Sisson and 
Kimport (2014) that examines how abortion is portrayed in tv and movies. However, I plan to 
expand on that study and use a coding framework inspired by our consent in the media project 
(Jozkowski, Canan, Rhoads, & Hunt, 2016) to examine how abortion and other reproductive 
practices are portrayed in the media. 
 Last, I hope to make connections in my new community and work with clinics to collect 
data and inspire new projects. I am interested in conducting reproductive health research in 
Washington state. Perhaps I will even find a way to compare the two states as living in one of the 





Figure 6.3. Infographic of the most restrictive and supportive states in 2017. Source: 
Guttmacher.org, circles added by the author for emphasis. 
Lessons Learned and Personal Reflection 
 In contemplating my professional and personal growth over five years (seven years at the 
University of Arkansas), I think of the mistakes and deviations from my plan (satirically 
illustrated in Figure 6.4), the people that have helped me, and the things I thought went wrong, 





Figure 6.4. Illustration of a PhD plan vs. reality. Source: Twitter.com 
The dissertation process. I learned three primary lessons from the execution of this 
project: kindness will get you further, things will go wrong, and knowing people/networking is 
vital to success. This project exposed the internal workings of my institution to which I was 
previously oblivious. There are gatekeepers to successful execution of research and, first, one 
must identify these key stakeholders. Accessing grant funds required the help of our 
departmental administrative assistant, Shari Witherspoon, and multiple people in the office for 
Research and Sponsored Programs. To use the funds to buy incentives, there were several steps 
and forms that I would not have known about had it not been for these personnel. I learned there 
are some tasks within a structure that I could not do on my own. To complete a project, one 
needs patience, organization, kindness, and persistence.  
Creating specialized media (i.e., the videos) was another lesson in patience. The person 
from Production Services who initially agreed to shoot my intervention videos backed out 




accounted for in my grant budget. It was through Dr. Jean Henry, a faculty mentor with a brother 
in IT, that I found the freelance video production specialist I hired.  
I learned how to make a casting call. I had to troubleshoot when only White women 
replied with interest. It was through one of the actors I hired that I was put in touch with an actor 
of color who was interested in working on the project. Moreover, because my actors were in 
other shows on campus, organization and, again, persistence were imperative to scheduling the 
video shoots. One actor did not show up one day and one actor did not have her part memorized. 
So I problem-solved.  
In addition to the administrative lessons learned, personally, I found the dissertation 
process to be isolating. I am able to reflect on the misery I felt in the beginning now that I see a 
light at the end of tunnel. The elation of the project being funded was eclipsed by a lack of 
confidence and motivation. It was an ambitious project. But, perhaps, the most debilitating part 
of the dissertation process was, for me, its conjunction with the job search and trying to figure 
out what kind of academic I wanted to be.  
 The doctoral process. I started studying sexuality when I was an undergraduate student 
at Kansas State University. It was in a class during my sophomore year where I first saw a 
Sexual Health Peer Educators (SHAPE) presentation. Three undergrads talked about condoms 
and risky behaviors; they were so funny and confident, blowing up a condom and putting it over 
their head to demonstrate the durability of condoms. The audience was in an uncomfortable hush 
and then erupted into laughter. I joined SHAPE to gain confidence and to make people laugh and 
think. I became the co-president and simultaneously interned in the health promotion department 




I started looking at Masters of Public Health Programs in states north of me. I wanted to 
get out of Kansas and go somewhere where sex education was valued and funded. But, life is 
funny and my aunt, who works for the University of Arkansas, is very persuasive. I went South 
instead. I started at the University of Arkansas in 2012 in the Master’s program. I was awarded a 
graduate assistantship to teach health classes and began working with my mentor, Dr. Kristen 
Jozkowski, who was just starting her career at the University of Arkansas. Over seven years, I 
gained experience teaching college students and conducting sexuality research. 
 Teaching progression. I taught classes for six years—starting with introductory level 
classes like Medical Terminology. For the first few semesters, I used the pre-made textbook 
lectures and was learning the material along with my students. I remember reading my student 
evaluations and crying. But I also took some of the student feedback and improved the course 
materials and my teaching approach. Students told me they wanted more engagement with the 
health terminology, so I created a group presentation assignment where they had to present 
words to their peers. Students told me I was funny, so I began making the lectures my own, 
incorporating anecdotes, pictures, and pneumonic devices.  
I grew as a teacher when I co-instructed a senior-level health class, Applied Health 
Behavior Theory, with my mentor, Dr. Jozkowski. The course material was challenging and 
abstract. At first, I was intimidated—especially sharing the front of the room with an actual 
professor. When it was my turn to lecture, I used my strengths to reconstruct the presentations in 
a way that made sense to me, which helped me master the material. The students responded 
positively to my approach and I took over the class in subsequent semesters. Dr. Jozkowski’s 





Diversifying my teaching dossier with courses like Human Sexuality, Personal Health 
and Safety, and Public Health Internship built my confidence and confirmed my passion for 
teaching. Two student evaluation comments I am most proud of were: “I feel significantly more 
prepared to enter into the public health workforce because of the things I learned in this course” 
(Applied Health Behavior Theory) and “Everyone felt safe and open sharing their stories because 
you cultivated an environment of respect and tolerance. We were enthusiastic to speak up 
because you made it clear that we would be heard!” (Human Sexuality). 
Research progression. Simultaneously with my teaching progression, I learned to be a 
researcher. I had the unique opportunity to begin my research journey as Dr. J was beginning her 
career as a professor and mentor at the University of Arkansas. Our first project together was 
analyzing in-depth interviews with college students. We read the interviews separately and then 
met in her office to discuss our findings. From these interviews, I realized my penchant for 
identifying themes in qualitative data, which inspired my master’s thesis. For my thesis project, I 
conducted a salient belief elicitation (SBE; Middlestadt et al., 1996). I was able to understand 
SBE on a deeper level because of its foundation in Reasoned Action Approach, a theory Dr. J 
taught me. I was then able to effectively explain the Reasoned Action Approach in my theory 
classes. Additionally, I taught this technique to an undergraduate honors’ student, undergraduate 
research assistants, and doctoral students. 
Skilled researchers must also adequately disseminate their work. My first solo research 
presentation introduced my thesis data to the department research seminar. I was nervous, 
sweating, and not natural or smooth. Prior to the presentation, I practiced for our undergraduate 
research assistants. One of them told me I said “uh” so much he wanted to “strangle me.” I 




presentations, I wrote out what I was going to say and my performance improved. I don’t 
remember when it clicked for me that giving research presentations was just like giving a lecture 
in class. For some reason, I hadn’t connected the two skills. I gave more presentations—in 
seminar, at conferences, for university events. Dr. J told me at my last presentation for the 
department seminar it was the best presentation she had seen me give. 
In cultivating skills as an individual researcher, I also learned the importance (and fun) of 
collaboration. Over seven years, I was able to observe inter-group dynamics change with the flux 
of graduate students in and out of Dr. J’s lab. The first research group iteration comprised 
myself, Kelley Rhoads, and Sasha Canan. With Dr. J, the four of us embarked on an intensive 
content analysis project, where we analyzed mainstream movies and coded sexual scenes for 
variables related to consent. It was the most fun I ever had collecting data.  
Sasha and Kelley graduated and two new doctoral students, Tiffany and Malachi, joined 
the lab. They were from counseling psychology and clinical psychology programs respectively; 
with their background, came a hunger and competitiveness for publications and productivity. I 
felt inadequacy, anxiety, and had started viewing research more from the lens of how it could 
advance my career rather than a way to examine aspects of sexuality. I admit it was this 
competitiveness that pushed me as a researcher. I applied for and got several grants to fund an 
ambitious dissertation experiment, worked with others to publish papers, and presented annually 
at conferences. I liked the collaboration and creativity of research, giving feedback, and having 
critical conversations about gender, feminism, and societal programming. It was the pressure of 
producing for admiration, prominence, and rank that made me question what kind of 
environment in which I would excel. Specifically, I was unsure if I would thrive in a “publish or 




Searching for an academic position. Articulating these experiences, I realize now that I 
always wanted to be a teacher first. I solidified my identity in Arkansas. It was my charge to give 
young adults of the Midwest and South the comprehensive sex education most were deprived of 
as kids. I wanted them to question the anti-feminist messages that many may have been exposed 
to during their upbringing, to cultivate their confidence so they would take ownership of their 
sexuality and health. But I struggled coming to terms with that. I was influenced by the hierarchy 
of Research I universities and the prestige that comes with being a researcher first. I was worried 
I would lose the research skills I gained in the seven years I worked under Dr. J if I sought a 
teaching-heavy position. It was hard to figure out my next step when I was searching for a job 
and confidently market myself. This indecisiveness, in addition to the gendered nature of 
interviewing, made the search feel hopeless. As a woman raised in the Midwest, I was 
encouraged to be humble--not to brag.  
Everyone thinks a PhD will go according to plan. I thought, “others may take extra years 
and run into problems that extend their doctoral work, but that’s not me.” It was. Even if I had 
finished my dissertation “on time,” there was no job. I read articles about how competitive the 
tenure-track job market was. It was true. It did not help that I applied everywhere but had my 
heart set on being in the middle of the country--where I felt I was needed. 
In the end, I applied to 37 jobs in 14 months, had 13 phone/skype interviews, and went on 
6 on-site interviews. The first three on-sites were in my fourth doctoral year. Getting a job during 
that round would have put me on track for what I had planned in terms of my theoretical vision 
for my career. But, there were no good fits. I began to panic. “What will I do? Will I move back 
in with my parents?” I went through the stages of academia grief. “Do I really want to be part of 




who do not take college seriously. Am I helping the right people? Maybe I’ll just get a 9-5 job. 
I’ll work in a health department. Something stable.” I applied for a few jobs outside of academia.  
But, I talked with a friend, who came from a socially disadvantaged upbringing, and he 
changed my mind. He told me college opened doors for him that would never have been opened 
otherwise. He reminded me of why I wanted to be a college professor. I applied for a fifth year 
of doctoral funding and took a second crack at the academic job market. I went on another three 
on-site interviews and felt I hit my stride. I figured out how to talk about myself. And I found a 
school that was a good fit. I will be starting as a tenure-track Assistant Professor of Community 
Health Education at Western Washington University in the Fall of 2019.  
Accepting that job sparked another, slightly smaller, existential crisis. “I can’t go to 
Washington. It’s a blue state.” There was another grieving process—of my former identity: being 
a sexual health educator in a place where I felt I was needed. That is not to say that there is not 
work to be done in Washington. But my identity came from going to conferences, like the Forum 
on Family Planning, and seeing all of the sexuality research and abortion provision from people 
on the coasts. I took pride in knowing that I was doing the work in a place with one procedural 
abortion provider and no mandated sex education. I felt as though I would be abandoning my 
post. But it’s time for a change and I have to give myself permission to make a difference in a 
new area. 
My graduate work and academic career so far have taught me many things about how the 
world works. When at social events making small talk with new people, every day comes with a 
choice when asked “what do you study?” My interactions change depending on what I say. Do I 




kick myself because this statement brings to mind babies and menstruation and eating right for 
your figure--everything that Women’s Health magazine has made it to be. It’s safe. But yet it’s 
an act of self-preservation. If you come in hot with a “I study ABORTION” it can shut the 
conversation down pretty quickly. That’s not what I want. I never want to shut people down. I 
want to open them up and have meaningful conversations free of coercion, shame, and stigma.  
Studying sexuality and abortion has taught me about the power of language. Of pronouns. 
Of the constant recalibration of inclusive terms. It has taught me about reading the room. It has 
taught me about inclusivity--the problem with the phrase “women who seek abortions.” It has 
taught me about power and intersectionality. It has pushed me to be a better activist, academic, 
and person. It has taught me to be more empathetic. It has taught me to check my privilege in my 
life and in my career. It has taught me who I am and who I want to be. And that is something I 
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Appendix A: Video Script Content Tables 
Cognitive (Knowledge) Portion 
Wording of Video  Corresponding 
survey portion 





reasoning for shifting 
attitudes toward 
abortion with knowledge 
“News anchor” introduces 
self 
Hello, my name is Michelle. I 
am an educator at the 
University of Arkansas in the 
public policy program with a 
focus on reproductive health 
laws. Today I am going to talk 
about laws that restrict 
abortion in Arkansas. 
- - - Establishing credibility of 
the source influences an 
audience member’s 
digestion of the persuasive 
messages (Petty & 
Priester, 1994)  
Arkansas residents will be 
familiar with the 
University of Arkansas 
and specifying that she has 
training/education on RH 
laws makes her qualified 
to speak on this subject. 
Abortion, which is when a 
pregnancy is ended so that it 
does not result in the birth of a 
child, has been legal in all 50 
US states for over 40 years. 
Based on what you 
know or have heard, is 
it currently legal for a 
woman to get an 
abortion in all 50 
 (Roe v Wade, 
410 US 113, 
1973) 
Knowledge of abortion is 
low (Bessett et al., 2015; 
Kavanaugh, Bessett & 
Littman, 2013) which can 






states in the U.S./in 
Arkansas?  
the safety of abortion. 
White and colleagues 
(2016) noted the impact of 
misperceptions of safety of 
abortion on support for 
abortion legislation. That 
is, those who are 
misinformed are more 
likely to support abortion 
legislation under the 
pretense that it makes 
abortion safer for women. 
 
There are a few types of 
abortion- the most common 
two are Medication, which is 
a combination of pills that can 
only be taken up to 10 weeks 
of pregnancy and Aspiration, 
which involves a procedure 
using gentle suction, 92% of 
which take place before 13 
weeks of pregnancy. 
• There is more than 
one type of abortion. 
•Based on what you 
know or have heard, 
what is a 
medication/aspiration 
abortion? 
 (Jerman, Jones, 
& Onda, 2016; 




Even though abortion is legal 
in all 50 states, in recent years, 
states have passed many laws 
to restrict abortion. In the last 
7 years, states passed 338 new 
abortion restrictions. Arkansas 
is in top three states with the 
newest laws restricting 
abortion access. 
Based on what you 
know or have heard, is 
it easy for women to 





Nash et al., 2017) 
Audiences value 
information with 
geographic proximity over 
news in distant locations 
(Devereux, 2007; Golding 
& Elliott, 1979; Wahl-
Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 
2009) 
To get an abortion in 
Arkansas, there are several 
rules that patients and doctors 
must follow … 
 
Based on what you 
know or have heard, 
which of the following 
laws regarding 
abortion apply to 
Arkansas? 
- - Research indicates that 
knowledge of state-level 
legislation on abortion is 
low (Lara et al., 2015; 
White et al., 2016) and 
people have low awareness 






that laws make abortion 
safer (Weitz et al., 2008; 
White et al., 2016).  
Each statement includes 
what the law is and why its 
effect hinders the people 
who face them -- 
especially low- income 
individuals because they 
are the majority of 
abortion patients (75%; 
Jerman et al., 2016). These 
statements aim to 1) 
increase knowledge and 2) 
encourage audience 
members to start thinking 
about their effect on more 
vulnerable populations. 
However, they are not as 
pointed as the testimonial 
on empathy-induction. 
If you’re under 18, you have 
to get permission from a 
parent. Research shows it 
delays the procedure or teens 
may travel to states without 
these laws to get an abortion. 
•Minors must get their 
parents’ permission 








Potential effect on 
vulnerable populations: 
Barrier for minors (often 
who have limited 
resources or resources 






You have to go in for a 
required counseling session 
and then wait 48 hours 
before you can get an 
abortion, which means going 
into a clinic twice and 
increasing costs associated 
with travel and lodging. 
•A woman must wait 
48 hours after required 
counseling before the 








Potential effect on 
vulnerable populations: 
Increasing costs for travel 
and lodging (especially 
burdensome for low-
income individuals) 
Sometimes, doctors use 
telemedicine to provide care 
for people who live far away 
from a clinic. This is a way to 
meet with a doctor over video 
conference so you don’t have 
to travel to see the doctor in 
person. But in Arkansas, 
doctors aren’t allowed to use 
telemedicine to provide the 
abortion pill, which means 
they must meet the doctor in 
person and… 
During the counseling session, 
doctors are required to tell 
patients that it is possible for a 
medication abortion to be 
reversed after the first dose of 
pills, which is not backed up 
with medical evidence. 
•Doctors may not 
prescribe the abortion 
pill through 
“telemedicine” (e.g., 
online video session) 
Before an abortion, 
doctors must tell 
women that it is 
possible for the 





2017a; Jones & 
Kooistra, 2011) 
Potential effect on 
vulnerable populations: 
Increase travel and cost for 
people who live far from a 
clinic (especially low-
income individuals who 
live in rural areas) & 
misinformation to women 
from people they trust 
Almost half (46%) of over 
1000 voters across the 
country reported they did 
not think there was a law 
that would make doctors 








So in order to get an abortion, 
you must go to the facility at 
least twice and the abortion 
has to be performed by a 
licensed doctor, which means 
if you usually go to a health 
professional like a nurse 
practitioner, you have to go to 
a different place. 
•Abortions must be 
performed by a 





& Palazzo, 2003; 
Schacht, 2008; 
Taylor et al., 
2009; Weitz et 
al., 2013) 
Potential effect on 
vulnerable populations: 
Displace individuals who 
do not normally go to 
physicians (especially low-
income and women of 
color, as they are more 
likely to be cared for by 
NPs and PAs in public 
health departments or 
community health centers 
(Taylor et al., 2009; Weitz 
et al., 2013)) 
In Arkansas, if you are 20 
weeks pregnant or later, you 
cannot get an abortion unless 
your life is endangered or were 
a victim of rape or incest.  
•A woman cannot get 
an abortion after 20 
weeks of pregnancy 
unless her life or 




Potential effect on 
vulnerable populations: 
 “Nearly 99 percent of 
abortions occur before 21 
weeks, but when they are 
needed later in pregnancy, 
it’s often in very complex 
circumstances” (Planned 
Parenthood, 2018). 
Prohibition after 20 weeks 
ignores complex 
circumstances of those 






The safest and most common 
procedure for abortion after 
20 weeks, called dilation and 
extraction, is not allowed in 
Arkansas. You may have 
heard people call this a “partial 
birth” abortion but that is not a 
medical term or an actual 
procedure. 
•A woman cannot get 
a “Partial-birth” 
abortion 
•A woman cannot get 
a dilation and 
extraction abortion 
which is often 
performed after the 
20th week of 
pregnancy 





We differentiate between 
the two terms to see if 
support differs based on 
language. 
In large national polls, 60-
70% of the samples 
reported they thought 
“partial birth” abortions 
should be banned, but only 
45-50% reported support 
for “bans at 20 weeks” 
(Bowman & Sims, 2017) 
If you are approved to get an 
abortion after 20 weeks in 
Arkansas, doctors are 
required to give you 
information about pain the 
fetus might feel in a 
counseling session. Other 
states require doctors to talk 
about about the link between 
abortion and breast cancer or 
negative mental health 
outcomes. None of this 
information is evidenced by 
medical research. 
•Required counseling 
before the abortion 
must include 
information on alleged 
fetal pain (to women 






Potential effect on 
vulnerable populations: 
Misinformation to women 
from people they trust 
(physicians) 
Almost half (46%) of over 
1000 voters across the 
country reported they did 
not think there was a law 
that would make doctors 








Lastly, Medicaid (state 
insurance for low-income 
people) will not cover 
abortion in Arkansas unless 
your life is endangered or were 
a victim of rape or incest. This 
limits reproductive options for 
women who are poor. 
•Public funding such 
as Medicaid can only 
cover abortions in 
cases of the woman’s 
life is endangered, 






Nash et al., 2017; 
Roberts et al., 
2014) 




Because of these restrictions, 
many places that offered 
abortion services have closed. 
Now there are only 4 clinics in 
2 cities in the state that can 
offer abortion services to the 1 
million women that live in 
Arkansas. 
Based on what you 
know or have heard, is 
it easy for women to 








Ends on note of scarcity 









Affective (Testimonial) Portion 
Intro by 
news anchor 
States have passed these laws with the reasoning they are 
making it safer for women.  But these laws don’t actually 
improve safety, they only make it harder for women who 
seek an abortion to get one, which can delay getting care, and 
cost more time and money. 
The largest group of women who get abortions in the US are 
in their 20’s and low-income like Mia, who is here to tell us a 
personal story about her experience with these Arkansas 
laws. 
Weitz and colleagues (2008) comment that some people report 
being in favor of certain laws because they believe they benefit 
women’s health (e.g., lessens the harm of abortion on women’s 
mental health outcomes). This statement clarifies that there are 
outcomes that are not related to safety. 
Sharing stories and hearing others’ perspectives have been 
effective in creating empathy (LeBaron & Carstaphen, 1997) 
The testimonials actually specify common abortion patient 
demographics (Jerman et al., 2016) unlike the knowledge 
portion, which only implies who may be vulnerable populations. 
The story told by the testimonial woman reinforces what the 
audience is told about laws in Arkansas (e.g., they increase 
costs, make it more difficult- especially for vulnerable 
populations). 
The words of the testimonial are similar. The phrases that are the 
same are meant to build empathy for this individual, especially 
indicating that she is low-income. The phrases that are different 
(in bold) by pregnancy circumstance, are meant to build more 
empathy for the rape victim and use the consensual sex 
condition as a foil (contrasts with and emphasizes and enhances 
the qualities of another). 
 
Rape Consensual Evidence-based reasoning for building an empathetic 
character 
Last year, I was raped. I was 
coming out of work and someone 
attacked me the parking lot. I 
didn’t know the guy and I didn’t 
Last year, I became pregnant. I 
didn’t really know the guy and I 
The rape condition is more empathetic because it was a 
“stranger attack,” and implies she had a lack of control over the 






tell anyone about it for a long 
time. 
didn’t tell anyone about it for a 
long time. 
Majority of people support abortion in cases of rape 
(Mikoajczak & Bilewicz, 2015; Smith & Son, 2013). People 
have empathy for rape victims, especially if they know someone 
who has been raped (Wiener, Felman Wiener, & Grisso, 1989) 
We posit people will assume consensual sex was under the 
control and blame the woman for the pregnancy and have less 
empathy for her (Hans & Kimberly, 2014) 
Not knowing the guy prevents the audience from assuming it 
could be a partner or friend and not telling anyone implies she 
felt shame or embarrassment and did not feel positive about the 
pregnancy. 
By the time I found out I was 
pregnant, I was about 8 weeks 
along. You count from the first day 
of your last period so by the time 
you find out you’ve missed a 
period, you’re already 4-5 weeks 
pregnant. I rarely get my period on 
time so I didn’t even know I was 
pregnant until I took a test around 8 
weeks. 
By the time I found out I was 
pregnant, I was about 8 weeks along. 
You count from the first day of your 
last period so by the time you find out 
you’ve missed a period, you’re 
already 4-5 weeks pregnant. I rarely 
get my period on time so I didn’t even 
know I was pregnant until I took a 
test around 8 weeks. 
Meant to get the audience to realize that some people do not 
know they are pregnant right away and to target the 
misconception that women wait until the last minute to change 
their minds about the pregnancy. Increase empathy by implying 
this is something (gestation) that is happening to her without her 
knowledge. 
Also, to increase empathy for this woman, it implies she had an 
abortion earlier in the pregnancy and more people support an 
earlier abortion than a later abortion (Ludlow, 2008; Norris et 
al., 2011) 
I live paycheck to paycheck. I can 
barely make rent and groceries. I 
knew I didn’t have the money to 
support a baby as well. 
I live paycheck to paycheck. I can 
barely make rent and groceries. I 
knew I didn’t have the money to 
support a baby as well. 
Increase empathy by indicating she is low-income and 







I also knew I definitely did not 
want to have the baby of the 
person who raped me. 
 Increase empathy for rape victim 
My insurance wouldn’t cover me 
because I didn’t report the rape. I 
didn’t want people to know. 
My insurance wouldn’t cover it. Increase empathy for low-income individuals because Medicaid 
will not cover abortion but further empathy for rape victim 
because even though there is an exception for rape, she does not 
want to tell anyone. 
It was about $500. I had to use all 
the money in my bank account. By 
the time I got the money together 
and asked about an appointment, I 
was almost 9 weeks pregnant. I live 
in the middle of nowhere so the 
closest clinic is 3 hours away. I had 
to take off work, and ask a friend 
for money for the bus ride to the 
doctor. 
It was about $500. I had to use all the 
money in my bank account. By the 
time I got the money together and 
asked about an appointment, I was 
almost 9 weeks pregnant. I live in the 
middle of nowhere so the closest 
clinic is 3 hours away. I had to take 
off work, and ask a friend for money 
for the bus ride to the doctor. 
Increase empathy for low-income women by informing audience 
about actual cost of procedure (Roberts et al., 2014) and 
detailing steps taken in order to make this experience feasible. 
 
But then they make you wait 48 
hours to get it done which means I 
had to take two more days off work. 
I had nothing left to even get a hotel 
so I slept in the bus station. 
But then they make you wait 48 hours 
to get it done which means I had to 
take two more days off work. I had 
nothing left to even get a hotel so I 
slept in the bus station. 
Increase empathy for low-income women by reiterating cost and 
effect of 48 waiting period 
With increased knowledge, one can better take a person’s 
perspective and even change attitudes (Currier & Carlson, 
2009). Plumm and Terrance (2008) state that in order to take 
another person’s perspective, one must also learn about the 
“contextual and structural constraints” that contribute to that 
person’s perspective (p. 189). 
I was sure of my decision and just 
wanted to get this taken care of as 
soon as possible, in the safest way 
I was sure of my decision and just 
wanted to get this taken care of as 
soon as possible, in the safest way 
Increase empathy for low-income women who have to follow 






possible. But these laws made 
everything go so much slower and 
so much more expensive because I 
had to take time from work and stay 
extra days. 
possible. But these laws made 
everything go so much slower and so 
much more expensive because I had 
to take time from work and stay extra 
days. 
I don’t regret the abortion. I felt 
relieved. I just wanted to put the 
rape behind me. 
I don’t regret the abortion. I felt 
relieved. It wasn’t the right time. 
Most common psychological outcome is relief (Bradshaw & 
Slade, 2003) 
Increase empathy for rape victim by reiterating that the 












Appendix C: Online Survey Materials 
PART A: Survey Introductory Page 
Welcome to the Study! 
Thank you for clicking through to our survey!    
Before deciding whether or not to participate, please read more about the nature of this study.  
If I Decide to Participate, What Will be Expected of Me?       
This study is open to anyone who is over the age of 18 and lives in Arkansas. Those who decide 
to participate in this study will be asked to complete an online survey about attitudes toward 
abortion. 
In just a moment, we will ask you to read the study consent form. If after reading this consent 
form you agree to participate in the study, you will be asked to click through to the survey. This 
survey should take 30 minutes to complete. All information collected will be kept confidential to 





PART B: Informed Consent Page 
INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
Mary E. Hunt MS & Kristen N. Jozkowski PhD 
University of Arkansas 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE: 
You are invited to participate in a research study about your attitudes toward abortion. 
You are being asked to participate because you are aged 18 or older and live in Arkansas. 
 
Who are the researchers? 
Mary E. Hunt, MS 
Department of Health, Human Performance, and Recreation 
University of Arkansas 
Email: sexstudy@uark.edu 
 
Kristen N. Jozkowski, PhD 
Department of Health, Human Performance, and Recreation 
University of Arkansas 
Email: sexstudy@uark.edu 
 
Who will participate in this study? 
If you participate in this study, you will be one of approximately 450 individuals 
participating in the study. You must be at least 18 years old to participate and currently 
live in Arkansas. 
 
What am I being asked to do? 
Your participation will require the following: provide thoughtful answers to an online 
survey and watch a short video clip.  
 
What are the possible risks or discomforts? 
There are no anticipated risks for participating in this study. If you feel uncomfortable at any 
time while completing the survey, you can leave a question unanswered or can end your 
involvement in the study.  
 
What are the possible benefits of the study? 
You may benefit from self-awareness from your responses and you will be contributing to 
increasing the body of knowledge about attitudes toward abortion. Additionally, you may enter 
your email address to receive a gift card. 
 
How long will the study last? 
This survey should take about 30 minutes to complete (a 15-20 minute pre-test, a short video 





Will I have to pay for anything? 
No, there will be no cost associated with your participation. 
 
What are the options if I do not want to be in the study? 
Participation is completely voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you may refuse to 
participate; you can stop the survey at any time if you do not wish to participate. 
 
How will my confidentiality be protected? 
All information will be kept confidential to the extent allowed by applicable State and Federal 
law. Your responses will be anonymous. 
 
Will I know the results of the study? 
At the conclusion of the study, you will have the right to request feedback about the results. You 
may contact the principle researcher, Mary Hunt at sexstudy@uark.edu. 
 
You may also contact the University of Arkansas Research Compliance office listed below if you 
have questions about your rights as a participant, or to discuss any concerns about, or problems 
with the research. 
 
The University of Arkansas Research Compliance: 
 
Ro Windwalker, CIP 
Institutional Review Board Coordinator 
Research Compliance 
University of Arkansas 
109 MLKG Building 




I have read the above statement and I understand the purpose of the study as well as the potential 
benefits and risks that are involved. I understand that participation is voluntary. I understand that 
significant new findings developed during this research can be shared with the participant. I 
understand that no rights have been waived by consenting to participate in this study. By clicking 






Appendix D: Survey Instrument 
PRE-TEST 
Directions: Please select the response choice that most accurately describes you. Please 
answer honestly and completely. 
• What is your age in years (e.g., 25)? 
 
• Are you a current resident of Arkansas? 
o Yes 
o No 
• Is English your native language? 
o Yes  
o No 
 





*If below 18, not a current Arkansas resident, or English is not primary language in formative 
years, participant will be thanked for their interest and directed to the end of the survey because 
of eligibility requirements. 
Directions:  Please answer the fill in the blank questions below. 
Please use the directions below to make an unidentifiable code. This code is purely to help track 
your data over the entire survey.  
The code entails: 
1. The first 4 digits of your phone number 
2. The first 2 letters of your name 
3. The 2 digits of your birth month 
 For example, if your phone number is 776-5577, your name is Carl, and your birth month is 
June (06), then your code would be: “5577Ca06”. 
• What is your current zip code (e.g., 72701)? 
• What is the zip code of the area where you grew up (i.e., your “hometown”)? 
 
• How long have you lived in Arkansas in years rounded to the nearest year (e.g., 1 year, 6 





Directions: Please select the response choice that most accurate describes you. 
• Are you: 
o Male 
o Female 
o Other: please specify 
 
• How would you describe your race/ethnicity?  
o Asian or Asian American 
o Black or African American 
o Latino/a 
o Middle Eastern or Middle Eastern American  
o Native American or American Indian 
o Pacific Islander or Alaskan Native 
o Bi- or Multi- racial 
o White or Caucasian 
o Other: Please specify 
 
• What is your household income before taxes? 




o More than $94,000  
 
• How would you describe your current relationship status? 
o Single and not dating 
o Single, but casually seeing someone/hanging out with someone 




o Other: please specify 
 
• What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
o Less than high school 
o High school graduate/GED 
o Some college/associate degree 
o College graduate 
o Graduate degree 
 
• Are you currently employed at a paid job? 
o Yes, full time. What is your job? 
o Yes, part time. What is/are your job(s)? 
o No, full time student 




o No, retired 
o No, currently unemployed 
 






o Another orientation. Please specify 
 
• How often do you attend religious services? 
o Once a week or more 
o 2-3 times per month 
o Once a month 
o A few times per year 
o Never 
 
• How important is religion to you personally? 
o Very important 
o Somewhat important 
o Neither important nor unimportant 
o Not really important 
o Not at all important 
 
• How would you describe your religious denomination (e.g., Christian-Catholicism, 
Christian-Protestantism, Islam, Judaism)? 
 
• Have you or anyone you know experienced sexual assault? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I’m not sure 
 
The next questions will ask about your political viewpoints: 
• Generally, how would you describe your views on most social political issues (e.g., 
education, religious freedom, death penalty, gender issues, etc.)? 




o Strongly Conservative 
o These issues don’t matter to me 
 
• Generally, how would you describe your views on most economic political issues (e.g., 








o Strongly Conservative 
o These issues don’t matter to me 
 
• What political party to you most identify with? 
o Republican party 
o Democratic party 
o Libertarian party 
o Green party or Independent 
o Other. Please describe 
o I do not identify with a political party 
 
The next few questions will ask about your feelings about abortion: 
• In general, regarding abortion, which of the following do you most identify with? 
o Pro-Life 
o Pro-Choice 
o I do not identify with either  
o I identify with both 
o I don’t know 
 
• To what extent do you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal 
abortion?  
1- It should definitely not be possible 
2-   
3-   
4-   
5-   
6- It should definitely be possible 
 
Previous abortion experience 
• Have you or anyone you know had an abortion? 
o Yes 
o No 
o I’m not sure 
*Skip logic, if they answer “yes” or “I’m not sure,” they will be directed to the following 
questions. If they answer “no,” they will be directed to the next section 
• Who do you know that has had an abortion? Check all that apply. 
o Myself 
o My current partner 
o A previous partner 




o An acquaintance 
 
• Where did the abortion take place? Check all that apply. 
o A health care facility or clinic 
o At home (after an abortion pill had been prescribed by a health care professional) 
o At home (by doing something without speaking to a health care professional) 
o I don’t know 
o Other. Please specify 
 
• In regard to the abortion(s) from the previous questions, how do you know about it/them? 
Check all that apply. 
o I was there (I was the one getting an abortion) 
o I was there (I went with the person) 
o They told me 
o I suspect they have but they never told me 
o Other. Please specify 
 
Voting behaviors 
• Are you registered to vote?  
o Yes 
o No 
o I cannot vote in America 
 
• Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs? 
o Most of the time 
o Some of the time 
o Only now and then 
o Hardly at all 
 
• Where do you get your information on current events from? 
o Television: please specify programs 
o Online: please specify websites 
o Print media: please specify 
o Radio or podcasts: please specify 
o Other: please specify 
 
• How would you describe the media sources you listed in the previous question? 




o Strongly Conservative 
 





o Nearly always 




• How likely are you to vote in the next Arkansas state elections (e.g., state representatives, 
governor)?  
o Definitely will vote 
o Probably will vote 
o Probably will not vote 
o Definitely will not vote 
 
• In making your decision about who to vote for in the next election, will the issue of 
abortion be… 
o Very important 
o Somewhat important 
o Not too important 
o Not at all important 
 
• Thinking about how certain issues might affect your vote for Arkansas state positions 
such as representatives or governor, would you say a candidate’s position on abortion 
would be…  
o The single most important factor in your vote 
o Very important but not the most important factor 
o One of many factors you’ll consider 
o Not an important factor in your vote 
 
• If you agreed with an Arkansas state representative or governor on other issues, but not 




• Do you think abortion is… 
o A critical issue facing the country 
o One among many important issues 




(SDO7 Scale: Personal beliefs about status/power (Ho et al., 2015)) 
Show how much you favor or oppose each idea below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the 
scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is generally best. 
1: Strongly Oppose 




3: Slightly Oppose 
4: Neutral  
5: Slightly Favor 
6: Somewhat Favor 
7: Strongly Favor 
 
1. Some groups of people must be kept in their place. 
2. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. 
3. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
4. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. 
5. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top. 
6. No one group should dominate in society. 
7. Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place. 
8. Group dominance is a poor principle. 
9. We should not push for group equality. 
10. We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life. 
11. It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
12. Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
13. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. 
14. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
15. No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the 
same chance in life. 
16. Group equality should be our ideal. 
(INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX (Davis, 1980)) 
The following statements ask about your thoughts and feelings in a variety of situations. For each 
item, indicate how well it describes you by choosing the appropriate number 1-5.. READ EACH 
ITEM CAREFULLY BEFORE RESPONDING. Answer as honestly as you can.  
ANSWER SCALE: 1 (Does not describe me well)        2       3        4       5 (describes me very 
well) 
1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
2. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view.  
3. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.  
4. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
5. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
6. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective.  
7. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.  
8. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
arguments.  
9. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them.  




10. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen.  
11. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both.  
12. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.  
13. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while.  
14. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
 
(Attitudes and knowledge about Arkansas abortion restrictions) 
• Based on what you know or have heard, is it currently legal for a woman to get an 
abortion in all 50 states in the U.S.?  
o Yes, abortion is legal in all 50 states 
o No, abortion is not legal in all 50 states (legal in some but not others) 
o No, abortion is not legal in any of the 50 states 
o I’m not sure 
 
• Based on what you know or have heard, is it currently legal for a woman to get an 
abortion in Arkansas?  
o Yes, abortion is legal 
o No, abortion is not legal 
o I’m not sure 
 
• Based on what you know or have heard, is it easy for women to obtain an abortion in 
Arkansas?  
o Yes, it is easy for a woman to get an abortion 
o No, it is not easy for a woman to get an abortion 
o I’m not sure 
 
• Would you like to see abortion laws in this country… 
o Made more strict (would make abortion more difficult to obtain) 
o Made less strict (would make abortion less difficult to obtain) 
o Remain as they are 
 
• Would you like to see abortion laws in Arkansas… 
o Made more strict (would make abortion more difficult to obtain) 
o Made less strict (would make abortion less difficult to obtain) 
o Remain as they are 
 
Based on what you know or have heard, which of the following are current laws in 
Arkansas? (yes, current law in Arkansas/no, not a current law in Arkansas) 
• Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion* 
• Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t need permission. 
• Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link between breast 
cancer and abortion 
• For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel 




• Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative 
psychological effects  
• A woman must wait a period of time after required counseling before the abortion can be 
performed: 
o 24 hours 
o 48 hours* 
o 72 hours 
• A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the pregnancy) before an 
abortion  
• Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of 
the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger* 
• Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can 
require people to pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion 
• Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare 
provider)* 
• Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., online video 
session) for people who live far away* 
• Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the abortion pill to be 
reversed* 
• Please select “No, not a current law in Arkansas” 
• Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g., 
hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to be within a certain 
distance to a hospital) 
• A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or health is 
in danger* 
• A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion* 
• A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often performed after the 
20th week of pregnancy* 
 
To what extent do you agree or disagree that this should be a law in Arkansas (1: strongly 
disagree to 5: strongly agree)?  
“It should be a law in Arkansas that…” 
• Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion* 
• Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t need permission. 
• Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link between breast 
cancer and abortion 
• For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel 
that that a fetus can feel pain * 
• Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative 
psychological effects  
• A woman must wait a period of time after required counseling before the abortion can be 
performed: 
o 24 hours 




o 72 hours 
• A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the pregnancy) before an 
abortion  
• Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of 
the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger* 
• Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can 
require people to pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion 
• Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare 
provider)* 
• Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., online video 
session) for people who live far away* 
• Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the abortion pill to be 
reversed* 
• Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g., 
hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to be within a certain 
distance to a hospital) 
• A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or health is 
in danger* 
• A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion* 
• A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often performed after the 
20th week of pregnancy* 
 
(Attitudes toward stigmatized populations (based on Batson et al., 1997)) 
• For most women who seek abortions, it is their own fault that they got pregnant. (1 = 
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• Most women who seek abortions could have avoided getting pregnant. (1 = strongly 
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• Our society does not do enough to help women who seek abortions (1 = strongly 
disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
• Women who seek abortions have no one to blame but themselves for getting pregnant. (1 
= strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• Our society should do more to protect the welfare of women who seek abortions. (1 = 
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
• Anyone who seeks an abortion must be inhuman. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly 
agree)  
• Anyone who seeks an abortion should be punished. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly 
agree)  
• No one would seek an abortion unless she had a moral or mental deficiency. (1 = strongly 
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• Our society should do more to prevent women from getting pregnant when they do not 
want to get pregnant. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• How much do you personally care about the well-being of women who seek abortions? (1 




• Compared with other health issues we face today, how would you rate the importance of 
helping women who seek abortions? (1 = not at all important, 9 = extremely important)  
• In general, what are your feelings toward women who seek abortions? (1 = extremely 
negative, 9 = extremely positive)  
 
(General Knowledge of abortion) 
The following questions will ask about your general knowledge of abortion. If you do not know 
the answer, provide your best guess. 
• Which has a greater health risk for a woman? 
o Having an abortion  
o Giving birth to a baby* 
o Both have the same risk 
• What percentage of women in the United States will have had an abortion by the age 
of 45? 
o 48% of women 
o 24% of women* 
o 12% of women 
o 2% of women 
• A woman who has an abortion is more likely to have breast cancer than if she were 
to continue the pregnancy. 
o True 
o False* 
• A woman who has an abortion is more at risk of a serious mental health problem 
than if she were to continue the pregnancy. 
o True 
o False* 




• There is more than one type of abortion. 
o True* 
o False 
• How confident are you in your answers to the previous questions about general 
knowledge of abortion? 




o 5: Not at all confident 
 
BLOCK BREAK 




• Based on what you know or have heard, what is an aspiration abortion? 
 
The next few questions will ask about personal characteristics of women who most commonly 
obtain abortions: 
• Women who most commonly obtain abortions are in what age group? 
o Younger than 20 
o 20-29* 
o 30-39 
o 40 or older 




o Asian/Pacific Islander 
o Other 
• Women who most commonly obtain abortions have completed how much education? 
o Less than high school 
o High school graduate/GED 
o Some college/associate degree* 
o College graduate 
o Graduate degree 




• Women who most commonly obtain abortions are religiously affiliated. 
o True* 
o False 
• Women who most commonly obtain abortions are of what relationship status? 
o Married 
o Cohabiting, not married 
o Never-married, not cohabiting* 
o Previously married, not cohabiting 
• Women who most commonly obtain abortions were using a contraceptive method when 
they became pregnant. 
o True* 
o False 




(Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale-Short Form (Ballard, 1992; Reynolds, 1982))  




Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to you. (Answer 
T/F) 
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged 
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way 
3. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener 
4. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone 
5. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake 
6. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget 
7. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable 
8. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own 
9. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others 
10. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me 
11. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings 
 
(Video Administration) 
You will now watch a short news story about abortion laws in Arkansas (~3-5 minutes). If you 
want to put on headphones so as not to disrupt others, please do so at this time. There will be NO 









UNIQUE IDENTIFIER (only Follow-up Post test 2) 
Please use the directions below to make an unidentifiable code. This code is purely to help 
track your data over the entire survey.  
The code entails: 
1. The first 4 digits of your phone number 
2. The first 2 letters of your name 
3. The 2 digits of your birth month 
 For example, if your phone number is 776-5577, your name is Carl, and your birth month is 
June (06), then your code would be: “5577Ca06”. 
After hearing the news story, to what extent did you experience feeling: (POST TEST 1) 
A few weeks ago, you watched a news story about abortion laws in Arkansas. When thinking 
about this video clip, what are your current feelings? (POST TEST 2) 
 
• Sympathetic (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Moved (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Compassionate (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Tender (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Warm (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Soft-hearted (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
What aspect of the video caused you to feel the way you did while watching it? 
 
Which picture best describes how you feel about yourself (self) in relation to a woman who has 


















POST-TEST (Intervention only) 
UNIQUE IDENTIFIER (only Follow-up Post test 2) 
Please use the directions below to make an unidentifiable code. This code is purely to help track 
your data over the entire survey.  
The code entails: 
1. The first 4 digits of your phone number 
2. The first 2 letters of your name 
3. The 2 digits of your birth month 
 For example, if your phone number is 776-5577, your name is Carl, and your birth month is 
June (06), then your code would be: “5577Ca06”. 
A few weeks ago, you watched a news story about abortion laws in Arkansas. When thinking 
about this video clip, what are your current feelings? (POST TEST 2) 
 
• Sympathetic (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Moved (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Compassionate (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Tender (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Warm (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
• Soft-hearted (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 
What aspect of the video caused you to feel the way you did while watching it? 
 









Why do you feel that way about a woman who has had an abortion? 
 
Which picture best describes how you feel about yourself in relation to the woman you watched 











POST-TEST CONTINUED (Control and Intervention) 
Abortion Knowledge 
• Based on what you heard in the video you watched, is it currently legal for a woman to 
get an abortion in all 50 states in the U.S.?  
o Yes, abortion is legal in all 50 states 
o No, abortion is not legal in all 50 states (legal in some but not others) 
o No, abortion is not legal in any of the 50 states 
o I’m not sure 
 
• Based on what you heard in the video you watched, is it currently legal for a woman to 
get an abortion in Arkansas?  
o Yes, abortion is legal 
o No, abortion is not legal 
o I’m not sure 
 
• Based on what you heard in the video you watched, is it easy for women to obtain an 
abortion in Arkansas?  
o Yes, it is easy for a woman to get an abortion 
o No, it is not easy for a woman to get an abortion 
o I’m not sure 
 
• After watching the video, would you like to see abortion laws in this country… 
o Made more strict (would make abortion more difficult to obtain) 
o Made less strict (would make abortion less difficult to obtain) 
o Remain as they are 
 
• After watching the video, would you like to see abortion laws in Arkansas… 
o Made more strict (would make abortion more difficult to obtain) 
o Made less strict (would make abortion less difficult to obtain) 
o Remain as they are 
 
Based on what you heard in the video you watched, which of the following is a current law 
in Arkansas? (yes, current law in Arkansas/no, not a current law in Arkansas) 
• Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion* 
• Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t need permission. 
• Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link between breast 
cancer and abortion 
• For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel 
that that a fetus can feel pain * 
• Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative 
psychological effects  
• A woman must wait a period of time after required counseling before the abortion can be 
performed: 




o 48 hours* 
o 72 hours 
• A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the pregnancy) before an 
abortion  
• Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of 
the rape and incest or if the woman’s life is in danger* 
• Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can 
require people to pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion 
• Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare 
provider)* 
• Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., online video 
session) for people who live far away* 
• Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the abortion pill to be 
reversed* 
• Please select “No, not a current law in Arkansas” 
• Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g., 
hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to be within a certain 
distance to a hospital) 
• A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or health is 
in danger* 
• A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion* 
• A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often performed after the 
20th week of pregnancy* 
 
After watching the video, to what extent do you agree or disagree that this should be a law 
in Arkansas (1: strongly disagree to 5: strongly agree)?  
“It should be a law that…” 
• Minors must get a parent’s permission before they can get an abortion* 
• Minors must tell a parent before they can get an abortion but they don’t need permission. 
• Before an abortion, doctors have to counsel that there may be a link between breast 
cancer and abortion 
• For women having an abortion at 20 weeks of pregnancy or later, doctors have to counsel 
that that a fetus can feel pain * 
• Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that the abortion can cause negative 
psychological effects  
• A woman must wait a period of time after required counseling before the abortion can be 
performed: 
o 24 hours 
o 48 hours* 
o 72 hours 
• A woman must get an ultrasound (a scan to produce a picture of the pregnancy) before an 
abortion  
• Medicaid (insurance for people who are low-income) can only cover abortions in cases of 




• Private health insurance companies (e.g., Blue Cross Blue Shield, United Healthcare) can 
require people to pay more or buy special insurance to cover abortion 
• Abortions have to be administered by a licensed doctor (not a nurse or other healthcare 
provider)* 
• Doctors may not prescribe the abortion pill through telemedicine (e.g., online video 
session) for people who live far away* 
• Before an abortion, doctors must tell women that it is possible for the abortion pill to be 
reversed* 
• Facilities that provide abortions have to adhere to ambulatory surgical standards (e.g., 
hallways have to be a certain width, requires extra nursing staff, has to be within a certain 
distance to a hospital) 
• A woman cannot get an abortion after 20 weeks of pregnancy unless her life or health is 
in danger* 
• A woman cannot get a “Partial-birth” abortion* 
• A woman cannot get a dilation and extraction abortion which is often performed after the 
20th week of pregnancy* 
 
(Attitudes toward stigmatized populations (based on Batson et al., 1997)) 
• For most women who seek abortions, it is their own fault that they got pregnant. (1 = 
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• Most women who seek abortions could have avoided getting pregnant. (1 = strongly 
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• Our society does not do enough to help women who seek abortions (1 = strongly 
disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
• Women who seek abortions have no one to blame but themselves for getting pregnant. (1 
= strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• Our society should do more to protect the welfare of women who seek abortions. (1 = 
strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree) 
• Anyone who seeks an abortion must be inhuman. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly 
agree)  
• Anyone who seeks an abortion should be punished. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly 
agree)  
• No one would seek an abortion unless she had a moral or mental deficiency. (1 = strongly 
disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• Our society should do more to prevent women from getting pregnant when they do not 
want to get pregnant. (1 = strongly disagree, 9 = strongly agree)  
• How much do you personally care about the well-being of women who seek abortions? (1 
= not at all, 9 = very much)  
• Compared with other health issues we face today, how would you rate the importance of 
helping women who seek abortions? (1 = not at all important, 9 = extremely important)  
• In general, what are your feelings toward women who seek abortions? (1 = extremely 







• After watching the video, how likely are you to vote in the next Arkansas state elections 
(e.g., state representatives, governor)?  
o Definitely will vote 
o Probably will vote 
o Probably will not vote 
o Definitely will not vote 
 
• After watching the video, in making your decision about who to vote for in the next 
election, will the issue of abortion be… 
o Very important 
o Somewhat important 
o Not too important 
o Not at all important 
 
• After watching the video, thinking about how certain issues might affect your vote for 
Arkansas state positions such as representatives or governor, would you say a candidate’s 
position on abortion would be…  
o The single most important factor in your vote 
o Very important but not the most important factor 
o One of many factors you’ll consider 
o Not an important factor in your vote 
 
• After watching the video, if you agreed with an Arkansas state representative or governor 





• After watching the video, do you think abortion is… 
o A critical issue facing the country 
o One among many important issues 
o Not that important compared to other issues 
 
Why? (open-ended) 




Finally, the next few questions will ask about your feelings about abortion: 
• In general, regarding abortion, which of the following do you most identify with?? 
o Pro-Life 
o Pro-Choice 




o I identify with both 
o I don’t know 
 
• To what extent do you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal 
abortion?  





6- It should definitely be possible 
 
• Based on what you know or have heard in the video you watched, what is a 
medication abortion? 
• Based on what you know or have heard in the video you watched, what is a surgical 
abortion? 
• How would you describe the news video you watched? 




o Strongly Conservative 
 
Think back to the video you watched and evaluate what you thought of the person who gave the 
news story, Michelle.  
 
In your opinion, was she: 
(Source Credibility Scale (Ohanian, 1990) (9 point scales)) 
Attractiveness 
Attractive – Unattractive 
Classy – Not classy 
Beautiful – Ugly 
Elegant – Plain 





Dependable – Undependable 
Honest – Dishonest 
Reliable – Unreliable 
Sincere – Insincere 
Trustworthy- Untrustworthy 
Expertise 
Expert – Not an Expert 
Experienced – Inexperienced 
Knowledgeable – Unknowledgeable 
Qualified – Unqualified 
Skilled – Unskilled 
 
Evaluate what you thought of the woman who told her story about seeking an abortion, Mia.  
(Intervention 1 & 2) 
 
 
(Intervention 3 & 4) 
 
In your opinion, was she:  
Attractiveness 




Classy – Not classy 
Beautiful – Ugly 
Elegant – Plain 
Sexy – Not sexy 
Trustworthiness 
Dependable – Undependable 
Honest – Dishonest 
Reliable – Unreliable 
Sincere – Insincere 
Trustworthy- Untrustworthy 
Expertise 
Expert – Not an Expert 
Experienced – Inexperienced 
Knowledgeable – Unknowledgeable 
Qualified – Unqualified 
Skilled – Unskilled 
 
Did you personally know any of the women in the video? 
a. No 
b. Yes, please describe 
 
In the 2 weeks between watching the video and now, did you seek any media or resources that 
provided you with additional information on abortion, abortion laws, or related topics?  
a. No 
b. Yes-- please describe 
c. I’m not sure 
 




f. I’m not sure 
 




Please enter the email where you wish to receive an Amazon e-gift card. The first 450 people 
who completed the survey will receive a $10 gift card.  
In 2 weeks, you will be sent a follow-up survey for an additional $10 Amazon e-gift card. 
 
Reminder: Your email address will be used so that we can send you the gift card and to contract 
you for one follow-up survey in 2 weeks. After that time, you will get a second gift card for 
participation in the follow-up survey. After that, your email will be deleted permanently.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
